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vScience and Technology is evident in every aspect of modern life for most 
humans. We can hardly work, communicate, travel or even eat without the crucial 
support of some modern technological development. This is true whether we live 
in the developed or the developing world. The overall dependence we have devel-
oped on modern science and technology is both significant and terrifying, as it has 
reached high levels of intimacy in our lives. The terrifying part of this intimacy 
derives from our inability to either understand or control it, and the difficulty we 
are having in setting common rules of engagement. But such “rules of engage-
ment” are the cornerstone of our relationship with modern science and technology 
that come under the term of “ethics” and this is exactly the theme of this book.
Europe has taken great leaps towards common research policies in the last 
30 years. I was fortunate to have been involved in developing the European 
Union’s science and technology strategy in the last decades and the creation of 
the European Research Area. The European Research Area was successful in 
boosting the EU’s (and beyond) science and technology output but also signifi-
cantly, it opened the door to global collaborations. The tremendous opportunities 
that global partnerships bring are not without problems though. Hard as it is to 
develop common ethical rules within the close-knit European societies, our new 
global partners have brought in new approaches, new perspectives and new values 
to our debates. It is clear that, if we are to have meaningful collaborations with our 
global partners, we need to promote common debates on the ethics of science and 
technology.
This book represents one of the first efforts to undertake a global debate in 
an analytic and multidisciplinary manner. It discusses ethics from a comparative 
perspective and focuses on the relevant debates in Europe, China and India; these 
are the two principal partners for Europe at present and doubtless more so in the 
future. Discussing the ethics of science and technology amongst these three key 
global players is proper and significant.
I applaud this effort and I am looking forward to seeing more of such endeav-
ours in the future. We recently had a workshop at the European Parliament 
where we had the chance to discuss some of the results presented in this book. 
Foreword
Forewordvi
The discussion was lively and informative and we all agreed in the end that 
if there is a single message to take home it is this: We all face similar issues, 
challenges and debates; there is a way to find common resolutions and create 
 meaningful and responsible global approaches to science and technology; this 
can only happen if we continue the effort and stick together. So, let’s stick 
together!
Philippe Busquin
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1Chapter 1
Introduction: Embedding Ethics in Science 
and Technology Policy—A Global Perspective
Miltos Ladikas, Sachin Chaturvedi, Yandong Zhao and Dirk Stemerding
© The Author(s) 2015 
M. Ladikas et al. (eds.), Science and Technology Governance and Ethics,  
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1.1  Introduction
Ethics is important. No one doubts this. Yet no one knows with certainty what 
ethics is. Since historical records began, the question of what ethics is or what it 
means to live ‘ethically’ has been akin to the well-known eternal riddles about the 
origins of humanity and the will of God (or the gods) for humankind. From the 
Vedic scriptures to the teachings of Confucius and the philosophical debates of 
ancient Greece and Rome, questions on ethics have been asked and answers have 
been given in different forms and shapes, some evidently in direct contradiction. 
And the debates are continuing with the same intensity and urgency as ever.
This book is about ethics, but it does not try to answer any of the basic ques-
tions that have tormented humanity for the past 3,000 or 4,000 years. It has a 
much more modest aim that is also quite important in its own area, as it focuses 
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on a unique feature of modern societies: technological developments. Never before 
have technologies reached such a level of penetration in people’s everyday lives or 
been used so widely by citizens from every walk of life. Rich and poor, young and 
old, educated and unschooled, male and female—everyone uses modern technolo-
gies and everyone is deeply influenced by them. The effect that technologies have 
on our psychological and physical functioning is unprecedented and has reached 
high levels of intimacy (van Est 2014). Therefore questions on ethics in science 
and technology developments are crucial and urgent: How ought we to view new 
technologies? How are we to control their effects? On what should we base our 
thinking and decisions on technological developments? Whom should we rely on 
to advise us?
These are some of the questions that became the focus of analysis for the 
European Commission-funded project Global Ethics in Science and Technology 
policy (GEST), which ran from 2011 to 2014.1 The main aim of GEST was to ana-
lyse the concepts and issues surrounding ethics in science and technology in 
Europe and the two main technology-intensive emerging economies of China and 
India, in order to create a robust global debate that directly informs science policy.
China and India are strong contenders in the production of science and technol-
ogy, new ideas and knowledge. They make up roughly half the world’s population 
and one fourth of its economic output, and there is little doubt that both contribu-
tions will increase significantly. Europe, India and China are at different stages of 
economic and social development, but all face similar challenges with regard to 
ethics issues in science and technology.
In Europe, and in the West in general, scandals associated with scientific 
misconduct and food technologies have been publicized and debated in recent 
decades, resulting in a series of policy initiatives, and similar debates have 
taken place in China and India. In China, for instance, recent public controver-
sies in areas such as scientific misconduct, food safety and public health have 
proven to be a catalyst for science and technology debates (Xie 2013). These 
controversies have raised a host of ethics issues, highlighted limitations in sci-
ence and technology governance and also eroded public trust in science (Zhao 
and Ma 2009). This has increased calls for debates on policy-making processes 
that incorporate socioethical considerations alongside economic ones. Similarly, 
India is seeing debates on new technological developments, with contribu-
tions from lay people and stakeholders alike, triggered by scandals in clinical 
trials and the introduction of genetically modified crops. Views on the ethical 
and social implications of science and technology are increasingly being dis-
cussed as part of the standard approach to assessing the implications of new 
technologies, and processes of wider consultation are gaining policy acceptance 
(Chaturvedi 2013; Mashelkar 2008).
1 The project was funded by the European Commission’s Seventh Framework Programme under 
grant agreement 266592 (see http://www.uclan.ac.uk/research/environment/projects/global_ethics_ 
science_technology.php).
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1.2  The Project’s View of Ethics
During the past two decades, with debates on ethics in science and technology 
developments reaching a level of public significance, it has become clear that the 
meaning of the term ‘ethics’ is at best debatable. What is an ethical consideration 
for some people might be considered an economic matter by others, and when it 
comes to deeply held values on life, in many instances it is even more difficult to 
separate opinion from dogma, or belief from religious prescription.
The chorus (some might call it a cacophony) of voices in ethical debates has 
abated somewhat in recent years, as more and more lay people have found a com-
mon voice to express opinions that cannot easily be accommodated within standard 
belief systems, whether ideological or religious. Debates have become less ‘expert’ 
and more ‘open’ to participation by groups or individuals that do not necessarily 
claim any particular expertise in the scientific subjects under discussion, but are nev-
ertheless persuaded that their voice is as valid as those of the experts. Whether this 
constitutes a revolutionary step in science and technology debates is the business 
of future historical analysis. At present, while some argue that ethical debates have 
crystallized in a form that allows unconditional input from experts and lay people 
alike through means that range from typical opinion surveys to atypical participatory 
policy discussions, others claim that dynamic new forms of public participation are 
required to avert a crisis of international governance regarding new and emerging 
technologies (Grunwald 2007; Owen et al. 2012; Stilgoe et al. 2014).
It is for this reason that GEST has adopted a view of ethics as a non-discipli-
nary, public area of social interaction that encompasses a plethora of forms of 
expression. Our definition of ‘ethics debate’ is thus:
A common platform for deliberation and discussion of values in society that is based on 
perceptions of right and wrong, is influenced by cultural norms, and aims at informing 
policy making.
The emphasis on ‘perceptions of right and wrong’ pertains to the need to acknowl-
edge the importance of public perceptions in the debate, regardless of their origin 
(e.g. religious vs. secular). Public perception research, whether quantitative or quali-
tative, is nowadays an integral part of the ethics debate around any new science and 
technology development. What has been termed ‘lay morality’ is often even more 
evident in debates than the opinions of expert ethicists, and no decision can easily be 
taken in direct opposition to public sentiment (see Decker and Ladikas 2004).
The influence of cultural norms in ethics debates is a key subject for a pro-
ject whose work has a global perspective. It is clear that ethical opinions do not 
appear out of a void and, whether or not one believes in an innate human nature, 
that upbringing plays a significant role in shaping notions of right and wrong. We 
therefore focus on how value systems in society influence ethical debates in the 
public and expert domains alike. We believe that ethics debates cannot be dissoci-
ated from cultural norms and values.
The aim of ethics debates in influencing policy-making forms another part 
of our definition. Ethics debates are by default policy debates. They are at core 
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action-oriented in that they set out to allow or prohibit certain activities. As such, 
these debates aim to influence policy-making, and the opinions expressed are also 
policy opinions. Therefore it would be wrong to dissociate ethics debates from 
policy or doubt their impact on policy-making.
1.3  The Incorporation of Ethics in Science  
and Technology Policy
The incorporation of ethics in policy-making does not happen in isolation, as if ethics 
were a stand-alone concept. Ethics is inextricably connected to culture, and this affects 
its expression in a multitude of respects: dominant values, history and official govern-
mental structures all influence the expression and direction of ethics debates. At the 
same time, private concerns, whether business-related or not, influence ethics debates 
by promoting moral arguments over certain world-views and policy choices. Figure 1.1 
graphically depicts the position of ethics in a typical policy-making apparatus.
The first vital distinction to be made is that ethics can be both ‘formally’ and 
‘informally’ expressed. ‘Formal’ expression occurs through the official struc-
tures in the decision-making system that have been created specifically to provide 
informed reflection on ethics issues. From government advisory bodies on sci-
ence and technology to informal arms-length, quasi-governmental organizations, 
there is a plethora of ways to debate ethics in a reflective, formalized and disci-
plined manner. This contrasts with the spontaneous, public perspective on ethics 
expressed by lay people with little or no formal education in the field. This type of 
‘informal’ lay view of ethics is more akin to morality, but nevertheless important 
in its expression of ethics in public debates (Burgess 2014). Lay morality is an 
Fig. 1.1  Incorporation 
of ethics in science and 
technology policy
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integral part of the incorporation of ethics in policy-making, although it requires 
different analytical methodologies (e.g. public surveys and citizens’ dialogues).
Whether formalized or not, ethics derives from the dominant values that are 
held dear by society at the time of the debate. These values are easily recognized 
since they are promoted in official documents that organize society and policy pri-
orities. National constitutions are the most relevant documents that describe domi-
nant values, closely followed by international treaties, government white papers 
and key political speeches. In any case, ethics debates relate directly and indirectly 
to the dominant values in their content structure.
Also in the background is the historical and cultural context from which the 
dominant values, and therefore ethics views, are derived. The development of cul-
ture depends on historical events such as population movements, wars and occupa-
tions, and creates a distinct regional form expressed as much in arts and literature 
as in world-views and prescriptions of social behaviour. This results in specific 
values systems, as described above. Therefore a view on relevant history and cul-
ture in the analysis of ethics debates is necessary in order to explain the state of 
affairs and the main argumentation used.
Looking at the effect of ethics debates on policy-making, one ought not to dis-
regard private activities that influence the direction of decisions. Such activities 
are organized in some form, for instance in terms of business interests or bringing 
together like-minded individuals, with the aim of influencing policy via lobbying. 
Business has traditionally been the most active private concern to lobby policy, but 
in recent decades we have seen the rise of civil society organizations as successful 
lobbyists. Both business and civil society organizations influence ethics debates by 
employing moral arguments and leading information campaigns.
The GEST project and the current book analyse in detail the most vital parts of 
the structure of the incorporation of ethics, namely formal and informal ethics dis-
cussions, regulatory mechanisms and dominant values systems. A perspective on 
history, culture and lobbying is given, but the work does not concentrate on these 
issues. Three regions as different as Europe, India and China offer a wealth of 
material for social scientists to analyse—in fact, much more than one could possi-
bly digest in just 3 years of effort. To fully understand the antecedents and origins 
of three major world cultures would take a significant international effort. What 
we have done is to provide a snapshot of certain ethics debates in enough detail to 
enhance our understanding of the arguments involved, the decisions made and the 
values they represent. Most importantly, though, we point the way towards a com-
mon approach to ethics that can be followed at a global level with a global audience.
1.4  Structure of the Book
The book is divided into 12 chapters in three parts. Part 1 serves as the background 
to the remainder of the book, in that it conveys sufficient basic knowledge in rel-
evant areas of academic research and policy to give a reader without significant 
prior knowledge an appreciation of the subtleties of the topic.
6 M. Ladikas et al.
Chapter 2, explores the way in which ethical discussions are organized as part 
of the official science and technology policy-making process in the three regions. 
As each region has unique arrangements for ethics discussion, the development 
of the official structures is analysed in terms of the science and technology priori-
ties that each region promotes, but also critically reviewed in terms of the regional 
needs and how these are covered by the existing structures. It shows that although 
overlapping structures do exist, the actual embedding of ethics in the regulatory 
process depends on the concrete characteristics of decision-making in each region.
Chapter 3, provides a basic comparative analysis of public perceptions of sci-
ence and technology in the three regions. Comparable surveys, mainly from 
Europe and China, are analysed in terms of interest, information, attitudes etc. The 
results show remarkable similarities, but also significant differences, that have a 
direct influence in the dominant view of ethics in each region.
Chapter 4, addresses the societal governance issues in the three regions that are 
leading to increasing calls for and practice of public engagement in science and tech-
nology policy-making. It is a welcome fact that lay morality is an important analyti-
cal component of ethical debates in all regions, and that this is translated into public 
engagement. The processes and location of public engagement vary, though, and 
also depend on the context of policy-making, as discussed in this chapter.
Part 2, which discusses the value systems in the three regions, is the back-
bone of the book. The discussion is conducted from two perspectives: values as 
reflected in the dominant culture, and values as evident in official legislation in 
relation to science and technology governance. Based on this, the project’s com-
mon analytical framework for the incorporation of ethics in decision-making pro-
cess in the three regions is developed.
Chapter 5, discusses European constitutional values in terms of their influ-
ence in the governance of science and technology. Fundamental European values 
enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the 
Treaty of Lisbon are described and their relationship to existing science and tech-
nology policy-making is analysed.
Chapter 6, offers a similar analysis by describing the traditional Chinese con-
cept of values in the tripartite culture of Confucianism-Buddhism-Taoism and 
explaining how the modernization process in China has brought in contrasting 
Western values and new value discourses such as scientism and developmentalism.
Chapter 7, describes the evolution of science and technology policy in India 
as part of the effort to promote socioeconomic development in the country. The 
role of science and technology in nation-building and modernization processes 
is analysed, along with the dominant values of equitable distribution, access and 
inclusion.
Chapter 8, uses the preceding analyses to develop a practical framework sup-
porting a comparative analysis of the ethical debates in the three regions. The 
framework differentiates three public discourses focusing on innovation, risk, and 
power and control, and two reflective discourses focusing on ethics and lay moral-
ity. These form the categories that, along with the dominant values in each region, 
direct the analysis of the ethical debates.
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Part 3, synthesizes the preceding analyses of perceptions, value systems, 
engagement and regulations using three major and emerging technologies for 
illustrative purposes. The three technologies chosen represent key science and 
technology aspects in all three regions and are in urgent need of further govern-
ance policies, especially at the global level.
Chapter 9, deals with the most intensely debated technology in the three 
regions. The chapter focuses on values and controversies relating to food technolo-
gies, including transgenic, traditional and organic perspectives as well as ‘produc-
tivist’ and ‘post-productivist’ agricultural models. It analyses the public discourses 
on the themes of risk, innovation, and power and control and their socioeconomic 
impacts so as to understand the utility of novel and emerging food technologies in 
the regional context and frame issues associated with ethical and broader societal 
discourses and consumer perceptions.
Chapter 10, offers an analysis of the ethics debates in the three regions and 
exposes the framing and dominance of discourses and underlying value con-
cepts in each region. The predominance of the innovation discourse in India 
and China focuses on grand societal challenges and economic growth, while 
in Europe the strong involvement of nongovernmental actors offers alterna-
tive discursive framings and value concepts, resulting in a critical assessment of 
nanotechnologies.
Chapter 11, provides a comparative analysis of emerging debates on synthetic 
biology in the three regions in terms of the dominant discourses and themes, and 
their roots in the regional value systems. As this is a new technology, the formulation 
of the ethical debates and their anchoring with existing ones is of particular interest.
Finally, the overall conclusions of Chap. 12 bring together the insights gained 
throughout the book, along with policy recommendations. These aim at creating 
common institutional structures and common research programmes in the three 
regions with the object of achieving a truly global platform on which ethics can be 
debated and policy initiatives initiated according to a common road map.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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2.1  Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed a significant increase in ethical debates on science, 
technology and innovation, in the sense of both greater intensity and a wider plu-
rality of voices. In addition to the standard expert perspectives, more and more 
lay people have found a common voice to express their opinions. People fear the 
negative consequences of science, technology and innovation and want to protect 
fundamental social values against the intrusion of new values that appear to show 
less respect for living entities when these are instrumentalized through the scien-
tific world-view. The European debate on genetic modification in agriculture is a 
well-documented example of the ‘ethicization’ of the public discourse on science, 
technology and innovation (Bovenkerk 2012).
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It is clear that ethics debates have become less ‘expert’ and more ‘open’ to 
 participation by groups or individuals who do not necessarily claim any particular 
expertise, either in scientific subjects or in ethical theory, but are nevertheless per-
suaded that their voices are as valid as those of the experts. Ethical debates have 
developed in Europe in a form that allows input from experts and lay people alike, 
through various means such as opinion surveys and participatory policy discus-
sions. These debates acquire public significance because they reach parliaments, 
governments and scientific organizations through institutionalized means that are 
aimed at influencing science, technology and innovation policy (Paula 2008).
Nowadays, developments in science, technology and innovation are global phe-
nomena in which scientists and technology experts from different countries coop-
erate in international consortia. Innovative solutions are often transferred globally 
and adapted locally. Both in Europe and in the emerging economies of China and 
India, the core of science, technology and innovation policy is broadly similar: 
stimulating science and technology as important factors in developing innovative 
solutions to societal needs. Against this background, the Global Ethics in Science 
and Technology (GEST) project is interested in comparing Europe with China and 
India: to what extent is there a global ethics in science and technology, and how 
are ethical debates institutionalized in science, technology and innovation poli-
cies? The latter is the focus of this chapter.
The issue will be addressed as follows. First we will sketch the general pol-
icy on science, technology and innovation in all three regions and the position 
of ethics debates in it. The common idea in the respective policies is that sci-
ence and technology are important factors in developing innovative solutions to 
societal needs, but these solutions might have a profound influence on the moral 
fabric of society. Questions have been raised with regard to justice, equity, auton-
omy, human dignity and social harmony (see Chaps. 5, 6 and 7). In these ethical 
debates, however, the tone of voice differs greatly from region to region. This leads 
to the question: is this attention to ethics solely lip service, or does it have a real 
impact on the regulatory frameworks of science, technology and innovation? We 
found that each region has a unique structure of ethics debates involving the insti-
tutionalization of three related tasks: ethical governance, ethical deliberation and 
ethical reflection. The remainder of this chapter describes these tasks and provides 
examples of the institutionalization of ethics debates.
With regard to ethical governance, in all three regions the governance of pro-
tecting explicitly accepted social values such as scientific integrity, or human sub-
jects involved in research, is implemented in regulatory frameworks. With regard 
to animal research, there are clear differences from region to region. For govern-
ance this involves discussion of the content of common standards for science, 
technology and innovation in terms of academic integrity, the protection of human 
research subjects and the protection of animals, and of questions about how to 
ensure common standards and comparable practices.
As for ethical deliberation, the institutionalization of ethics debates in Europe 
functions as an amalgam of advisory systems that sound early warnings on new 
ethical issues relating to science, technology and innovation. In Europe, ethics 
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debates are often a mix of expert-based and lay-based ethical deliberation. This 
leads to the institutionalization of engagement through participatory methodolo-
gies (see Chap. 4). In China and India, on the other hand, one cannot understand 
the institutionalization of ethical deliberation by looking at advisory committees 
that are directed at protecting social values and fundamental rights within develop-
ments in science, technology and innovation. The general tone of voice of ethics in 
science, technology and innovation debates in these countries is aimed at setting 
social agendas. A short description of India’s science and technology policy clari-
fies this point. The value discussions are not institutionalized separately, but func-
tion as an integral part of the agenda-setting discussions (see Chap. 7).
Societies develop, which is why both tasks—ethical governance and ethical 
 deliberation—need to be aligned with new societal and scientific developments. Ethics 
cannot function without systematic ethical reflection. This becomes clear when we see 
how ethics debates on new emerging technologies proliferate in emerging economies. 
Based upon China’s experience with agricultural biotechnology, we see the need for 
broadening ethical deliberation and societal engagement as a part of an early warn-
ing system for ethical issues (see Chap. 9). This requires ethical reflection, not only in 
terms of academic research as a reflective practice that needs to be institutionalized, but 
also in terms of the development of societal reflection on core values, rights and ideals.
2.2  Science and Technology for Innovation
Science and technology are important factors in developing innovative solutions 
to societal needs. This idea is a strong driver behind the science, technology and 
innovation policies in all three regions. It is against this background that the role 
of ethics in the regulatory regimes has to be placed.
2.2.1  Developing Innovative Solutions with Science  
and Technology
The European Union formulated the idea of developing itself as a competitive 
knowledge society in the year 2000 as was a part of the so called Lisbon Strategy 
(2000–2010):
The Union has today set itself a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion 
(European Council 2000).
This strategy has been branded as the ‘Innovation Union’:
Innovation Union is the European Union strategy to create an innovation-friendly environ-
ment that makes it easier for great ideas to be turned into products and services that will 
bring our economy growth and jobs (European Commission 2014a).
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The Innovation Union is based in science and technology policy, where this policy 
is directed at ‘turning our research into new and better services and products if we 
are to remain competitive in the global marketplace and improve the quality of life 
in Europe’ (European Commission 2014b).
The challenge to Europe to remain globally competitive relates to the funda-
mental role of science, technology and innovation policy in competing regions 
such as India and China. In these regions science and technology policy have been 
an integral part of economic development. A rough outline of some of the dynam-
ics in the regulatory regimes governing science, technology and innovation policy 
follows.
In India, the government’s policy tools for setting out technology policy objec-
tives and approaches are its science and technology policy statements. Since 
independence, four such statements have been issued, in 1958, 1983, 2003 and 
2013. The 1958 statement was called ‘Science Policy Resolution’, that of 1983 
‘Technology Policy Statement’, that of 2003 ‘Science and Technology Policy’ and 
that of 2013 ‘Science, Technology and Innovation Policy’. These four documents 
have provided overarching frameworks for science and technology policy and have 
guided its societal linkages. The 2003 document also acknowledged the impor-
tance of linking modern technology with an indigenous knowledge base, and tech-
nology was part of a framework for an independent industrial base to be achieved 
through planned economic growth (Baark 1986). This led to the creation of a 
huge institutional base of organizations funding research and development and of 
research institutes.
The latest government policy statement, Science, Technology and Innovation 
Policy 2013 (DST 2013), mentions ‘a strong and visible Science, Research and 
Innovation System for High-Technology-led path for India (SRISHTI) as the goal 
of the new STI Policy’ and ‘science, technology and innovation for the people’ 
as the new paradigm of the Indian science, technology, innovation enterprise. It 
argues that the national science, technology and innovation system must therefore 
recognize Indian society as its major stakeholder: ‘Innovation for inclusive growth 
implies ensuring access, availability and affordability of solutions to as large a 
population as possible.’ It states that the policy will drive both investment in sci-
ence and the investment of science-led technology and innovation in select areas 
of socioeconomic importance. It acknowledges that public understanding of sci-
ence is an important dimension of reaching the people and introducing the ben-
efits of modern science and technology to them. According to the new policy, the 
guiding vision of aspiring Indian science, technology and innovation enterprise is 
to accelerate the pace of the discovery and delivery of science-led solutions for 
faster, sustainable and inclusive growth.
China has, since the adoption of the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, 
been following the lead set by Deng Xiaoping’s observation that ‘science and tech-
nology are the primary productive forces’, and pursuing a science and technology 
development strategy which stresses that ‘economic development must be based on 
science and technology, and science and technology must serve the need of economic 
development’ (Deng 1993). In 2007, the Chinese government set a new strategic 
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objective of ‘enhancing indigenous innovation capacity and building an innovation-
oriented country’. The history of China in the past century shows that recognition of 
the important role of science and technology has played a crucial part in every major 
decision affecting economic and social development strategy in China. It also clearly 
demonstrates that the Chinese people cherish the value of science and technology 
and that China is firmly committed to catching up with the world’s leading nations 
in science and technology. Through one hundred years of hard effort, China has 
made notable progress in science and technology development, having started with a 
blank slate. In the meantime, a big proportion of the Chinese public now recognizes 
the importance of science and technology and the dominant position of science and 
scientific pragmatism in the mainstream value system.
2.2.2  ‘Ethics Debates’: Discussing the Societal Impact  
of Science, Technology and Innovation Policies
It is clear that, as one might expect, science, technology and innovation policies 
have not, in any of the three regions, been blind to the impact of scientific and 
technological developments on the moral fabric of society. Questions have been 
raised about the impact of science, technology and innovation on dominant social 
values such as justice, equity, autonomy, human dignity and social harmony, relat-
ing to both individual and social life.
A recent example of the European tone of voice in raising ethical questions in the 
science, technology and innovation debate was a resolution on science and technol-
ogy ethics adopted with an overwhelming majority by the senate of the Netherlands 
(Eerste Kamer 2014). The senate concluded that technological innovations were 
necessary for a competitive economy, that some technological innovations, such as 
the convergence between nanotechnology, information technology, biotechnology 
and cognitive science, might have profound consequences for privacy and citizen-
ship, and that these consequences raised fundamental ethical questions. Based upon 
this conclusion, the senate asked the government to structurally embed ethics in its 
technology and innovation policy and to inform the senate regularly of the results. 
This tone of voice in raising ethical questions in the debate on science, technology 
and innovation signifies a recognition of the importance of technological innovation 
for a competitive economy, while at the same time stressing that its consequences 
for social values and fundamental rights need close scrutiny.
Value questions are not, of course, exclusive to Europe: they have also been 
raised in India and in China.
An example of the Chinese tone of voice is what then Chinese president Jiang 
Zemin pointed out at a meeting with Nobel laureates in Beidaihe on 5 August 
2000:
The issue of scientific ethics is going to become more prominent in the 21st century. The 
bottom line is: advances in science and technology should serve the interests of the man-
kind, serve the lofty cause of world peace, development and progress, rather than hurt the 
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human race itself … To build and improve scientific ethics, respect and protect intellec-
tual property rights, and provide policy guidance for the research and use of science and 
technology in ways that meet the common interests of people around the world is a major 
issue to be resolved in the 21st century (Jiang 2000).
That science, technology and innovation should be directed at the interests of 
humankind and the benefits broadly accessible in society has been a core issue 
in the ethics debates in India, where ‘access’ itself is a larger issue that provokes 
intense and passionate debate when intellectual property rights are under discus-
sion. India’s tone of voice can be discerned from the debate’s focus on inclusion 
and equity. These are brought up against the background of wider inequality within 
the country and across various regions. The idea of ethics in this respect is also sig-
nificant, since technology and gender divides are strongly evident across the board. 
Access, equity and inclusion have repeatedly been emphasized in the series of five-
year plans emanating from India’s Planning Commission (Planning Commission 
2011). The focus on inclusion and access has primarily been in policy statements, 
however; there are not many reports or studies on evaluated actual implementation.
2.2.3  An Amalgam of Institutionalizations
To the question posed above—is this attention to ethics solely lip service, or does 
it have a real impact on the regulatory frameworks of science, technology and 
innovation policies?—we can attest that there is a broad and interesting discussion 
on the institutionalization of ethics debates in science, technology and innovation 
policy in all three regions. Our research identified a variety of structures, ranging 
from institutes and committees that are part of government departments to arms-
length quasi-governmental organizations and influential non-governmental entities 
that include ethics in their remits.
Presenting a complete overview would be neither helpful nor possible. 
Institutional structures are dynamic fields that change and develop along with sci-
ence, technology and innovation policies. Detailed descriptions could only have 
temporary value. As political and regulatory perspectives change, committees 
are established, transformed, merged and eventually abandoned, while regulation 
adapts to new situations and issues. Instead of striving for a full description of the 
amalgam of institutions in the three regions, we propose a systematic description 
of the three main tasks that the institutionalizations of ethics debates in science, 
technology and innovation policy concentrate on. This is based on a synthesis of 
the empirical material analysed as part of the GEST project. We will undertake 
this along three lines of inquiry:
•	 ethical governance: institutionalizing ethics debates in terms of the implementa-
tion of standards in research ethics in science, technology and innovation policies
•	 ethical deliberation: institutionalizing ethics debates that raise ethical issues in 
scientific and technological developments in science, technology and innovation 
policies
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•	 ethical reflection: institutionalizing ethics debates that support critical reflection 
and engagement in debates on research standards, emerging technology issues 
and social justice in science, technology and innovation policies.
2.3  Ethical Governance
The first function that one sees in the institutionalization of ethics debates is 
the institutionalization of compliance. Ethics debates do not start from scratch: 
some of the values, rights and ideals that are relevant to the development of sci-
ence, technology and innovation are already broadly shared and sometimes even 
explicitly codified in codes of conduct or legal requirements for research. These 
form the firm core of research ethics describing behaviour with regard to science 
(scientific integrity) and with regard to society (human research subjects, animals 
and the environment). There are three fields of governance in which ethics is of 
clear importance for the societal impact of science and technology directed at 
innovation:
•	 academic integrity
•	 research (including medical research) involving human subjects
•	 research involving animals.
2.3.1  Academic Integrity
There is a debate on academic integrity evolving in all three regions. Our analysis 
shows that this debate is very intense in Europe and has recently become so in 
China. The discussion on research integrity and compliance with standards of aca-
demic integrity forms an important focus point for the discussion on the ethics of 
science, technology and innovation in China. The core question here concerns the 
relationship between academic integrity and broader issues of science, technology 
and innovation ethics. Here are three examples from the respective regions:
•	 The UK Research Integrity Office, an independent body that provides expert 
advice and guidance on the conduct of research, covers all subject areas and 
helps everyone involved in research deal with integrity issues.
•	 In China the Ministry of Science and Technology has established an office for 
research and development integrity and a committee that focuses on developing 
research and development integrity to administer issues concerning the research 
and development ethics of Chinese scientists.
•	 The Department of Biotechnology in India’s Ministry of Science and 
Technology has issued a ‘Statement on Handling of Allegations of Research 
Misconduct’ for departmentally funded organizations and researchers all across 
the country. The department asserts that integrity is naturally expected in the 
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communication of science through seminars, meetings and publications. The 
policy statement also stipulates punishments for research misconduct.
2.3.2  Research on Human Subjects
In all three regions there is a strong focus on the institutionalization of research 
ethics involving human research subjects, especially in medical research (Jesani 
2009; Muthuswamy 2010). The main question in this field is whether the regula-
tions and institutionalizations are comparable between the different regions.
2.3.3  Protecting Research Animals
With regard to the ethics debate on animals in research, we find comparable structures 
in Europe and India in terms of national legislation and ethics committees at institu-
tional level. In China, discussion on the use of animals in research is not prominent. 
The core question for a global ethics of science, technology and innovation revolves 
around two issues: the fundamental ethical question of whether, why and how animals 
are to be considered proper objects of moral concern, and the practical ethical question 
of comparing existing regulations and applications in the field of animal research.
2.3.4  Conclusion
Overall, the institutionalization of ethics debates in the field of governance high-
lights the importance of further comparing ethical standards and their application 
in practice. In other words, the challenges confronting the development of a global 
ethics in science, technology and innovation in relation to governance are:
•	 To what extent are common standards for science, technology and innovation 
with regard to academic integrity, the protection of human research subjects and 
the protection of animals necessary and possible?
•	 How does one ensure that common standards lead to the development of 
 comparable practices?
2.4  Ethical Deliberation: Explicating Ethical Issues  
in Science, Technology and Innovation Developments
New emerging technologies raise new ethical issues. From a European perspec-
tive, the institutionalization of ethics debates functions as an advisory system that 
issues early warnings about new ethical issues relating to science, technology and 
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innovation. The existing and developing European institutes are directed at open-
ing up new developments for ethical deliberation. Official advisory reports place 
these issues on the policy agenda with authority and inform policymakers and 
researchers of relevant issues to consider. Developing ethical deliberation is often 
a mix of expert-based and society-based ethical deliberation. Engagement through 
participatory trajectories is a crucial part of the institutionalization of ethical delib-
eration (see Chap. 4).
In order to understand the institutionalization of ethical deliberation in India 
and China, however, we should look beyond advisory committees that are directed 
at protecting social values and fundamental rights against developments in sci-
ence, technology and innovation. In Sect. 2.2.2 we saw that the general tone of 
voice of ethics within science, technology and innovation debates is directed at 
priority setting in order to solve broad societal issues and improve the life situa-
tion of those in need—in other words, setting social justice innovation agendas. 
Instead of an examination of individual committees, a description of the history of 
the agenda-setting process might help clarify the ethics structure in these regions. 
An example from India will clarify this point.
2.4.1  Ethics Advisory Committees
One way in which ethical debates are institutionalized to foster engagement in 
public discourses on regulations, politics and governance is by the installation of 
official ethics advisory committees that give public advice aimed at broadening 
policy discourses. These committees institutionalize ethics debates if, and only if, 
they advise publicly. Giving advice based upon accessible systematic reflective 
argumentation broadens the possibilities of public engagement in the discussion. 
Once arguments are given publicly, they can be challenged publicly too.
The idea of the ethics advisory structures in Europe follows strongly the tone of 
voice as described above in Sect. 2.2.2: recognizing the importance of technologi-
cal innovations for a competitive economy while at the same time stressing that 
their consequences for social values and fundamental rights need close scrutiny. 
The ethics structures need to advise how the social values and fundamental rights 
can be protected.
2.4.2  Ethics in Agenda Setting in Science, Technology  
and Innovation
The institutionalization of the ethics debates in India and China does not follow 
the pattern of advisory committees directed at protecting social values and fun-
damental rights against developments in science, technology and innovation. An 
outline of the history of Indian research and development policy makes it clear 
that institutionalizations aim to steer developments in science, technology and 
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innovation towards solving broad societal issues and improving the life situation 
of those in need: in other words, setting social justice innovation agendas.
India embarked upon an ambitious development path after gaining independ-
ence in 1947. Led by the visionary prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the govern-
ment revamped the science and technology infrastructure and established many 
new laboratories across the country. Their vision was to harness science and tech-
nology for social development and economic growth. The various national plans 
and science and technology policies recognize that science and technology are 
vital aspects of national capability. The central focus of the Twelfth Five Year 
Plan for the period 2012–2017 is to ensure that science and technology become 
major drivers in the process of national development (GOI 2012). The government 
has declared 2010–2020 the Decade of Innovation, with the object of achieving 
access, equity and inclusion. In fact, this has been on the agenda of the govern-
ment since the 1950s.
The Scientific Policy Resolution of 1958, the Technology Policy Statement of 
1983, the Science and Technology Policy of 2003 and the Science, Technology 
and Innovation Policy of 2013 categorically declare that science and technology 
have an unprecedented impact on economic growth and social development. They 
state that one of the aims of the policy is to secure for the people of the coun-
try all the benefits that can accrue from the acquisition and application of scien-
tific knowledge. The objective is to ensure the security of the people in terms of 
food, agriculture, nutrition, the environment, water, health and energy on a sus-
tainable basis, with special emphasis on equity in development, so that the ben-
efits of technological growth reach the majority of the population, particularly the 
disadvantaged, leading to an improved quality of life for every citizen. According 
to the new Science, Technology and Innovation Policy, the guiding vision of aspir-
ing Indian science, technology and innovation enterprise is to accelerate the pace 
of the discovery and delivery of science-led solutions for faster, sustainable and 
inclusive growth.
The policies also call for close coordination of the various government depart-
ments, and also among those concerned, at all levels, with any sector of economic, 
scientific or technological activity, and not least the understanding and involve-
ment of the entire Indian people. It is realized too that ‘scientific and technological 
developments today also have deep ethical, legal and social implications. There 
are deep concerns in society about these. … Scientific work and policies arising 
from these have to be highly transparent and widely understood’ (DST 2003).
The Science, Technology and Innovation Policy of 2013, which is the latest 
such document, states that ‘a strong and visible Science, Research and Innovation 
System for High-Technology-led path for India (SRISHTI) is the goal of the new 
STI Policy’ and ‘science, technology and innovation for the people’ is the new par-
adigm of the Indian science, technology and innovation enterprise. It declares that 
the national science, technology and innovation system must therefore recognize 
Indian society as its major stakeholder: ‘Innovation for inclusive growth implies 
ensuring access, availability and affordability of solutions to as large a population 
as possible.’ It says that the policy will drive both investment in science and the 
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investment of science-led technology and innovation in select areas of socioeco-
nomic importance. It acknowledges that the public understanding of science is an 
important dimension for reaching the people and introducing the benefits of mod-
ern science and technology to them. However, it also argues that this public and 
political understanding of science should be based on evidence and debated with 
an open mind. ‘People and decision makers must be made aware of the implica-
tions of emerging technologies, including their ethical, social and economic 
dimensions’ (DST 2013). This new policy acknowledges the increasing role of the 
private sector in research and development and advocates the public-private part-
nership model.
Within these policy contours, the Department of Science and Technology, as 
part of its ‘S&T Programmes for Socio-Economic Development’ has set up a 
Science for Equity, Empowerment and Development Division. This has the objec-
tive of ‘working for technological empowerment and sustainable livelihoods at the 
grass-root levels’, aiming at the socioeconomic upliftment of poor, disadvantaged 
sections of society. The department has programmes to facilitate participation 
by women in science and technology. It has also established a Nanotechnology 
Mission to give emphasis to research and development and capacity building in 
nanosciences and technology, with a view to harnessing these to address soci-
etal challenges and economic growth by leveraging its industrial applications. 
Similarly, the Department of Biotechnology has initiated many programmes in 
frontier areas of the biosciences.
Thus the orientation of science and technology programmes has been to use 
science and technology for development purposes, and to catch up with advanced 
countries. From time to time the Indian Council of Medical Research issues ethi-
cal guidelines for biomedical research on human participants (ICMR 2006). These 
stipulate that all research involving human participants should be conducted in 
accordance with the four basic ethical principles, namely autonomy (respect for 
persons or participants), beneficence, non-maleficence (do no harm) and justice 
(Kumar 2006). The council’s Health Research Policy (ICMR 2007), in its section 
on operating principles, says that the ethical guidelines should be mandatory for 
all research.
2.4.3  Conclusion
Europe, India and China can learn from one another. The discussion in Europe 
could benefit from the Indian example of opening up the agenda setting for sci-
ence, technology and innovation to broader value-based discussions. The basic 
idea of responsible research and innovation in the EU’s new Horizon 2020 agenda 
might give opportunities for this, while the existing amalgam of European ethics 
advisory structures as an early warning system might also be a source of inspira-
tion for China and India. This is because, as the next section of this chapter will 
demonstrate, strong societal debates on emerging technologies are popping up in 
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China and India too. A telling example of such a debate is the discussion on agri-
cultural biotechnology in both China and India.
2.5  Ethical Reflection
Ethical discussion on new emerging technologies has proliferated in China and 
India. The example of agricultural biotechnology shows the need to broaden the 
ethics debate and for societal engagement through participatory trajectories as an 
early warning system. The Chinese example serves to clarify this point.
A genetically modified cotton variety developed by Monsanto was introduced 
to China in 1995, for the purpose of dealing with severe outbreaks of bollworm. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese government was also intensifying its efforts to develop 
related biological technologies. In China, the discourse on supporting genetically 
modified foods and related technologies through innovation takes the form of two 
intertwined systems. The first is the discourse of developmentalism and the sec-
ond the discourse of scientism, both of which provide an excellent environment 
and great opportunities for the development of genetic modification. Whether in 
scientific research or industry development, the government of China has given 
substantial support to modern biotechnology as a national strategy. Hence geneti-
cally modified crops are developing rapidly in the country and enjoy strong mar-
ket opportunities. In addition to the cotton variety, genetically modified crops and 
products that have been granted biosafety certificates since 1998 include tomato, 
papaya, pimento and animal vaccines.
In August 2009, China’s Ministry of Agriculture formally approved the issuing 
of safety certificates to two transgenic rice varieties and a transgenic corn variety. 
When Greenpeace International learned of this and made it widely known through 
the media, a huge public backlash ensued. In a demonstration of widespread con-
cern about genetically modified crops, there was much discussion in both tradi-
tional and online media. Some unverified negative reports were widely circulated. 
In March 2010, the Center for Science Communication, Peking University, pub-
lished on its official website an open letter jointly signed by some scholars in 
humanities and social sciences, claiming that the safety certificates granted to 
the transgenic rice and maize varieties ‘were not based on adequate demonstra-
tion. If decisive measures are not taken immediately to put a halt to commercial 
planting of genetically modified corps, China’s food security and food sovereignty 
will face major impacts.’ The views carried by the media have a strong influence 
on the degree of acceptance among Chinese consumers for genetically modified 
foods. Because the debate on these foods has not been settled, the majority of 
people with no interest in the scientific details of the issue have left the middle 
ground to join the conservative camp. In recent years, as urban consumers have 
become more aware of genetically modified foods, acceptance of these foods has 
decreased.
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2.6  Conclusion
We conclude that the institutionalization of ethics debates in science, technology and 
innovation needs to be analysed from three different perspectives, each of which has 
a unique structure: ethical governance, ethical deliberation and ethical reflection.
From the ethical governance perspective, deliberation targets compliance 
issues within the existing ethical frameworks. The institutionalization of eth-
ics debates in the field of governance highlights two challenges for the devel-
opment of a global ethics in science, technology and innovation in relation to 
governance:
•	 the extent to which common standards for science, technology and innovation 
with regard to academic integrity, the protection of human research subjects and 
the protection of animals are necessary and possible
•	 how to ensure that common standards lead to the development of comparable 
practices.
In ethical deliberation, new emerging issues and the social agenda for science, 
technology and innovation are debated. The idea of the ethics advisory structures 
in Europe follows strongly a tone of voice that recognizes the importance of tech-
nological innovations for a competitive economy, while at the same time stressing 
that its consequences for social values and fundamental rights need close scrutiny. 
European ethics structures are designed to provide advice on how to protect social 
values and fundamental rights. The Chinese and Indian advisory structures on sci-
ence, technology and innovation, in which new emerging issues and the social 
agenda are debated, aim to steer developments in science, technology and innova-
tion towards solving broad societal issues and improving the life situation of those 
in need: in other words, setting social justice innovation agendas.
Finally the institutionalization of societal and academic reflection on ethics to 
feed governance and deliberation shows that the ethical debate on new emerging 
technologies has flourished in China and India. Agricultural biotechnology shows the 
need to broaden the ethics debate and for societal engagement through participatory 
trajectories as an early warning system. Societal and academic reflection is directed 
at the question: how does one organize these trajectories? (see also Chap. …).
2.7  Background Material
This chapter builds upon the reports of the EU research project Global Ethics in 
Science and Technology (GEST), specifically the following:
EU country reports from Deliverable 1.1, Ethics state of the art: EU debate
•	 Chapter 2: S&T ethics advisory structures in the United Kingdom, by Miltos 
Ladikas and Cathy Lennon (University of Central Lancashire)
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•	 Chapter 3: S&T ethics advisory structure in Germany, by Leonhard Hennen 
(Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis—ITAS) and Arnold 
Sauter (ITAS and Office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag)
•	 Chapter 4: S&T ethics structure in Netherlands, by Virgil Rerimassie, Frans 
W.A. Brom (Rathenau Instituut)
GEST background papers
•	 Ethics state of the art: Yesterday, today, and tomorrow in China, by Wenxia 
Zhang, Yandong Zhao Ying Ma, Miao Liao (Chinese Academy of Science and 
Technology for Development)
•	 Science and technology policy in India: Policy contours, institutional frame-
work and ethical considerations, by Sachin Chaturvedi, K. Ravi Sriniva, Pallavi 
Singh (Research and Information System for Developing Countries, New Delhi)
In these reports the data collected is available for further analysis and discussion. 
These reports are available on the GEST project website and in the deliverables 
(EU website) for the European Commission.
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3.1  Introduction
Science and technology are held in high esteem by important Chinese, European 
and Indian political leaders.
Science and technology constitute a primary productive force …. The future of agriculture 
will eventually lie in bioengineering and other highly advanced technologies. So we must 
recognize the full importance of science and technology (Deng 1993).
These words of Deng Xiaoping, leader of the People’s Republic of China from 
1982 to 1987, turned out to be the cornerstone of the Chinese science and technol-
ogy policy that followed. Similarly, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of 
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post-Independent India gave importance to development of S&T and emphasized 
its role in national development and in finding solutions to hunger and poverty. He 
advocated inculcation of scientific temper.
Also when we turn to the European Union (EU), we find high hopes for sci-
ence and technology among political leaders. For instance, in a speech about 
the EU funding scheme Horizon 2020, Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, the European 
Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science, noted that ‘research and 
innovation are the best tools at our disposal to renew our economy and tackle a 
long list of other major challenges that we face’ (Geoghegan-Quinn 2012).
Indeed, science and technology are highly valued by important political leaders 
of the three regions. But how are they perceived by the citizens those leaders rep-
resent? For history has shown that the public reception of science and technology 
exerts a crucial influence on the development of science and technology.
This chapter provides a brief comparative analysis of public perceptions of 
science and technology in Europe, China and India. Compiling such an analysis 
is not an easy task, however. First of all, while research on public perceptions of 
science and technology has been common practice in Europe and China, this is 
not the case in India. In addition, the comparability of the available information 
is limited, since the surveys differ in scope and the questions asked vary widely. 
Moreover, one has to be aware of the multitude of different cultures and subcul-
tures, belief systems and traditions found in each region, which are manifestly 
hard to differentiate and analyse in a fair and just manner.
We therefore do not claim to have conducted a comprehensive, detailed analy-
sis, but aim merely to provide an impression of public perceptions of science and 
technology in the three regions that can serve as a backdrop for the other chapters 
of this book. Discussions of the case studies of genetically modified foods, nano-
technology and synthetic biology are certainly informed by more general percep-
tions of science and technology.
To gauge public perceptions of science and technology in the EU, we draw on 
Eurobarometer, the main series of polling surveys by the European Commission, 
run regularly in all EU member states. Our primary source of information is the 
Special Eurobarometer 340 (European Commission 2010).1 For China, the 
national survey of public scientific literacy (Ren et al. 2010, 2011), provides the 
most comprehensive and systematic statistics concerning public perceptions of sci-
ence and technology. Since the 1990s, the China Association for Science and 
Technology has conducted the national survey approximately every 2 years. 
Information on public perceptions in India is, however, far more scarce: the most 
relevant and recent study is the India Science Report (NCAER 2005), commis-
sioned by the Indian National Science Academy from the National Council of 
Applied Economic Research, which included a questionnaire on science and tech-
nology perceptions. A key objective was to understand public attitudes to science 
1 Occasionally this chapter refers to earlier editions, or to the more recent 2014 report (European 
Commission 2014). We focus mainly on the 2010 survey, however, because it is the most directly 
comparable to the surveys of the other regions.
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through a primary survey. The sample size was limited, and there have been no 
subsequent studies based on this questionnaire. Yet it provides a glimpse of Indian 
public perceptions of science and technology, and moreover contains some 
directly comparable survey questions.
The following section discusses and compares the key themes of interest in and 
basic knowledge of science and technology, the image of science and technology 
and scientists, tensions between science and faith, and the weighing up of the ben-
efits and potential risks of science and technology.
3.2  Interest and Knowledge Regarding Science  
and Technology
How much interest do citizens have in science and technology? All three surveys 
compared interest in science and technology with interest in other issues.
According to the Eurobarometer report (European Commission 2010), EU citizens 
consider themselves very, or at least moderately, interested in and informed about issues 
of everyday life, such as politics, environmental problems and culture and the arts. 
Regarding new scientific discoveries and technological developments, 79 % of EU citi-
zens are interested (30 % very interested, 49 % moderately so), whereas 20 % are not 
interested at all. Interest in environmental problems and new medical discoveries is 
higher, but interest in science and technology is higher than interest in politics, culture, 
the arts, and sports news. If we compare this with the level of interest in science and 
technology according to the earlier Eurobarometer surveys of 1993 and 2005, we can 
conclude that interest in science and technology has been fairly high over the years.2 In 
2005 about 76 % indicated an interest in science and technology (European 
Commission 2005), and in 1992 the figure was 82 % (European Commission 1993).3 In 
Special Eurobarometer 401 (European Commission 2014), interest in science and tech-
nology was also gauged, but without reference to other issues (politics, culture and arts, 
sports news etc.). In the 2014 survey, 53 % indicated their interest in scientific and tech-
nological developments, compared with 46 % who were not interested. While the ques-
tion is formulated differently from its equivalent in the 2010 Eurobarometer, the lower 
numbers in 2014 are certainly notable.
2 Regarding comparisons over time, it is important to keep in mind that the composition of 
the European Union has changed considerably. The survey work for the Eurobarometer report 
Europeans, Science and Technology (European Commission 1993), was conducted in 1992, 
when the European Community, as it was then, consisted of only 12 member states. There were 
15 member states in 2001 and 25 in 2005.
3 In 2001 just 45 % of respondents indicated an interest in science and technology, but this sur-
vey posed the question and possible answers differently. The survey question read: ‘Are you 
rather interested or not very interested in each of the following subjects?’. The possible answers 
were ‘rather interested’, ‘not very interested’ and ‘do not know’. The level of interest registered 
in other subjects was lower too, due to the different way the statement was posed (European 
Commission 2001).
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Regarding active interest in science and technology, Eurobarometer 2010 shows 
that European citizens are actually not very active in science and technology 
issues. They are most active in donating money to fundraising campaigns for med-
ical research (39 %), as well as the 13 % of respondents who claim that they sign 
petitions or take part in street demonstrations on science and technology matters 
such as nuclear power and biotechnology (European Commission 2010). Overall, 
we find that EU citizens are indeed interested in science and technology, but this 
does not translate into an active involvement in science and technology issues.
Like the Eurobarometer survey, the Chinese scientific literacy survey in 2010 
included questions on the public’s interest in various news topics. Of the 11 topics 
covered, four clearly related to science and technology: new scientific discover-
ies, new medical discoveries, suitable production technologies, inventions and new 
technologies. Generally speaking, developments in science and technology were 
not the area that attracted the greatest interest. The public was most interested in 
culture and education (79 %), public security (77 %) and economic development 
(76 %), followed by agricultural development (73 %), and resources and energy 
saving (72 %). The four topics relating to science and technology ranked from 
sixth to ninth place—new scientific discoveries (72 %), new medical discoveries 
(71 %), inventions and new technologies (68 %), and suitable production technolo-
gies (64 %)—with sports and entertainment and international and foreign policy 
at the bottom (Ren et al. 2011). Among the four news topics related to science 
and technology, public interest was highest in new scientific discoveries and new 
medical discoveries.
Although fewer Chinese respondents expressed an interest in these topics than 
Europeans, the proportion of the Chinese public explicitly expressing ‘no interest’ 
was also lower than that of the EU: only about 7 % said they were ‘not interested’ 
in the four topics, while the figure for Europe was more than 17 %. Apart from the 
options ‘interested’ and ‘not interested’, a considerable proportion of the Chinese 
public chose the option ‘do not care’ or ‘do not know’: in fact, for all four topics, 
more than 20 % chose one of these options (Ren et al. 2011), whereas in Europe 
only 1 % of respondents selected ‘do not know’. This shows not only that the 
Chinese public, compared with the European public, has a lower explicit interest 
in science and technology, but also, and more significantly, that a higher propor-
tion of the public does not have a clear attitude on the issue.
Turning to India, we find that according to the India Science Report (NCAER 
2005), high levels of illiteracy and low levels of income have not prevented 
Indians from having very high interest in a wide range of social issues as well 
as a reasonably good knowledge of scientific and other events. Indians profess to 
be most interested in issues of poverty (77 %), followed by those concerning old 
people (75 %), women (74 %), local schools (71 %) and agriculture (71 %). Only 
47 % of those surveyed were interested in economic issues other than employment 
(in which 66 % were interested). In comparison, interest in science and technology 
was actually rather low: only 30 % indicated interest, while 40 % said they were 
not interested. Also striking was that 30 % of the respondents claimed not to have 
an opinion on this subject matter (NCAER 2005: 45, 46).
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While it is difficult to compare the results from the European, Chinese and 
Indian surveys directly, we can make some cautious observations. First, notwith-
standing a stronger interest in other topics, citizens in the EU and in China do 
appear to have considerable interest in developments of science and technology: 
the survey results indicate that more than two thirds expressed an interest in such 
developments. Indian citizens, however, have a significantly lower degree of inter-
est in science and technology, according to the India Science Report. They are cer-
tainly less outspoken on science and technology developments, with almost a third 
indicating that they had no opinion on whether they had an interest or not.
Level of interest is an important parameter for public engagement with science 
and technology, as is the level of knowledge of the subject. In all three regions, 
efforts were made to gauge the level of basic scientific knowledge. In order to do 
so, the respective surveys incorporated comparable quiz sections, in which true-or-
false questions were asked, testing basic knowledge on, for example, astronomy, 
biology and physics. These included ‘the oxygen we breathe comes from plants’, 
and ‘the centre of the Earth is very hot’.
According to the 2005 Eurobarometer (the last edition to address the basic sci-
entific knowledge of European citizens), respondents had a good knowledge of sci-
entific topics. On average, two thirds of the given answers were correct (European 
Commission 2005). In the India Science Report, almost half of the survey partici-
pants gave the correct answers to a similar set of questions: in other words, although 
illiteracy is widespread in India, a significant percentage of the survey partici-
pants had a good basic knowledge of science (NCAER 2005: 50). Last, turning to 
the most recent Chinese survey of 2011, we find that about 40 % of respondents 
gave the correct answer (Ren et al. 2011). We may conclude that the basic scientific 
knowledge in the European Union is high in comparison with India and China.
3.3  The Image of Science and Technology
The level of interest in science and technology is important, but it does not tell us any-
thing about the image of science and technology—that is, whether it is viewed in a 
positive or negative light. The available Chinese, European and Indian surveys include 
questions that tell us something about the image of science and technology among citi-
zens in the three regions. We will look at responses to the following statements:
•	 Science and technology can sort out any problem.
•	 Science and technology will ensure that the planet does not run out of resources.
•	 Science and technology will create more opportunities for future generations.
•	 Science and technology will make our lives healthier, easier and more 
comfortable.
It should be noted that not all of the surveys address all of these issues. While the 
last is addressed in all three regions, the first three are dealt with in the European 
and Chinese surveys only.
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3.3.1  Science and Technology Can Sort Out Any Problem
First, EU citizens do not believe that science and technology can sort out any 
problem: ‘Only 22 % at the EU27 average indicate that they agree that science and 
technology can sort out any problem, while a clear majority of 57 % shows disa-
greement to this statement’ (European Commission 2010: 39). This does not sig-
nificantly deviate from the Eurobarometer report of 2005 (European Commission 
2005: 53), but a comparison with the 2001 survey indicates that EU citizens have 
actually grown more optimistic about science and technology: in that year, 16.5 % 
agreed and 73 % disagreed with the statement (European Commission 2001: 29).
Interestingly, in the 2005 Chinese survey, this statement drew agreement from 
22 % of respondents, significantly fewer than the 39 % of 2003 (Ren et al. 2010). 
Since the Chinese and EU surveys were conducted in different years, it is not possible 
to compare the results directly, but one can note the different trends: while the Chinese 
public is becoming less optimistic, the EU survey points in the opposite direction.
3.3.2  Science and Technology Will Ensure that the Planet 
Does Not Run Out of Resources
Nanotechnologies and synthetic biology are expected to make an important con-
tribution to more sustainable ‘bio-based’ production strategies. Just as they have 
little faith in the potential of science and technology to sort out any problem, EU 
citizens do not regard it as likely that the advances of science and technology will 
prevent the exhaustion of Earth’s natural resources. Only 21 % believe that science 
and technology will render the Earth’s natural resources inexhaustible (European 
Commission 2010). Comparison with the support level of 23 % in 2005 suggests 
that EU citizens have grown slightly more sceptical on this subject (European 
Commission 2005: 53). In 2001, however, the rate of support was just as high as in 
the most recent survey (European Commission 2001: 29).
Turning to China, we actually find slightly more optimism on this issue than in 
the EU, with 28 % of the public endorsing the statement in 2010 (Ren et al. 2011) 
(Fig. 3.1).
3.3.3  Science and Technology Will Create More 
Opportunities for Future Generations
In the EU this statement is certainly supported: in the most recent Eurobarometer 
three-quarters of respondents agreed and just 7 % disagreed (European 
Commission 2014). Earlier editions of the survey also reflect widespread agree-
ment: the 2014 and 2010 results are almost identical. This is a slight decrease 
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on 2005, when support was at 77 %. In 2001 it was about 72 % (European 
Commission 2001: 30). All of these numbers are considerably more favourable 
than the response in 1992, when 63 % believed science and technology would cre-
ate more opportunities for future generations (European Commission 1993: 70).
Meanwhile, asked in 2010 whether science and technology would provide more 
development opportunities for future generations, 85 % of Chinese respondents 
said yes. Earlier Chinese surveys indicate that support from the Chinese public has 
always been slightly higher than that of EU citizens (Ren et al. 2011).
As Fig. 3.2 shows, both Chinese and EU public are quite optimistic about sci-
ence and technology enabling more opportunities or future generations, but there 
is even more optimism in China than in the EU.
3.3.4  Science and Technology Will Make Our Lives 
Healthier, Easier and More Comfortable
This matter is addressed in all three regional surveys. The Eurobarometer 2010 
demonstrates widespread agreement with the statement (including strong agree-
ment) among EU member states, with two thirds (66 %) of respondents agreeing. 
This level of support was similar in the 2014 Eurobarometer survey, but had, in 
fact, been even higher in earlier surveys. In 2005, 78 % of the respondents 
Fig. 3.1  Science and 
technology will ensure that 
the earth does not run out of 
resources
Fig. 3.2  Science and 
technology will provide 
more opportunities for future 
generations
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subscribed to this statement (European Commission 2005: 53), and in 2001 sup-
port was at about 71 % (European Commission 2001: 29).4
If citizens of the EU are quite optimistic about science and technology, the 
Chinese public is even more positive: no less than 89 % of Chinese respondents 
agreed with this statement in the 2010 survey. As for trends, as many as 94 % of 
Chinese citizens supported the statement in 2001.5 After falling to 83 and 70 % in 
2003 and 2005, the support rate climbed back to 76 and 89 % in 2007 and 2010 
(Ren et al. 2010, 2011).
The India Science Report indicates that the Indian public is also more optimis-
tic than the EU public, with 77 % of respondents believing that science and tech-
nology make lives healthier and more comfortable. The researchers note, however, 
that there are pronounced differences in perception according to educational and 
income levels. The report records that just 56 % of illiterate respondents felt that 
science and technology makes lives healthier, easier and more comfortable, while 
98 % of postgraduates felt the same way (NCAER 2005). Yet overall, the balance 
of opinion was that science and technology benefited the country:
(T)his remains true for all sets of people, ranging from the illiterate to postgraduates and 
from the bottom-most income quintile to the top-most income quintile. Over three-fourths 
people in rural India also, for instance, feel that S&T makes life healthier and easier 
(against 80 % for urban areas) and 57 % feel that new technology makes work more inter-
esting (68 % for urban areas) (NCAER 2005: 40).
Interestingly, in the first section we observed that the interest of the Indian pub-
lic in science and technology developments was rather low, and yet they are quite 
optimistic about the benefits such developments might bring.
Figure 3.3 graphically demonstrates that the public in all three regions are quite 
certain of the benefits that science and technology may bring, and convinced that 
science and technology will make their lives healthier, easier and more comfort-
able. Yet we find remarkable differences in the levels of optimism: in the EU two 
4 Strikingly we can observe a steep decline in support for this statement in Germany: from 86 % 
in 2005 to 57 % in 2010 and 54 % in 2014 (European Commission 2005, 2010, 2014).
5 The proposition before 2010 was: ‘Generally speaking, the work of scientists has made our life 
easier and more comfortable.’
Fig. 3.3  Science and 
technology will make our 
lives healthier, easier and 
more comfortable
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thirds agree with the statement, in India about three quarters and in China almost 
nine out of ten respondents.
3.4  Fear of Scientists
We have seen that Chinese and EU citizens do not expect miracles from science 
and technology: science cannot solve all problems, nor can it ensure that the Earth 
never runs out of natural resources. They are, however, quite confident that sci-
ence and technology will enable more opportunities for future generations. We do 
not know as much about Indian public perceptions of science and technology in 
this regard as we know of the sentiment in China and the EU. What little infor-
mation is available, though, points in a similar direction: Chinese, Indian and EU 
citizens are all quite convinced that science and technology will enable healthier, 
easier and more comfortable ways of living. Scientific knowledge, however, equals 
power. How do members of the public view scientists in this regard? Here we can 
examine the EU and Chinese publics.
More than half of EU citizens (53 %) agree with the statement ‘Because of 
their knowledge, scientists have a power that makes them dangerous,’ while 24 % 
explicitly disagree (European Commission 2010: 42). This fear of scientists has 
diminished since 2005, however, when an average of 59 % of respondents in the 
then 25 member states believed that scientists have a power that makes them dan-
gerous (European Commission 2005: 82). In 2001 even more respondents, 63 %, 
agreed with the statement (European Commission 2001: 36).
Few people in China agreed with a comparable statement, namely ‘Scientists 
are scary because they have the knowledge and capability to change the world.’ 
Only 14 % of the Chinese public supported this statement in 2007, and the support 
rates in 2005 and 2003 were 11 and 15 % respectively (Ren et al. 2010, 2011).
The results of the Chinese survey are therefore set in stark contrast with those 
of the EU, as more than half of EU citizens see scientists as wielding a power that 
makes them dangerous. This divergence reveals a major difference between the 
Chinese and European publics: although the Chinese public is less optimistic on this 
question than in the past, its cautious attitude is far from materializing into worries 
and fears for science and technology in general, and its negative attitude and senti-
ment towards science and technology therefore seem rather limited in scope.
3.5  Between Science and Faith
Faith and religion have had a delicate relationship with science and technology 
throughout history. Therefore both the Eurobarometer survey and the Chinese 
national survey of public scientific literacy test the proposition: we depend too 
much on science and not enough on faith.
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The Eurobarometer 2014 report points to a public divide on this statement. On 
average 39 % of EU citizens agree and 32 % disagree, which is not very differ-
ent from the 2010 survey. In addition, the reports show that opinions differ greatly 
between countries, with respondents in the eastern and Mediterranean countries 
more inclined to agree (European Commission 2010, 2014). On a related subject, 
most people (58 %) agree that the pace of developments in science and technology 
makes our ways of life change too fast.
In contrast the Chinese survey conducted in 2007 showed that only 16 % of 
respondents supported this argument. Moreover, support from the Chinese public 
shows a steady declining trend: while 23 % of respondents said yes to the ques-
tion in 2001, the support rate was only 18 % in 2005 and as low as 16 % in 2007. 
These results show that the Chinese public is clearly not as worried about the 
issue as the EU public. Based hereon, we may wonder whether the Chinese pub-
lic is disinclined to consider and judge issues arising from science and technol-
ogy developments from the perspective of the dominant belief system, than the 
European public.
3.6  Balancing Risks and Benefits
Nanotechnology, genetically modified crops and synthetic biology all hold the 
promise of major benefits for society. However, they also have in common that 
they raise potential risks. In this section we discuss how EU, Chinese and Indian 
citizens perceive the benefits that science and technology may bring and the risks 
that these entail.
‘Close to half of Europeans, 46 % of respondents at the EU27 level, agree 
that the benefits of science are greater than any harmful effects it may have’ 
(European Commission 2010: 74). However, 20 % disagree. The level of agree-
ment has declined since earlier surveys (European Commission 1993: 74, 2001: 
29, 2005: 75). This raises the issue of what role the precautionary principle should 
have in coping with science and technology, which was examined through the 
statement: ‘If a new technology poses risks that are uncertain and not yet fully 
understood, the development of this technology should be stopped even if ben-
efits are expected’ (European Commission 2010: 78). Interestingly, the survey 
demonstrates that almost one in two (49 %) EU citizens agree with this statement, 
while only 22 % disagree. To make the situation even more complicated, ‘while 
Europeans express the need for risk management, at the same time they do not 
want to miss out on technological progress. A slim majority of 52 % of respond-
ents at the EU27 level agree that technological progress will be slowed down if 
risks that are not yet fully understood receive too much importance’ (European 
Commission 2010: 81).
Once again the Chinese public seems more optimistic: almost three-fourths 
(74 %) of respondents indicated that science and technology could ‘bring good 
and bad and the good is always more than the bad’. In earlier years, however, the 
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support rate was slightly lower, but in any case significantly higher than that of EU 
citizens on this issue (Ren et al. 2010, 2011).
The issue is not addressed in the India Science Report, but it does ask whether 
‘technologies will eventually destroy the Earth’, which evidently tells us some-
thing about the perception among the Indian public of the risks involved in science 
and technology. The report shows that a striking 39 % agree with this statement, 
while 25 % disagree. Another 36 % answered ‘do not know’ (NCAER 2005: 109).
In sum: EU citizens and Indian citizens perceive science and technology very 
much as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they are quite confident about 
its potential benefits and, in case of the EU, do not really want to miss out. On the 
other hand, they are quite wary of the potential downsides of developments in sci-
ence and technology. The Chinese public, on the other hand, is optimistic about 
the benefits and convinced that the potential downsides can be accommodated.
3.7  Conclusion
What have we learned from this comparison? It is hard to draw elaborate conclu-
sions in the absence of fully comparable data sets. But while we work towards 
establishing more comparable surveys, it would be foolish to disregard the obvi-
ous opportunity to draw certain cautious conclusions from the material that is 
available.
Science and technology perceptions are, overall, positive in the three regions. 
Interest in science and technology varies between the high levels of the EU and 
China and a somewhat lower level in India. This might be the result of access to 
science and technology developments in everyday life currently being higher in 
the EU and China than in India. Interest grows with increased exposure to sci-
ence and technology. Interest does not, though, necessarily translate into involve-
ment, as we have seen in the case of EU. Actual engagement with science and 
technology issues relates to proximity to technological developments (e.g. geneti-
cally modified food), while the incorporation of engagement into policy-making 
requires the establishment of official structures that might not exist in every region 
yet (see Chap. 2).
The overall image of science and technology is positive in all three regions, 
and this does not appear to be related to one’s knowledge level, educational back-
ground or income. Rich and poor, literate and illiterate find the promise of science 
and technology compelling and worth supporting. The fact that most people do 
not regard science and technology as a panacea for the problems society faces is 
merely the reflection of a pragmatic attitude on the part of citizens who have expe-
rienced financial crises, unemployment or even a lack of basic amenities. It does 
not translate into lower support for science and technology.
What appears to put the brakes on people’s optimism is the awareness that 
power can serve good as well as bad aims. The power that individuals (i.e. sci-
entists) can wield is problematic for Europeans, while it does not appear to be an 
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issue for the Chinese public (yet). This could reflect the instinctive uneasiness that 
the average European would have with the concentration of power in few hands, 
something that the average Chinese might perhaps be less worried about.
A related matter is the perception of a precarious balance between faith and 
science in the minds of the more religious European publics, in contrast to the less 
religious Chinese public. Here one recalls the uneasy dichotomy between faith 
and state that developed during the Enlightenment in Europe; in China, however, 
the dominant belief system has happily incorporated science and technology as a 
main pillar, thus easing the potential tension between traditional beliefs and new 
developments. As for India, one can only make an informed guess that the tension 
between faith on one hand and science and technology on the other is real and 
strong in the most traditional sectors of society (see Chap. 7).
Finally, perceptions of risks and benefits vary in the three regions, demonstrat-
ing that this is a very volatile variable, depending on the focus of the questions 
(i.e. the specific technology) and the current social context (e.g. recent scandals 
and media attention). Few people in the three regions see science and technology 
as without risk, but most retain a guarded optimism about the overall benefits. 
When it comes to application of the precautionary principle, the EU leads support, 
naturally influenced by the widespread debates in Europe on genetically modified 
foods and crops. Increasing support for precaution can certainly be expected in 
China and India too, once the debates there acquires a focus similar to what we 
have seen elsewhere (for instance, see Chap. 9).
Overall, the available comparisons provide many valuable insights into state of 
affairs in the three regions, but they also highlight the need to create fully compa-
rable surveys to facilitate detailed analysis of the parameters affecting science and 
technology perceptions. Once such surveys have been executed, then our under-
standing of the three regions will increase substantially, and our aim of promoting 
meaningful science and technology collaborations among them will be more easily 
realized.
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4.1  Introduction
In contemporary societies ‘public engagement’ or ‘public participation’ is becom-
ing an increasingly popular means of approaching certain highly awkward issues 
such as the management of risks or the development and socially sound imple-
mentation of emerging technologies. There are many reasons, practical and norma-
tive, for policymakers to involve lay people in policy-making (e.g. Fiorino 1990; 
National Research Council 1996). In the field of emerging technologies scientific 
uncertainties frequently exist in combination with a plurality of value-based per-
spectives. In those cases decisions may be influenced to a significant extent by the 
values of the experts involved, who cannot claim that their moral sentiments have 
a higher validity than those of the public.
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Aside from ethical and normative reflections, decisions made without public 
support tend to provoke a loss of empirical legitimacy that may be expressed in 
confrontation, disruption and public distrust. Emerging technologies such as food 
technologies, nanotechnologies and synthetic biology are increasingly regarded 
as political issues due to their potentially immense impact on society associated 
with controversies about risk and benefits and ethical disputes about human dig-
nity, the common good and questions of responsible research. Hence the fact that 
many questions, such as the setting of security standards and the social distribution 
of costs and benefits, as well as their compatibility with ethical standards, are not 
just of a technical or scientific character, but have to be dealt with politically as 
well (Wynne 2001). This is taken into account by the trend of including a range 
of interests and moral values in science and technology governance processes by 
engaging representatives of the general public.
The expected benefits of public engagement are easier and faster decision-
making by preventing public discontent, greater trust in decision-makers and in 
decisions reached through open and fair procedures, and enhanced knowledge of 
complex issues among decision-makers and citizens through the inclusion of lay 
knowledge and values as well as through mutual learning.
The ways in which citizens are becoming involved differ from country to coun-
try, depending on cultural and institutional structures—the civic epistemology of 
a country (Jasanoff 2005). This chapter will take a close look at public engage-
ment in European countries, China and India. There are huge differences among 
the regions in economic development, political systems and levels of science and 
technology development. A comparison of these regions will help us better under-
stand public engagement in science and technology governance.
4.2  Public Engagement in Europe
In Europe, forms and methodologies of public involvement have attracted increas-
ing attention since the 1960s, in line with successive waves of societal democra-
tization. The 1990s in particular, when the Soviet system disintegrated, marked a 
phase of transition and, to some extent, democratization for Europe. Concepts and 
theories of deliberative and participatory democracy gained importance in scien-
tific and policy circles.
These developments coincided with the increasing emergence of critical 
debates on science and technology provoked by environmental, health, safety and 
food scandals, such as those relating to asbestos, contaminated blood reserves and 
the BSE (‘mad cow disease’) crisis. Thus the equating of technological progress 
with the amelioration of human living conditions was challenged, with scientific 
expertise becoming a politically contested field.
The failure of science, in the eyes of many members of the public, to speak 
truth to power in fields such as the environment, consumer protection and agricul-
ture, as well as the strong opposition to genetically modified organisms in sections 
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of the public, has led to reappraisals in the field of policy advice and to the estab-
lishment of technology assessment institutions in many European countries.
In the past 10–15 years, a series of documents and actions in Europe have 
marked a shift from the ‘public understanding of science’ paradigm to a new 
appreciation of citizens and their views on ethical problems, including risk man-
agement and legal and socioeconomic issues related to new technologies (Hennen 
2013). A case in point is the call for dialogue, participation and empowerment 
of the European citizen in the European Commission white paper of 2001 on 
European governance (EC 2001a). A report by the white paper working group (EC 
2001b) recommended that the selection of expertise used in the process of policy-
making be revised, that guidelines be established for the selection of expertise, and 
that as broad as possible a spectrum of expertise be consulted in policy advice. 
Most prominent of the recommendations regarding socially robust knowledge for 
decision-making was the creation of ‘greater opportunity for informed participa-
tion by society in policy-making’. The promotion of participatory procedures was 
one of the means to be employed to support ‘public debate, knowledge-sharing 
and scrutiny of policy makers and experts’ (EC 2001b: ii). The EC took up this 
reorientation of science and technology governance in its Science and Society 
Action Plan (EC 2001c). The action plan recommended involving people actively 
in technological development and giving them the ‘opportunity to express their 
views in the appropriate bodies’ (EC 2001c: 14). To this end participatory policy-
making would have ‘to be widened and deepened to systematically include other 
sectors of civil society at all stages’ (EC 2001c: 14).
Participatory technology assessment (pTA) is one of the most important exer-
cises for promoting public engagement in science and technology governance 
(Decker and Ladikas 2004). Some standard participatory methods have been 
developed in the course of such exercises—such as citizen juries, consensus con-
ferences, 21st century meetings, charrettes, focus groups, deliberative polling, 
scenario building exercises and technology festivals—as well as new and experi-
mental forms that mostly recombine the standard methods. The following analysis 
will describe a case study of technology assessment practices with lay participa-
tion in genetically modified food technology.
4.2.1  PTA Practices in the Governance of Genetically 
Modified Foods in Europe
The shift to the predominance of the science and society paradigm in Europe cor-
responds with several events related to food and agriculture, such as the BSE cri-
sis, the birth of the cloned sheep Dolly, the arrival of genetically modified corn and 
soybeans from the United States and the trade conflict between the US and Europe 
resulting from Europe’s ban on hormone-raised beef (Ansell et al. 2006: 97). In 
this context, decision-makers realized that governmental food safety policies could 
easily provoke high politicization and public distrust.
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Genetic modification in food production provokes concerns about health and safety 
issues and raises ethical and moral objections. For example, the consumption of genet-
ically modified food would be ethically problematic, in an indirect way, if its produc-
tion caused or risked harm, violated rights or caused injustice. Genetically modified 
foods also provoke other reactions: some perceive them as ‘unnatural’ and as a viola-
tion of the intrinsic value of nature. Thus, when nature or the environment is thought 
of as an object of ethical concern, regardless of how the environment affects the inter-
ests of humans, genetically modified foods raise ethical issues about the rights and 
wrongs of the ways humankind affects nature that are particularly difficult to explore 
and resolve. Surveys show that there is a gap between the favourable public perception 
of biomedical applications and the negative perception of agri-food biotechnology, 
although there are significant differences among European countries. This is in line 
with the observation that over the past two decades heated debates have taken place in 
many European countries between decision-makers, experts and stakeholders, includ-
ing lay people as consumers, about genetically modified plants and foods without 
common ground having been found between proponents and opponents.
One could add here that in several EU member states, such as France, the 
United Kingdom and Germany, public engagement started with self-organized 
activism on the part of citizens who destroyed genetically modified test crops or 
occupied supermarkets that were selling genetically modified products. In particu-
lar, countries that had not used pTA beforehand tried to introduce it to appease 
activists and the broader public. This was the case in France, the UK, Germany 
and Austria. In countries including Norway, Denmark, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands (all relatively small, with fewer than ten million inhabitants), forms 
of pTA or other forms of political participation had already been established, and 
the genetic modification debate did not become as intense as in the other countries.
Based on documents available on the internet and scientific literature on pTA 
published since the 1990s, we have identified 20 pTA exercises in the field of 
genetically modified foods, 15 of which involve lay people. These can be sub-
divided into eight consensus conferences, three focus groups, one charrette, two 
21st century town meetings, one scenario building exercise, and one event in a sci-
ence museum that cannot be categorized. The UK’s ‘consumer views on geneti-
cally modified food’ combined focus groups, a local citizens jury and events for 
students, but we have listed it as a focus group exercise because the exercise 
consisted mainly of focus groups. Of the 15 lay pTA exercises, 13 were organ-
ized by specialized technology assessment bodies or state institutions, one by a 
research organization that had no direct link to a national parliament or govern-
ment (Citizen GMO UK) and one by a science museum (Future Foods (UK)).
The common objectives of almost all of these pTA practices comprised the 
improvement of information about genetically modified organisms, the stimulation 
of a broad public discourse based on a higher quality level, and the facilitation of 
dialogue between experts and non-experts. Some organizing bodies additionally 
mentioned that they wanted to test or improve methodologies of discursive practice.
Regarding the impacts of the analyzed practices, the picture is mixed. Nearly 
all practices ended with written reports, but for many of them, the trail of political 
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impact got lost after the written report and some press coverage, especially in 
France, the UK and Germany. Other procedures, however, seemed to have a closer 
link with political institutions. TA-SWISS, for example, was able to present the 
results of a citizen conference, or ‘PubliForum’, on genetically modified food 
to the parliamentary commission for science, education and culture. The Danish 
Board of Technology stated that political interest in the field of genetically modi-
fied food had increased in the wake of a consensus conference held on the issue, 
and that both national and EU politicians had shown interest in the project, with a 
view to becoming better informed about citizens’ perspectives. In the end, how-
ever, the interest shown may not have been sufficient to modify policies or reg-
ulatory principles (Hansen 2006). In Norway there was the special case of two 
consecutive consensus conferences within 4 years with the same lay panel. Both 
enjoyed high mass media coverage, and the conference facilitators were invited to 
present the major conclusions and recommendations in the Norwegian parliament.
What is the lay people’s opinion on genetically modified food, as far as it can 
be summarized from these activities? While the proponents of genetically modi-
fied plants highlight the environmental and economic benefits (fewer fertilizers, 
fewer pesticides, less tillage, higher productivity), the opponents put more empha-
sis on health and environmental risks, as well as factors such as naturalness and 
the integrity of nature. Furthermore, many consumers have difficulty identifying 
clear benefits of genetically modified food products. Some consumers would be 
willing to spend more money on genetically modified products if they provided a 
better taste or a higher nutritional value.
Concerning the governance of science and technology in the field of genetically 
modified food, French and UK citizens in particular complained that public debate 
had come too late. Their suspicion focused on the government having made a deci-
sion already, with inadequate knowledge of citizens’ needs, and on the motivation 
of multinational companies to promote their own interests above the wider public 
interest. Many lay people felt that very little information was available to the public 
on genetic modification: they needed to know more about what genetic modifica-
tion was, what safety tests had been done, and about the regulating bodies and their 
responsibilities. Many citizens expressed concern about the power multinational 
companies exerted through the patenting of seeds—power that might affect the 
social distribution of costs and benefits. Consequently new regulations that were 
fair to primary producers, developers and end users were recommended. Another 
big topic for almost all citizens was openness and transparency. Consumers wanted 
clear and effective labelling and tracing that allowed them to make an informed 
choice between food that was genetically modified and food that was not.
With regard to risk and regulation, many lay people were worried about the 
possible impacts of genetic modification on the environment and biodiversity. 
They were therefore in favour of more precaution and argued that more time was 
needed to understand the long-term implications of genetically modified crops 
before farmers started growing them.
What the analyzed pTA practices have in common are concerns about the 
non-excludability of specific risks in the context of today’s level of scientific 
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knowledge—for example, the theoretical risk of antibiotic resistance being 
transferred to human beings. There are calls for intensified independent public 
research, combined with strong ethical guidelines.
Most lay recommendations include calls for greater consideration of ethical 
aspects in genetically modified research, for example via a code of practice or the 
establishment of a council on gene ethics, to ensure a continuing ethical debate 
in society. There is particular concern about the genetic modification of animals, 
as well as the crossing of barriers between animals and plants. In this context the 
Danish lay panel stated that ethical considerations of interference with individual 
plants or animals should be seen in an overall framework, taking into account the 
whole of living nature and its integrity.
4.2.2  Conclusions
In Europe, the search for new forms of governance of science and technology is 
ongoing, and part of it is about a redefinition of the role of experts, stakeholders 
and lay people in policy-making. The science and society paradigm now sees eve-
ryday aspects of life, previously deemed apolitical, as politically relevant. Given 
the increased frequency and widespread use of participatory procedures in tech-
nology assessment, it can be said that pTA and public engagement in science and 
technology policy-making are widely established practices in Europe.
To date, however, there has been little systematic empirical evaluation of the role 
and impact of pTA processes (Hennen 2013). Some reports clearly show that lay 
people are able to discuss highly complex societal and ethical aspects of science and 
technology reasonably and can engage in dialogue with experts, and that formats 
such as consensus conferences are suitable for initiating cooperative learning pro-
cesses among lay people. There are thus indications that deliberation—in the sense 
of joint reasoning on societal problems—can be achieved in pTA processes.
Studies indicate that the resonance of pTA in the media and in policy-making is 
often quite restricted (Joss and Bellucci 2002). Analysis of the factors conducive or 
obstructive to the public and political resonance of pTA arrangements (Hennen 2002) 
suggests that the potential influence of pTA is affected by the quality of the outcome 
of a pTA process or by features of the procedure itself (management, actors involved). 
More important than features of the procedure, however, is the context in which the 
procedure takes place. The nature of the issue or problem at stake and the institutional 
and political setting of the pTA arrangement appear to be of the greatest importance.
4.3  Public Engagement in China
Before reforms and opening up started in China in 1978, the state-led science and 
technology system was a highly hierarchical one in which public participation was 
rare. In the past 30 years, the Chinese government has taken active measures to 
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involve more parties, including the public, in science and technology governance. 
The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Science and Technology Progress, 
as amended in 2008, explicitly provides for the rights of the public to participate 
in decision-making on science and technology affairs: ‘The State encourages gov-
ernment departments, enterprises, institutions, public organizations and citizens to 
participate in and support activities for progress of science and technology’ (China 
2008).
This encouragement of public participation in the formulation of the country’s 
science and technology policies was reflected, for example, in the compilation 
of the Outline of the National Program for Long- and Medium-Term Scientific 
and Technological Development. In 2003, the Chinese government had begun to 
design multiple forms of public participation in accordance with the principle of 
‘public participation, brainstorming, democratic decision-making and scientific 
decision-making’. The Ministry of Science and Technology, for example, opened 
a new channel about the outline on its official website to keep the public informed 
of progress, and launched a public participation forum with 19 topics that the pub-
lic could visit to make comments and share views on the compilation of the out-
line. These measures strengthened communication and interaction with the public. 
Later, in the review and evaluation of the implementation of the outline, the office 
in charge of the programme issued more than 2,000 questionnaires and organized 
more than 100 working meetings to solicit expert opinions from relevant govern-
ment departments, enterprises, higher-learning institutions, research institutes and 
industry associations (Li 2011).
Meanwhile, as the rapid economic growth of the past 30 years has greatly 
improved Chinese people’s living conditions and levels of education, the Chinese 
public’s awareness of rights and perception of risks have risen accordingly. As a 
result, the Chinese people are more willing and able to participate in the govern-
ance of science and technology.
The case of the protests against PX projects in China is a good illustration of 
this tendency. PX is the abbreviated name for the dangerous chemical p-Xylene, 
which is strongly carcinogenic and teratogenic. In 2007, a petition cosigned by six 
members of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and 100 members of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Congress was submitted to the congress against 
the plan to establish a PX plant in Xiamen city, Fujian province. This proposition 
was reported in the media and received extensive public attention. Local people 
debated furiously in online forums and took to the streets holding banners bearing 
words such as ‘I love Xiamen’ and ‘We oppose PX’. However, the city govern-
ment did not pay enough attention to the protest. On the contrary, the government 
accelerated the project while taking control measures such as confiscating maga-
zines, closing websites and blocking SMS messages. These measures only fuelled 
the circulation of the PX information among local residents, who planned a street 
‘stroll’ against the PX project via SMS. In early June, some residents wearing yel-
low ribbons launched a ‘stroll’ in front of the seat of the city’s government, bring-
ing public participation in the matter to a head (Song and Yu 2012). It was only 
then that the government took account of the public’s demands and responded 
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positively. After that, the government made active efforts to listen extensively to 
the opinions of residents through a variety of channels such as SMS, telephone, 
fax, email and mail. In December 2007, the Xiamen government formally issued 
an environmental assessment report on the PX project and convened a symposium. 
Eventually it was decided, on 9 January 2009, that the PX project would be moved 
to another city.
From this case and many others, it is possible to identify some general char-
acteristics of public engagement in China. First, the main public participants in 
science and technology governance include direct stakeholders, indirect stake-
holders, social groups, lay experts and the general public. There is a lack of inde-
pendent third-party social groups, especially in large-scale campaigns, in which 
independent NGOs are not allowed to participate. It is the absence of independent 
organizations that has led to the occasion-specificity and disorderliness of public 
participation.
Second, the direct cause of public participation in science and technology gov-
ernance is their shared stake. Why did the Xiamen PX incident provoke a strong 
public response? The answer is that it was localized, it touched the vital interests 
of local residents, and it was caused by the omission of local government from 
the process. When the local public have shared motivations and common interests, 
they are better positioned to launch a large-scale mass campaign as a means of 
public participation.
Third, public participation in science and technology governance is mainly bot-
tom-up and post-occurrence, and lacks formal channels. Many important incidents 
of public participation have taken place after, rather than before, the occurrence of 
the problems. They have mostly taken the form of bottom-up campaigns to exert 
pressure on the authorities, which in some cases respond by setting up formal con-
sultative and participatory processes. Just as some scholars have observed, public 
participation in the decision-making on science and technology affairs is mostly 
spontaneous and non-institutionalized and lacks legal protection, and is also often 
ignored by decision-makers (Fan et al. 2011).
4.4  Public Engagement in India
Four pillars underlie India’s science and technology goals: techno-nationalism, 
inclusive growth, techno-globalism, and global leadership (Mashelkar 2008). 
The Science, Technology and Innovation Policy 2013 issued by the Ministry of 
Science and Technology observed that science and technology systems had to 
undergo a paradigm shift from the current input-driven innovation model to a 
more development-led strategy. The document emphasized the importance of pub-
lic awareness of Indian science and technology. It stated that ‘public and politi-
cal understanding of science should be based on evidence and debates with open 
mind. People and decision makers must be made aware of the implications of 
emerging technologies, including the ethical, social and economic dimensions’.
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India has a vibrant civil society, but in science and technology issues that civil 
society has much more potential to contribute. To begin with, not many groups are 
active in science and technology policy or in promoting pTA in India, and those 
that are there work on issues like sustainable agriculture, traditional medicine and 
the rights of forest dwellers, with a focus on praxis rather than on policy aspects. In 
the controversy over Bt brinjal, many of these groups came together and opposed 
the granting of permission for the commercial cultivation of the plant, but the same 
level of involvement is missing from the debate on policy issues like the proposed 
Biotechnology Regulatory Authority of India Bill. Although civil society groups 
opposed the bill, which proposed replacing the current regulatory system with a new 
regulatory authority, the debate was not as intense as the controversy over Bt brinjal.
There are not many civil society groups working on science and technology 
policy issues in India. One reason, perhaps, is that not many universities or institu-
tions of higher learning offer courses in science and technology policy or studies. 
Another factor could be that science and technology policy is too diffuse a topic 
to attract NGOs that usually focus on a single sector, such as health, agriculture 
or workers’ rights. Some groups are working on nuclear energy and atomic energy 
issues, but are divided on nuclear energy for peaceful uses.
There are some think tanks and other initiatives that have links with academic 
institutions working on science and technology policy issues, broadly speak-
ing, but these are not activist groups. They can, however, be considered part of 
civil society. For example, the Knowledge in Civil Society Forum is a network 
of academic institutions, researchers and NGOs working on agriculture, knowl-
edge and innovation. As part of the SET-DEV (Science, Ethics and Technological 
Responsibility in Developing and Emerging Countries) project funded by the 
European Commission, the forum published Knowledge Swaraj: An Indian 
Manifesto on Science and Technology in 2011. Earlier it held a national workshop 
with civil society groups engaged in science and technology issues. A perusal of 
the papers and proceedings indicates that the groups working on irrigation, energy, 
sustainable agriculture and forestry, and researchers working on traditional medi-
cine, innovation studies, and agricultural research and extension, participated in 
the workshop. However, although they covered many issues, there was no focus on 
science and technology policy or policy making per se.
Participation is an important issue in India, however. There are groups that 
work on participatory rural appraisal, irrigation, the participatory auditing of pro-
jects and the participation of marginalized groups in civic bodies. But their focus 
on participation is more on empowerment issues than on assessing systems and 
technologies. As in the case of science and technology policy, it is also difficult 
with pTA to identify any group or organization that is focusing on this, although 
there are many groups promoting alternative technologies in different sectors. 
One reason is that technology assessment itself is not a well-developed or thor-
oughly researched topic in India. The Technology Information, Forecasting 
and Assessment Council is an agency under the Department of Science and 
Technology that performs technology assessment, but pTA is a new concept in 
India and not much work has been done on it.
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The major constraint is the fact that civil society groups are not involved in sci-
ence and technology policy issues and lack expertise in technology assessment. 
Environmental groups, trades unions and people’s science groups are quite active 
in defending people’s rights and interests with regard to technological change, 
among other areas, and aspects of technology assessment play a role in rela-
tion to these activities, but technology assessment as a methodology is perceived 
as a matter for researchers. There is enough scope for pTA in India, particularly 
in the case of biotechnology, agricultural technologies and energy technolo-
gies. Participatory rural appraisal and the participatory management of natural 
resources in joint forest management have been thoroughly tested in India. The 
challenge lies in translating the need into action. What is required is interaction 
between civil society, policy-making and research to strengthen public participa-
tion in interdisciplinary problem-oriented research.
4.5  Discussion and Conclusion
It can be concluded from the research on pTA and its political role that the chances 
of public engagement being visible in public or political debates are relatively 
good when the political situation is open, with interested parties looking for new 
ways to solve problems and no immediate decisions at stake. Typically these 
are situations in which the problem has not yet been well defined politically or 
in which the interested parties are searching for common paradigms to solve the 
problem. The results of public engagement arrangements have a good chance of 
being referred to in the public sphere and in policy-making if the focus is on the 
development of ideas and the objectives are not highly contested. When the issue 
at stake is highly contested and interest groups hold definite positions on it, public 
debate of the benefits and risks may still continue, but it is highly unlikely that 
independent policy advice or consultation will have any kind of impact, regard-
less of whether it is expert or participatory (On this and the following, see Hennen 
2013).
The unclear political status of public engagement and the fact that it often 
appears to have little influence on decision-making have, taking pTA as an 
example, led to criticism (Rayner 2003; Stirling 2007; Abels 2007; Bora and 
Hausendorfer 2006). Although such criticism is justified with regard to many 
individual pTA exercises, the conclusions drawn from observation of the lim-
ited effect of pTA seem unduly strong. The effect is limited because there is no 
defined role for pTA in the established decision-making processes, not through any 
inherent bias against pTA procedures. It can be demonstrated that the outcomes 
of many pTA procedures (i.e. their conclusions and recommendations) contradict 
the expectations held by experts and decision-makers. The argument that pTA is a 
way of framing issues that allows non-scientific arguments (considered to be irra-
tional) to be ruled out by the process, or that it involves citizens in a procedure that 
rules out their authentic attitudes, does not find much support in empirical studies 
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of the outcomes of citizen juries in contested fields of technology or scientific 
development.
Framing and the instrumental use of outcomes are, as Stirling (2007) has 
argued, a problem for any type of policy advice and technology appraisal. He 
holds that participatory appraisal is as open to power and justification strategies 
as is expert appraisal. PTA can be used to induce ‘technical commitments’, that is, 
a closure of processes of technology development, instead of opening them up for 
new perspectives and values.
However, it is by providing for transparency and by giving as much control 
of the process as possible to participants that practitioners strive for an open and 
unbiased process. In brief, there are rules of good practice, some of them derived 
from Habermasian discourse ethics, that can protect against instrumental use and 
framing. With regard to expert appraisal (science), one cannot deny the relevance 
of central institutional features of science such as peer review and methodologi-
cal scepticism, despite known cases of scientific fraud. Similarly, participatory 
appraisal is guided by discourse rules and the principle of transparency, which are 
functional equivalents to the Mertonian principles of science.
An evaluation of the effects of pTA must take into account that it is quite dif-
ficult, and often impossible, to identify the effects of scientific advice on decision-
making processes. Such processes are generally influenced by a complex set of 
interests and rationalities (Albaek 1995). Thus expert appraisal often suffers from 
the same lack of visible impact as participatory appraisal. In contrast to expert 
appraisal, however, pTA cannot simply be regarded as a paid service to policy-
making that may be heeded or not. Because it includes underrepresented societal 
perspectives, pTA carries a connotation of democratizing science and technol-
ogy policy and produces expectations of democratic inclusion. A lack of perceiv-
able impact is therefore more problematical for pTA than for expert appraisal and 
might, in the long run, create grave disappointments.
For our comparison among the three regions of the state of the art in public 
participation, it is worth noting that civil society in European countries has been 
fighting for more participation in local, environmental, and technological decision-
making since the 1960s. In Germany, for example, the Planungszelle, a kind of 
citizen jury, was developed in the 1970s to handle local environmental conflicts. 
Concerning participation in technology policy, it took over 20 years, particularly 
in the bigger European countries, for methods like the citizen jury to be transferred 
to the field of technology policy.
This evolution in Europe has been advanced by different developments, includ-
ing the waves of democratization since the 1960s, the rise of environmental activ-
ism and civil society organizations since the 1970s and 1980s, and the publicly 
perceived accumulation of governance failures or scandals in the 1990s.
The Chinese PX case shows some parallels to European environmental activ-
ism and disputes in the 1970s and 1980s, when environmental NGOs and parties 
evolved. But, of course, these developments took place in different sociocultural 
settings. The Chinese government is starting to emphasize the importance of 
social engagement in science and technology governance. Meanwhile, the Chinese 
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public are more willing and able to participate. In future, the more difficult work is 
going to be building up a better institutional environment for public engagement in 
China.
In India, there is already a certain sentiment for self-organized bottom-up 
engagement and empowerment of local civil society groups and NGOs acting in 
specific local and cultural or application-oriented contexts. However, these groups 
and organizations still face problems in reaching or addressing science policy 
actors because they often lack the technical capacity to address broader and over-
arching science and technology issues beyond their operational context, and they 
also lack channels to the policy-making levels.
Europe, on the other hand, has to some extent managed to channelize, and even 
forestall, activist movements by offering alternative different channels for more 
or less extensive participation by stakeholders and the general public. In addi-
tion, science and technology governance in Europe could profit from a range of 
context-specific knowledge leading to more robust technology implementation 
processes.
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5.1  Introduction
This chapter is in four parts. The first describes the most fundamental European 
values as recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(EU) and the Treaty of Lisbon. One value that will be discussed in addition to 
those contained in the charter is that of sustainability. While the idea of sustainable 
development was included in previous European treaties and instruments, it has 
been given more emphasis in the Treaty of Lisbon through Art. 3(3) (EU 2007):
The Union … shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming 
at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of 
the quality of the environment (our emphasis).
A brief historical section will explain how many of these fundamental values 
attained prominence. Explanation of what exactly these values mean forms the 
main part of the chapter, followed by a case study section on preimplantation 
diagnostics.
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5.2  Fundamental European Values
Science and technology policies will succeed best if built on strong ethical 
foundations. These foundations are being debated worldwide, and the need 
for effective global governance of science is becoming more and more urgent. 
Given the democratic backing of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon (EU 2007), we shall explore funda-
mental European values and how they relate to science and technology policies 
(Fig. 5.1).
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) was signed on 7 
December 2000. Importantly, the charter is legally binding. This was achieved by 
incorporating a reference to the charter into a binding treaty. Article 6(1) of the 
Treaty of Lisbon (EU 2007) reads:
The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at 
Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties.
This reference to ‘the same legal value as the Treaties’ means that the charter 
now forms part of the primary law of the EU, and as a result provisions are 
potentially enforceable through national courts as well as in the European Court 
of Justice (Barnard 2008). (The scope of the charter is specifically aimed at 
institutions of the EU and only applies to member states, when implementing 
EU law.1)
1 The field of application is addressed in Art. 51(1) of the charter, which reads: ‘The provisions 
of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with 
due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are imple-
menting Union law.’
Fig. 5.1  Main principles of 
the charter of fundamental 
rights and the treaty on the 
European Union
555 Science and Technology Governance and European Values
5.3  European Enlightenment
The European Enlightenment was broadly coextensive with the 18th century. The 
German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) described it as a process of mov-
ing from superstition, unawareness and blind belief in authorities to progress for 
humanity through the power of reason (Kant 1990). The term ‘Enlightenment’ is thus 
generally used in Europe to describe a process of liberation from traditions, institu-
tions, conventions and norms that could not be rationally justified. Essential ideas 
associated with this period include the convictions that mastery over nature will lead 
to the advancement of humanity, that tolerance is a virtue of states needed to main-
tain public order and that human beings can be perfected through education (Mickel 
1986). Amartya Sen summarizes the European Enlightenment as an ‘intellectual cli-
mate … with [an] interest in reasoned construction of social order’ (Sen 2000).
Common to all ideas of the Enlightenment is the core belief that human rea-
son and not religious or state authority ought to decide on the norms of ethical, 
political and social action as well as the differences between truth and error. As a 
result, some of the values now found in the EU Charter rose to prominence when 
authoritarian regimes were challenged, especially on questions of freedoms, citi-
zens’ rights, solidarity and equality. This was particularly obvious in the French 
Revolution of 1789, with its rallying cry of ‘Liberté, égalité, fraternité’ [Liberty, 
equality, brotherhood].
Immanuel Kant was an exceptionally important figure in the European 
Enlightenment (Hampson 1982), and he has most often been credited as the father 
of human rights in their modern sense. In the West, the history of human rights is 
often told in two different ways. The first takes an inclusive approach, and claims 
that human rights are based on universal beliefs that can be traced back to most 
religions (Hampson 1982). For instance, believers in Islam have issued a Universal 
Declaration of Islamic Human Rights containing 23 rights, including the right to 
a fair trial, the right to protection against torture and the right to social security 
(Islamic Council 1981).
On the other hand, ‘Islam stresses the submission of the individual to Allah [as] 
God has rights, people do not…’ (Dalacoura 2005). This statement clearly con-
tradicts both the idea of individual human rights and the European Enlightenment 
belief that one should question religious authorities. Likewise, Buddhism seems 
incompatible with rights assigned to autonomous individuals, given that it ‘denies 
the very idea of autonomy, continuity and authenticity of the self’ (Chan 2005a). 
Similarly, Confucianism and its focus on virtue (the attainment of ren being the 
most perfect of virtues) links better to ideas of ethics of obligations than to rights; 
in particular, obligations to respect and care for others (Chan 2005b).
The second approach maintains from the start that the idea of human rights is 
of Western origin, usually credited to the Enlightenment and specifically to John 
Locke (1632–1704) and Immanuel Kant (1727–1804).
Analyses of the historical predecessors of the contemporary theory of human 
rights typically accord a high degree of importance to Locke’s contribution. 
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Certainly, Locke provided the precedent of establishing legitimate political author-
ity upon a rights foundation. This is undeniably an essential component of human 
rights. However, while the philosophically adequate completion of a theoretical 
basis of human rights requires an account of moral reasoning that is consistent 
with the concept of rights, it does not necessarily require an appeal to the authority 
of some superhuman entity in justifying human beings’ claims to certain, funda-
mental rights. Immanuel Kant provides such an account (Fagan 2005).
How does Kant justify his belief in universal human rights—in other words, in indi-
vidual rights irrespective of gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation etc.? For Kant, 
human beings have the capacity to act morally: their ability to separate good and bad 
actions depends on their faculty of reason, and only because they are rational is it pos-
sible for them to decide between right and wrong. This human ability to be rational and 
to make decisions leads to a particular way of looking at the world. As Kant says in a 
famous passage from the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1996):
[B]ut a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical 
reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person… he is not to be valued merely as a 
means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he 
possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from 
all other beings in the world.
In justifying human rights through the human ability to reason, Kant also intro-
duces a value which has since become central to European value systems, namely 
that of dignity. Humans have dignity and possess human rights because of their 
‘rational nature in its capacity to be morally self-legislative’ (Wood 1999). Kant 
therefore based individual, universal human rights on human dignity understood 
as the ability to be self-legislative. (For a broader view of dignity, see below.) This 
is why he is often regarded as the Father of Human Rights, which are now also 
reflected in the EU Charter.
The value of dignity was given added importance through the horrendous acts 
of Nazi doctors during the Second World War and other harmful, highly exploita-
tive medical experiments. As a result, the 1949 German Constitution now places 
respect for human dignity ahead of all other values, enshrined in Art. 1(1): 
‘Human dignity shall be inviolable’.
When European Enlightenment ideas of the questioning of authorities (politi-
cal and religious), mastery over nature, belief in human progress and individual 
autonomy are combined, it is clear why the development of science and innovation 
has accelerated in the West since the 17th century.
For instance, the optimistic notion of progress was paramount to the devel-
opment of modern science. It is often said that Western philosophers still debate 
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, while his scientific assumptions (for instance, 
that the void around the earth is filled with aether) have long since been discarded.
Only with the wider use of nuclear energy and nuclear deterrence (Lehming 
1991) in the 1950s and 1960s, and later with the development of genetically 
modified organisms, was the belief in social progress through science questioned 
among broader populations in Europe. The first European Green parties emerged 
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in the 1970s, and the most powerful—the German Green Party—has been sharing 
government responsibilities since the 1980s either locally, regionally or nationally, 
based on opposition to nuclear power and genetic modification. The value of sus-
tainability derives from this movement, which is active throughout Europe.
In addition to the Green movement’s subversion of an uncritical belief in sci-
ence, it is today widely acknowledged that the European Enlightenment, with its 
emphasis on human progress, human domination over nature and the importance 
of reason, nourished the European colonial enterprise. Indian scholar Sanjay Seth, 
who heads the London-based Centre for Postcolonial Studies, writes (Seth 2011):
Armed with the certainty that it possessed nothing less than universal Reason, Europe 
could proceed with its colonial conquests, no longer principally in the name of bringing 
the true word of god to the heathen, but rather in the name of bringing Enlightenment and 
civilization to the benighted.
While Seth emphasizes that ‘neither the modern age nor Europe has had a monop-
oly on … dogmatism’ (Seth 2011), he notes that the belief in tradition-free reason, 
which does not realize the cultural context of ideals and practices, made colonial-
ism possible.
At the same time, thinkers from different continents continue to stress a key 
idea from the Enlightenment period, namely humanism: the belief that all indi-
vidual human beings are important and deserve respect. For instance, according to 
Nigerian scholar in African Studies M.O. Eze, a ‘peculiar form of African human-
ism’ (Eze 2011) can be identified in the philosophy of Ubuntu. ‘Ubuntu’ is often 
summed up as meaning ‘I am because you are’ and the belief system emphasizes 
‘compassion, generosity, honesty, magnanimity, empathy, understanding, forgive-
ness, and the ability to share’ (Eze 2011). According to this system of thought, 
human beings flourish best through supportive relationships with others.
The new humanism, according to Mexican professor of political and social phi-
losophy Oliver Kozlarek, is a humanism that does not stop at recognizing cultural 
differences in postcolonial times, but instead looks for normative perspectives that 
all humans can agree upon. Importantly, these perspectives need to filter down 
into everyday life and practice (Kozlarek 2011). Once this is achieved, humanism 
will have succeeded in ensuring that human beings flourish in a culturally diverse 
world.
5.4  European Fundamental Values
5.4.1  Justice
The unjust ignore justified rules, exploit others and are enemies to equality, 
according to Aristotle (1985). An earthquake or a hurricane cannot be just or 
unjust, nor can a lion or a monkey. Even a human being, if entirely alone on a 
desert island, cannot be just or unjust. Justice is a principle that requires human 
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interaction. It can characterize agents and their actions, social rules or states of 
affairs (Pogge 2006). Justice is a wide field, and as Rawls (1999) has rightly 
observed:
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of system of thought. A theory 
however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws 
and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished 
if they are unjust.
Among the ethical principles that inform science and technology policy, justice is 
therefore likely to play a major role, given its supremacy as a virtue of social rules 
and institutions. Articles 47 to 50 of the EU Charter deal with justice: they include 
the right to a fair trial, the right to be presumed innocent and the right to propor-
tionate punishment. These rights have no direct relevance to science and technology 
policy; however, it has to be noted that the charter does not use the full scope of the 
justice principle, but is restricted to corrective and retributive justice. These are two 
of four distinct justice subprinciples that philosophers traditionally distinguish.
Of the subprinciples set out in Table 5.1, distributive justice could be especially 
relevant to science and technology policy. For instance, ‘nano-divide’ describes a con-
cern that the gap between the rich and the poor, both within nation states and globally, 
will increase through the use of advanced technologies (Barakat and Jiao 2010):
If global economic progress in producing high-value products and services depends upon 
exploiting scientific knowledge, the high entry price for new procedures and skills (for 
example, in the medical domain) is very likely to exacerbate existing divisions between 
rich and poor (Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 2004, p. 52).
While such concerns can be grouped under ‘distributive justice’ as a subprinci-
ple of justice, they can also be seen as relevant to the principles of solidarity or 
equality.
5.4.2  Solidarity
‘Solidarity’ means mutual support, especially among individuals with com-
mon interests. Solidarity is not as complex and long-debated a principle as jus-
tice. In fact, it does not even appear in Aristotle’s work, nor in Immanuel Kant’s. 
Table 5.1  Justice
Justice 
subprinciple
Description
Justice in 
exchange
Establishes the fairness or equity of transactions
Distributive justice Deals with the division of existing, scarce resources amongst qualifying 
recipients
Corrective justice Rights a wrong that one has brought upon another, usually through a court 
declaring a remedy to correct the given injustice
Retributive justice Establishes which punishment is appropriate for any given crime
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However, it has become a much debated topic in bioethics, with some arguing 
that solidarity is a value that characterizes continental European welfare states as 
opposed to Anglo-American states, which rather focus on individual autonomy 
(Habermas 2003; Bayertz 1998; Hermerén 2008). As a group of Dutch researchers 
put it (Hoedemaekers et al. 2007):
In a number of European welfare states altruistic solidarity as a commitment to help or 
support the needy and disadvantaged has been incorporated in their institutions and law. 
We term this institutional solidarity.
This institutional solidarity for the needy and disadvantaged is also part of the EU 
Charter, in Art. 27 to 38. While these articles also deal with workers’ rights, the 
main emphasis is on access to social security and (preventive) health care for all. 
How is this value relevant to science and technology policy?
An example: it has been argued that large-scale genetic research should be 
governed by the value of solidarity rather than the value of autonomy. Chadwick 
and Berg (2001) believe that medical progress depends on research participants’ 
accepting it as their duty to participate in research for the benefit of others Their 
use of the principle of solidarity focuses on duties, while the EU Charter focuses 
on rights. It is clear that such a duty-based use of the principle could have con-
siderable implications for research and development, especially the recruitment 
of research participants or sample donors in medical research. At the same time, 
extended globally, the principle could be used to lobby for capacity building and 
technology transfer in the context of the nano-divide referred to above.
It is worth noting, though, that the solidarity principle as used in the EU 
Charter does not extend to international aid beyond the EU member states. Hence, 
global solidarity is not covered. Here one would have to look at global legal instru-
ments such as the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which calls for international aid to achieve access to health care for all 
human beings based on the premise of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
that all human beings are born equal.
5.4.3  Equality
Only in logic is the principle of equality straightforward: two items or entities that 
cannot be distinguished are equal. In ethics and political theory, equality is not 
as easily described. Rather than referring to identical entities, the moral value of 
equality refers to equal rights, equal opportunities and equal moral status. It is 
only in this regard that we are all equal. The rights pronounced in the EU Charter 
are a good example: Arts. 20 to 27 are based on the understanding that nobody 
should be discriminated against, because we are all born equal in rights.
Difficulties arise not so much in the legal attribution of rights, but in political 
action. What does it mean in practice to have equal rights? In the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle referred to the formal equality principle, the principle of non-dis-
crimination (1985). According to Aristotle, it does not matter whether a good man 
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steals from a bad man, or a good man rather than a bad man commits adultery: 
only the action counts. Hence, a court would have to ensure corrective and retribu-
tive justice for the bad man and the good man in order to preserve legal equality.
Yet even among philosophers who promote egalitarian policies, the principle is 
not clear. There are four interpretations of what equality means when linked to public 
policies: equality of wellbeing, resources, opportunity and capabilities (Daniels 1990).
Equal concern for the wellbeing of citizens is outcome-focused and tries to 
achieve equal welfare or at least equal preference satisfaction for all. This approach 
does not imply equal treatment, given that some citizens will require more support to 
achieve wellbeing than others (for instance, those with serious disabilities).
This account of equality puts responsibility for citizen welfare onto the government. 
Equality of resources, on the other hand, moves responsibility for welfare onto individ-
ual citizens, provided they are given access to resources. It is then left to them to convert 
these into wellbeing. Likewise, on the policy of equality of opportunity citizens are pro-
vided with the means to obtain certain ends for which they have to strive themselves. 
For instance, equal opportunity policies will provide education to all so that not only the 
wealthy acquire the skills and knowledge necessary to find satisfying jobs. The capabili-
ties approach to equality aims to lift all human beings up to a given benchmark of func-
tioning that allows them to pursue alternative life plans freely chosen.
What is important in all discussions of equality is to be aware of the privileges 
and restrictions ingrained in all societies, for instance the privileges that men enjoy 
versus women in terms of realizing life plans, or the privileges enjoyed by most in 
affluent versus lower income countries. As ‘The World’s Greatest Money Maker’ 
(BBC 2009), Warren Buffett, has noted, ‘If you stick me down in the middle of 
Bangladesh or Peru, you’ll find out how much this talent is going to produce in the 
wrong kind of soil’ (Singer 2009).
5.4.4  Dignity
None of the six values from the EU Charter is as contested, in either scholarly or 
policy debates, as that of dignity. The principle has been described as useless 
(Macklin 2003), arbitrary (Van Steendam et al. 2006), elusive (Ullrich 2003), 
groundless (Rachels 1990), a nebulous drug (Wetz 2004) and without reference 
point (Statman 2000). In fact, the Canadian Supreme Court decided in 2008 that 
dignity was not to be used in anti-discrimination cases any longer as it was ‘con-
fusing and difficult to apply’.2 At the same time, dignity is a principle evoked in 
almost all modern constitutions and human rights treaties.
Articles 1 to 5 of the EU Charter summarize dignity rights, which include the 
right to life and integrity of the person, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment, and the prohibition of slavery and forced labour.
2 R. v Kapp [2008] Supreme Court Canada 41 at §22: ‘[H]uman dignity is an abstract and subjective 
notion that… cannot only become confusing and difficult to apply; it has also proven to be an addi-
tional burden on equality claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement it was intended to be.’
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An example of the complexity and difficulty of interpreting what the princi-
ple of dignity means can be given in the context of nanotechnology. When the 
European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) identified the 
ethical questions relating to the development of nanomedicine, its first question 
was: ‘How should the dignity of people participating in nanomedicine research tri-
als be respected?’ (EGE 2007). If one links this back to the dignity rights in the 
EU Charter, one wonders which right could be violated by taking part in nano-
medicine research trials. Certainly not the prohibition against torture or slavery. 
The right to life? But then safety concerns are usually discussed outside of dignity 
debates. The right to integrity of the person? The further explications of this right 
given in Art. 3(2) of the charter are:
In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in particular:
•	 the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the proce-
dures laid down by law,
•	 the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection 
of persons,
•	 the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of finan-
cial gain,
•	 the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings.
Looking at the above, it is still not possible to link the dignity concern of the EGE 
to the explicated rights. The reason could be that the concept is used in widely dif-
ferent ways: ‘dignity’ can serve, for example, as a synonym for religious principles 
or in a comment on a person’s manners. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the principle’s 
breadth of application by coupling definitions of common understandings of dig-
nity with illustrative quotations (Schroeder 2008, 2010).
Looking at this range of dignity concepts, it is not surprising that the Canadian 
Supreme Court decided that dignity was too confusing and difficult to apply in 
its decisions. However, the principle plays a supreme role in most constitutions, 
Fig. 5.2  Meanings of dignity
‘A human being … possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts 
respect for himself from all other beings in the world’ (Kant 1996).
‘[T]he Gospel of the dignity 
of the person and the Gospel 
of life are a single and 
indivisible Gospel’ (John 
Paul II 1995).
‘A wreath is much easier bound 
than a dignified head for it 
found’ (my translation: In the 
original German: ‘Ein Kranz ist 
gar viel leichter binden, als ihm 
ein würdig Haupt zu finden) 
(Goethe n.d.)
‘Conducting a public romance may have reduced the dignity of the presidency, but 
Sarkozy is president for an era in which dignity is less important than humanity’
(Tharoor 2008).
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and any attempt at purging such a powerful concept from ethical discourse would 
amount to whistling in the wind, in the view of some legal scholars (Beyleveld and 
Brownsword 2001).
5.4.5  Citizens’ Rights
Articles 39 to 46 describe very specific citizens’ rights, ranging from the right to 
vote in European elections to the entitlement to diplomatic support when travelling 
abroad. Given that the whole charter consists of citizens’ rights, it is somewhat 
surprising that the drafters chose these terms. Aside from that, however, what is 
of some interest here is the concept of a right in itself, in particular given current 
debates about the differences between Western and Asian ethical systems.
It has been argued that the Asian approach to ethics is community-based, 
focusing on the recognition of the interdependence of all forms of life on earth. It 
thereby presents ‘holistic harmony’ as an essential feature of its ethics (Sakamoto 
1999). Likewise, in traditional Chinese society, ‘there is less emphasis on indi-
vidual rights, self-expression, and self-determination. In the community, qualities 
such as harmony, function, and responsibility are stressed more than individual 
rights, and familial relationships assume primary importance’ (Ip et al. 1998).
What, then, is a right? Human communities are organized by social rules, many 
of which are encoded in law and administered through courts. These rules can be 
rights-centred or obligation-centred. As early as 1861, John Stuart Mill defined 
rights in a way that is still valid today (Mill 2002):
When we call anything a person’s right, we mean that he has a valid claim on society to 
protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of law, or by that of education and 
opinion … To have a right, then, is … to have something which society ought to defend 
me in the possession of.
A right as understood in the EU Charter is therefore a claim that individual EU 
citizens have on EU bodies. This claim right is open to each one of the approxi-
mately 500 million people living under EU law. It is centred on the individual, not 
on the community he or she lives in. In the context of science and technology, the 
rights of individuals can be usefully illustrated by way of the field of research eth-
ics in medical research.
To achieve progress in medical research, experiments on human beings 
are necessary. Research ethics is the field that governs how such research must 
be conducted if it is to respect fundamental human rights. These rights are non-
negotiable and cannot be overridden by reference to, for example, the common 
good. Hence, no human being can be involved in research against his or her will. 
Individual rights take precedence over the good of the community in medical 
research. Article 8 of the World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki reads 
(WMA 1964):
While the primary purpose of medical research is to generate new knowledge, this goal 
can never take precedence over the rights and interests of individual research subjects.
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5.4.6  Freedoms
Rights and freedoms are closely linked concepts. Western philosophers usually 
distinguish negative freedom from positive freedom. ‘Negative freedom’ describes 
the absence of barriers or external restraint, while ‘positive freedom’ describes the 
powers and resources required to pursue one’s life plans (Berlin and Hardy 2002). 
To be able to move to a different country as a privileged academic is a negative 
freedom, in that nobody stops us from going and no immigration control stops 
us from entering. However, this same ability would be a positive freedom for an 
orphaned child rescued in a war zone and taken abroad for hospital treatment or 
perhaps to stay.
The freedoms given to EU citizens through the charter include broad negative 
rights such as the right to property (Art. 17) and the right to liberty (Art. 6), as 
well as more specific negative rights such as the right to marry (Art. 9) and the 
right to religious freedom (Art. 10). On the other hand, the right to education (Art. 
15) is a positive freedom as it provides resources for individual citizens in order to 
increase their choices in life.
Strict libertarians argue that the state should be minimalist and focus on pro-
tecting negative freedom only (Nozick 1974). However, it is one of the defin-
ing features of Europe, especially continental Europe, that positive freedoms are 
given prominence. This approach can be observed, for instance, in the European 
Commission’s action plan on nanosciences and nanotechnologies. Rather than 
focusing on the negative freedom of researchers to ‘choose an occupation and 
right to engage in work’ (Art. 15), the plan focuses on the positive freedom of 
the public ‘to establish an effective dialogue with all stakeholders’ (European 
Commission 2005) and to take people’s expectations and concerns into account.
5.4.7  Sustainability
The values discussed so far are about people; sustainability is about the environ-
ment. Yet some approaches to environmental protection and sustainable develop-
ment are highly people-focused or instrumental (Fox 1996).
Instrumental approaches to the environment value the environment only in so 
far as it is useful for or appreciated by humans. In this regard, concern for the 
environment is only indirect, mediated through a direct moral concern for other 
people. The different instrumental approaches are set out in Table 5.2.
In contrast with instrumental approaches, intrinsic value approaches to the envi-
ronment accept that the environment, independent of humans, has a value in its own 
right. Hence, the concern for the environment is direct. This is set out in Table 5.3.
The emphasis in the Treaty of Lisbon on sustainable development and the pro-
motion of scientific and technological advancement (Art. 3(3)) suggests that the 
European Union’s stance on sustainability and environment is instrumental, in 
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other words people-centred or anthropocentric. The environment is to be protected 
and preserved in order to enable the sustainable use and continued availability of 
valuable resources for the benefit of today’s and tomorrow’s humans.
5.5  Case Study: Preimplantation Genetic  
Diagnosis in Europe
The far-reaching collaboration necessary to form a union of 28 countries has been 
accompanied by the transfer of national competences to EU institutions and, as 
we have seen above, by the codification of shared values. One can find striking 
consensus on certain applications of science and technology, such as the shared 
rejection of eugenic practices and reproductive cloning of human beings, both 
deemed to be in violation of human dignity, according to Art. 3(2) of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. However, the European Union is still a constellation of 
more than two dozen member states, each with its own distinct cultures and val-
ues, which also apply to its approach to science and technology and the applica-
tions thereof. In the light of such differences, it is important to keep in mind that 
in spite of the far-reaching collaborative nature of the EU, member states still have 
considerable autonomy in some areas. In fact, the competences of the EU itself 
are strictly limited to those conferred upon it by its member states (Art. 5(1) and 
Table 5.2  Instrumental approaches to the environment
Term Approach
Expansionism The environment is valued instrumentally for its contribution to economic 
growth and there are no limits to such growth
Conservation The environment is valued instrumentally for resources required in farming, 
mining, logging etc., and it needs to be conserved for future use
Preservation The environment is valued instrumentally for contributions to human wellbeing 
(e.g. it is good for physical recreation or a potential source of new medicines) 
and ought to be preserved, including for future generations. By contrast with 
conservation, which focuses on use value, preservation focuses on keeping the 
environment from harm, including unrestrained economic exploitation
Table 5.3  Intrinsic value approaches to the environment
Term Approach
Sentience Entities are intrinsically valuable if they are sentient. This is also called the 
animal liberation approach, and its most famous proponents are Bentham 
(1996) and Singer (1995)
Life Entities are intrinsically valuable if they exhibit a biologically based ‘interest’ 
in maintaining their own integrity—put simply, if they strive to maintain their 
own existence (e.g. a plant will expand its roots until it can reach water)
Holistic 
integrity
Entities are intrinsically valuable if they have self-renewing properties as 
a whole, i.e. if they are autopoietic systems such as ecosystems. The most 
famous proponent of this approach is Leopold (1980)
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(2) Treaty on European Union). This section of the chapter examines differences 
in the understanding of values by way of a case study on preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD).
5.5.1  Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
What is PGD? The Health Council of the Netherlands defines it as ‘the examina-
tion in vitro of an embryo (or an egg cell prior to fertilisation) in order to exclude 
a genetic condition in case a very high risk of that condition is known’ (Health 
Council of the Netherlands 2006). Since PGD takes place prior to transfer to the 
womb, it can only be used in combination with in vitro fertilization (IVF). PGD is 
most commonly used by prospective parents who are carriers of (severe) heredi-
tary diseases, such as Duchenne muscular dystrophy or sickle cell disease (Health 
Council of the Netherlands 2006). By using PGD, parents aim to ensure that only 
unaffected embryos are transferred to the womb. PGD is considered ethically con-
troversial in several regards:
•	 The life and moral status of the embryo are not respected by PGD.
•	 IVF and PGD are too burdensome for women.
•	 PGD leads onto a slippery slope towards ‘designer babies’.
•	 PGD can detect genes for diseases that may never develop (e.g. BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 mutations that predispose respectively for breast cancer and ovarian cancer).
•	 ‘Saviour siblings’3 are instrumentalized and treated as a commodity.
•	 PGD can be used for non-medical sex selection, a practice quite common in the 
United States (Dondorp and De Wert 2005; Health Council of the Netherlands 
2006; De Wert 2005; Pennings and De Wert 2003; Brownsword 2005).
The next section briefly examines how PGD is governed in the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands and Germany.
5.5.2  PGD in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has a long history of assisted reproduction. The first baby 
ever to be conceived via IVF was born there in 1978. This event and the rapid speed 
of developments in assisted reproduction led to the establishment of a national 
committee to develop principles for the regulation of IVF and embryology. The 
committee, chaired by philosopher Mary Warnock, concluded in its 1984 report 
that the human embryo should be protected, but research on embryos and IVF was 
permissible as long as appropriate safeguards were respected (Warnock 1984).
3 A child born specifically in order to secure the health of an older sibling, for instance to pro-
vide matching tissue for a bone marrow transplant.
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In the United Kingdom, PGD is allowed as long as the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority agrees that the condition the parents could pass on to the 
child is sufficiently severe. To this end, the authority has published a list of the con-
ditions it has approved so far. The list is quite extensive, and includes BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 mutations, which predispose to breast and ovarian cancer (HFEA 2014). 
PGD for human leukocyte antigen (HLA) typing as required for ‘saviour siblings’ 
is allowed, but such tests are licensed case by case (HFEA 2014). By contrast, sex 
selection for non-medical reasons is not allowed in the United Kingdom, in terms 
of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990. Overall, the United 
Kingdom has a rather liberal approach to the application of PGD.
5.5.3  PGD in the Netherlands
In the Netherlands PGD is allowed for the screening of severe hereditary diseases. 
The permitted scope of screening is determined by the ‘Ministerial regulation of 
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis’ (Aarden et al. 2009), which is based on the 
Embryo Act (Embryowet) of 2002. Whether or not PGD will be allowed is deter-
mined case by case by the performing clinic. To comply with the Act, the clinic 
has to consider the following criteria listed in the regulation:
•	 the severity and nature of the disease,
•	 treatment possibilities,
•	 additional medical criteria (e.g. whether or not expression of the condition at 
hand could be prevented) and
•	 psychological and moral factors.
The Dutch cabinet intended to allow PGD for prospective parents who were car-
riers of (severe) hereditary diseases with a high likelihood that the disease would 
be contracted by the child. After an intense parliamentary debate in 2008, the 
scope of permissible PGD was expanded to include hereditary conditions, even 
where they might never present as a (severe) disease. The regulation specifically 
mentions the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes as examples. PGD for HLA typing 
is, however, explicitly banned in the Dutch regulation, in contrast to the United 
Kingdom, as the ‘new child’ would only be conceived to benefit another child. In 
the Netherlands, as in the United Kingdom, sex selection is strictly limited: there 
must be medical reasons, according to Art. 26 of the Embryo Act. One might say 
that the Netherlands has a moderately tolerant stance towards PGD.
5.5.4  PGD in Germany
Until 2010, PGD was banned in Germany. In particular, the German Embryo 
Protection Act (Embryonenschutzgesetz) of 1990 prohibited any use of human 
embryos created in vitro that did not serve the embryo’s preservation and 
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the establishment of a pregnancy. Although the Act did not explicitly mention 
PGD, several articles were interpreted by academics and policymakers as for-
bidding the technology (Aarden et al. 2009). In July 2010, however, the German 
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) ruled that the Embryo Protection Act did not 
establish a ban on PGD. This in turn led to major public and political discussion 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2011).
In December 2011, after an intense political debate, PGD was eventually 
allowed under strict conditions, when the Preimplantation Diagnosis Act 
(Präimplantationsdiagnostikgesetz) came into force. According to the Act, PGD 
is prohibited in principle, but can be allowed if exceptional conditions are met, 
for instance case-by-case approval by an interdisciplinary ethics commission com-
bined with extensive counselling of the prospective parents. More importantly, 
PGD is limited to (severe) conditions that are highly likely to lead to miscarriage 
or the death of the infant within the first year. This effectively prohibits PGD for 
HLA typing, for the screening of hereditary conditions that might not develop into 
a disease (e.g. BRCA1 breast cancer) or for sex selection for non-medical reasons 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2011). As a result, one can characterize Germany as being 
restrictive towards PGD.
5.5.5  Comparing PGD Dispensations in Europe
Comparing the three EU member states examined above, one sees two common-
alities. First, all three allow PGD in screening for acute life-threatening condi-
tions, and second, they prohibit sex selection for non-medical reasons. However, 
if we look at other (contested) applications of PGD, we see notable differences 
(Table 5.4).
Values are a decisive factor in regulatory choices made regarding PGD in the 
three countries. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany, which all fall 
under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, have considerable room to develop 
policies to govern contested science and technology applications.
Table 5.4  Preimplantation genetic diagnosis in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and 
Germany
PGD applications
United Kingdom The Netherlands Germany
Sex selection for non-medical reasons Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited
HLA matching (‘saviour siblings’) Allowed Prohibited Prohibited
Cancer predisposition (e.g. BRCA1) Allowed Allowed Prohibited
Acute life-threatening conditions Allowed Allowed Allowed
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5.6  Conclusion
The principles and values recognized by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU and the Treaty of Lisbon constitute the point of reference for all acts by 
bodies of the EU. Hence, they also apply to science and technology policies and 
guidelines.
The EU thus conforms to a human rights framework and culture that prioritizes 
non-negotiable individual human rights over the common good. As the case of 
PGD has shown, member states retain considerable autonomy to develop independ-
ent policies to govern contested science and technology applications, an autonomy 
that is justified through the subsidiarity principle of the charter. However, this prin-
ciple is most certainly not unproblematic, since the autonomy of each member state 
extends beyond its own citizens, due to the free movement of persons and of ser-
vices that is a core freedom of the EU in terms of Art. 26(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (EU 2008). EU citizens of restrictive member 
states can easily travel to more liberal countries to make use of controversial tech-
nologies. Belgium, for instance, has a more liberal policy on PGD (comparable to 
the regulations in the United Kingdom) than its neighbour Germany (see, for 
instance, Centrum voor Reproductieve Geneeskunde n.d.).4 According to a study 
by Leopoldina (the German National Academy of Sciences) PGD is carried out for 
around a hundred German couples every year in one Belgian centre alone 
(Leopoldina 2011). Regulating reproductive tourism is just one unresolved instance 
of uniting differing value systems in the far-reaching collaboration of the EU. 
Given that science and technology developments occur at rapid speed, such regula-
tion will certainly remain a challenge within the union.
4 See for instance: http://www.brusselsivf.be/genetic-diagnosis-embryo (In English).
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6.1  Introduction
Science and technology are among the most important factors that have shaped 
modern society. They also have a direct bearing on the orientation of social devel-
opment and even the prospects of mankind. ‘Where is society heading?’ and ‘What 
kind of life should mankind live?’ are both questions pertaining to the appraisal 
of happiness in life: namely, what kind of life is happy and wonderful? Judgment 
on the pursuit of life is, in essence, a matter of values. Therefore values should be 
employed to guide, promote and constrain the direction in which science and tech-
nology develop.
As the primary law of a state, a constitution is the fundamental rule for rein-
ing in state behaviour and regulating relations between the state and its people. 
Therefore the values reflected in the constitution are codified in the form of primary 
law and offer important guidance for making laws and policies and regulating the 
actions of the government. An analysis of the values in the Chinese Constitution 
will help us better understand and judge current events and policies concerning sci-
ence and technology in China and form a clearer picture of ethical issues.
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The first Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was promulgated in 
1954, and another two versions were drafted in 1975 and 1978 respectively. The 
year 1982 saw a fourth version, which is the Constitution now in force. This ver-
sion underwent revisions in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004. These continuous revi-
sions are evidence of efforts made to adapt the Constitution to new situations and 
conditions.
In effect, the values in the Constitution are rooted in society. So, before focusing 
on the values in the Chinese Constitution, it is helpful to review the value system 
in Chinese society with a view to gaining a better understanding of constitutional 
values.
6.2  Major Sources and Elements of the Value System  
in Modern China
Chinese culture can be traced back thousands of years and has experienced 
several major transformations in this long process of evolution. The Yin 
Dynasty (about 1556–1046 BC) is considered to be the beginning of Chinese 
civilization. In the Spring and Autumn Period and the Period of Warring States 
(771–221 BC), Chinese civilization reached its first golden age, with a hundred 
different schools of thought contending for intellectual superiority. It was an era 
of Chinese history that produced a galaxy of great thinkers and philosophers. 
However, the order by Emperor Shihuang in the Qin Dynasty (221–206 BC) 
to burn books and kill scholars caused a serious setback in the evolution of 
Chinese culture.
Later, in the Han Dynasty (206 BC–220 AD), Emperor Wu carried out a 
policy of proscribing all non-Confucian schools of thought and espousing 
Confucianism as the orthodox state ideology, which established the Confucian 
classics as the dominant intellectual discipline in Chinese society. In this 
era of Confucian dominance, the intensive philosophical debate seen in the 
Hundred Schools era disappeared from society. Indian Buddhism was intro-
duced into China in the middle of the Han Dynasty, and steadily expanded 
its influence during the Jin Dynasty (265–420 AD) and the Southern and 
Northern Dynasties (420–589 AD). Then Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism 
emerged as equally dominant in the Sui (581–618 AD) and Tang dynasties 
(618–907 AD).
In the Northern Song Dynasty (960–1127 AD), neo-Confucianism ascended to 
the intellectual stage. Scholars of this school heavily criticized Buddhist and Taoist 
teachings, and brought Confucianism back to the centre. As a result, the Southern 
Song (1127–1279 AD), Ming (1368–1644 AD) and Qing (1616–1911 AD) dynas-
ties were known as the neo-Confucianism era.
In the late Ming Dynasty, European missionaries started coming to China, 
which facilitated cultural exchanges between China and Western civilizations. In 
the middle of the Qing Dynasty, the Opium War plunged the Chinese nation into 
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a grave crisis, and some progressive elements started seeking solutions from the 
West to save the country from total collapse, which set the stage for the beginning 
of a new era of learning from the West (Zhang 2004).
This prolonged process of cultural evolution has shaped the diverse, complex 
and conflicting values of Chinese society today. Based on the historical back-
ground, the value system has three parts: traditional Chinese values, Western val-
ues imported since 1840, and new values grown in contemporary Chinese society.
6.2.1  The Traditional Values of China
The tripartite culture of Confucianism-Buddhism-Taoism, with Confucianism 
dominant, comprises traditional Chinese values. These values take an individual 
as the basis of value judgment and focus on the moral cultivation of an individual, 
extending from the self to others, from an individual to a family, and from a group 
to a state and even the whole world. What is elaborated in the Confucian classic 
The Great Learning—from individual cultivation to familial regulation, govern-
ance by the state and universal tranquility and happiness—is only an ideal descrip-
tion of the lifetime accomplishments of an individual in Confucianism.
Confucianism regards virtue (ren) as the general principle guiding people’s 
ethics, and embraces wisdom, courage, filial piety, brotherhood, loyalty, integ-
rity, humility, tolerance, ingenuity, kindness and respect as the ethical codes for 
constraining behaviour. It underlines the different social status of the emperor, 
the official, the father, the son, the husband and the wife, and the importance 
of abiding by the moral principles and standards that exhort the son to love the 
father, officials to stay loyal to the emperor, the wife to follow the orders of the 
husband, the young to respect the elder, and friends to treat each other with hon-
esty. Taoism, on the other hand, advocates the principle of inaction and urges 
people to endure humiliation, lower social status and a position of weakness, 
stay out of conflict, cherish life, maintain purity and refrain from making moral 
judgments (Jiao 1993).
6.2.2  Western Values Imported Since 1840
In the process of global modernization, a number of concepts and ideas came to 
China gradually. A series of reforms and revolutions after 1840 allowed Western 
religions, science and technology, and political concepts of democracy and free-
dom, and Marxism to exert an immense influence on intellectual elites and the 
public in China (Zhu 2002: 304). Over one to two hundred years, an affinity for 
Western science and technology, the ideology of freedom, equality, and affluence, 
and the concepts of rights and legal awareness has taken root in Chinese society 
and constitutes an important criterion for value judgments by the public.
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6.2.3  New Values Grown in Contemporary Chinese Society
New values have grown in contemporary China under the new social conditions 
of building a socialist market economy towards independence and rejuvenation. 
On one hand, the pursuit is towards the socialist ideal of national development, 
common prosperity, social harmony and improved quality of life; on the other, it 
focuses on the philosophy of the market economy, featuring individual achieve-
ments and fair competition. These two aspects stand in conflict yet have common 
grounds, such as the pursuit of economic development. Consequently, developing 
the economy has become the most essential discourse in contemporary China.
Meanwhile, along with economic development, unintended consequences such 
as environmental risks and social inequality have undergone adjustment and inte-
gration by other elements of values to form the concept of sustainable develop-
ment. Sustainable development as a moral concept emphasizes development not 
just in the economy but also in society, science, culture and the environment; it 
expresses equity among generations and within one generation; and it calls for 
respecting nature, learning from nature, protecting nature and living in harmony 
with nature (Zhu 2002: 144).
6.3  The Basis of Values in the Chinese Constitution
The value system in modern China provides a backdrop against which the val-
ues in the Chinese Constitution can be understood. As the fundamental law of the 
People’s Republic of China, the Constitution defines the regime, which builds the 
foundation for the values to rest upon.
Article 1 of the General Principles of the Chinese Constitution clearly stipu-
lates that:
The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state under the people’s democratic dicta-
torship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The 
socialist system is the basic system of the People’s Republic of China. Sabotage of the 
socialist system by any organization or individual is prohibited.
Since China is a socialist country practising a socialist economic system, the rela-
tionships between the state and society and between the state and citizens reflected 
in the Constitution are different from those in countries with capitalist economic 
systems. Socialism pursues the collective interests of society (Chen et al. 2011). Its 
manifestations in the Constitution include not only the obligations of the state in 
social and economic life, such as developing education, the economy, culture and 
science, and building socialist ethics and ideas, but also the principle of democratic 
centralism that calls upon the minority to follow the majority in decision-making.
Such an emphasis on collective interests is highly consistent with the focus 
on community interests in China’s traditional moral values. The only difference 
is that the concept of community in traditional Chinese culture is a concentric 
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structure of interpersonal relations with each and every individual at its core 
(Fei 1998),1 whereas the collective interests defined by socialism have moved 
beyond the boundary of individuals or individual relations.
Article 3 of the General Principles of the Chinese Constitution states:
The state organs of the People’s Republic of China apply the principle of democratic 
centralism.
The socialist system and the emphasis on collective interests constitute the basis 
for understanding the values embodied in the Chinese Constitution.
6.4  The Key Values in the Chinese Constitution
6.4.1  Progress
‘Progress’ refers to the process from the beginning to the aim, or from the elemen-
tary to the higher stage in a given linear history. According to the Marxist theory 
of social development, human history goes through stages: primitive society, slave 
society, feudal society and capitalist society, and then socialist society and com-
munist society, as a result of constant progress in the motion of contradictions 
between productive forces and relations of production (Shao 1993).
The value of progress finds expression in Marxist theories as well as in the 
Constitution of the new republic, which is greatly influenced by Marxism. A large 
part of the preamble is devoted to the history of the progress of modern and con-
temporary China. It is thus easy to understand why the concept of progress holds a 
position of importance in Chinese society.
A measure of progress is the overall situation of society, including material, polit-
ical and spiritual civilization. Economic development occupies a primary position 
here, because the economic foundation underpins the superstructure, and economic 
development is the necessary condition and guarantee for other social developments. 
Economic development depends on improved productive forces, while the major 
driver of productive forces is the development of science and technology.
Article 14 of the General Principles of the Chinese Constitution states:
The state continuously raises labour productivity, improves economic results and develops 
the productive forces by enhancing the enthusiasm of the working people, raising the level 
of their technical skill, disseminating advanced science and technology …
In other words, to improve productivity and the development of productive forces 
in society, it is necessary to popularize knowledge of and skills in advanced sci-
ence and technology. In fact, enthusiasm and support for scientific progress serve 
as manifestations of the importance of this concept of value.
1 Xiaotong Fei termed interpersonal relations of this type cha xu ge ju, which can be translated 
as ‘the differential mode of association’ or ‘social egoism’.
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6.4.2  Affluence
‘Affluence’ means having adequate possessions and occupying a concomitantly 
superior position. Affluence is one goal-orientation of progress. The affluence pur-
sued in China covers:
•	 the modernization drive regarding industry, agriculture, national defence, and 
science and technology;
•	 the advanced development of education, science, and culture;
•	 higher living standards of the people; and
•	 China’s independence and self-reliance among the countries of the world.
In China today, the value of affluence is embodied at national level, in the pursuit 
of an independent, wealthy and strong nation standing confidently among all the 
nations of the world, and at the level of individual livelihood, in the pursuit of a 
higher level of material and spiritual wellbeing. From transcending basic subsistence 
to achieving a better-off society, to the pursuit of the rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation, all serves to prove the overwhelming momentum of the value of ‘affluence’.
Articles 19 and 20 of the General Principles of the Chinese Constitution state:
The state develops socialist educational undertakings and works to raise the scientific and 
cultural level of the whole nation … The state promotes the development of the natural and 
social sciences, disseminates scientific and technical knowledge, and commends and rewards 
achievements in scientific research as well as technological discoveries and inventions.
It is clear from these provisions that China values science and encourages innova-
tion. In today’s world, where science has become an overwhelming culture, a high 
level of science and education is no doubt a manifestation of affluence. Moreover, 
a high level of scientific development can advance technical invention and innova-
tion and thus substantially enrich the material life of people. To become an inde-
pendent, wealthy, modernized nation, it is imperative that China should possess 
solid strengths in terms of science and technical invention and innovation.
6.4.3  Peace and Safety
The value of peace and safety (ping an) is of immense influence in traditional 
Chinese society. For individuals, ‘peace and safety’ refers to good health and 
wellbeing in daily life, free from illness and calamity. In ancient times there were 
prayers on festive days for peace and safety each year (sui sui ping an); today 
there are wishes to friends and relatives to be safe and sound both at home and 
outside (chu ru ping an). Thus peace and safety have been a most basic pursuit of 
the Chinese people in everyday life over thousands of years.
Article 21 of the General Principles of the Chinese Constitution states:
The state develops medical and health services, promotes modern medicine and tradi-
tional Chinese medicine, encourages and supports the setting up of various medical and 
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health facilities by the rural economic collectives, state enterprises and undertakings and 
neighbourhood organizations, and promotes sanitation activities of a mass character, all to 
protect the people’s health …
The advocacy of people’s health in the General Principles of the Constitution 
and the stipulation that medical and health services are important to the country 
demonstrate the important position of health and hygiene in China while reflect-
ing, from another perspective, one aspect of the pursuit of the value of peace and 
safety.
6.4.4  Harmony
Harmony is another value that has existed in traditional Chinese society since time 
immemorial. Harmony envisages a state of coexistence, mutual help and mutual 
benefit, coordination and cooperation among multiple elements. To quote two 
old proverbs: ‘a family in harmony finds everything in good order’ (jia he wan 
shi xing) and ‘fortune favours those in harmony’ (he qi sheng cai). These sayings 
demonstrate that the concept of harmony is closely related to the everyday life of 
the general public and is an important prerequisite for becoming prosperous and 
affluent in life. Harmony is deeply rooted at all levels and in every aspect of life 
of the Chinese general population. That is why this value has survived and thrived 
up to the present, becoming part of the national pursuit of building a harmonious 
society in present-day China.
According to a speech made in February 2005 by Mr Hu Jintao, the then 
President of the People’s Republic of China, the six features of a harmonious soci-
ety are democracy and the rule of law, fairness and justice, integrity and friend-
liness, vigour and drive, peace and order, and harmony between man and nature 
(Qin 2006). In particular, the harmonious state of man and nature echoes the tradi-
tional Chinese belief in ‘heaven and man in one’. This philosophy describes man 
and nature as an integrated whole, coordinated and in harmony, which is different 
from the Western cultural concept that man and nature are contradictory, one being 
active and the other passive. The Chinese idea is a philosophical one typical of ori-
ental cultures (Zhu 2002: 325). In these terms the harmony of man and nature calls 
for a perspective beyond considering the natural environment as a mere pool of 
energy and resources: one that approaches environmental issues through perspec-
tives of ecology, coordination and sustainable development.
Article 26 of the General Principles of the Chinese Constitution states:
The state protects and improves the living environment and the ecological environment, 
and prevents and controls pollution and other public hazards …
The stipulation of environmental protection and improvement in the fundamen-
tal law means that China has grasped the possible problems of modern economic 
production and the mode of social development; and it also serves as the China’s 
response to these problems amid the pursuit of the value of harmony.
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6.5  Conclusion
Three streams of values, namely traditional values, Western values and new val-
ues established in contemporary Chinese society, converged to build China’s cur-
rent value system. The traditional values were once considered a major obstacle to 
Chinese modernization that should be amended or even abandoned. For example, 
the hierarchical values of Confucianism, described above as ‘the different social sta-
tus of the emperor, the official, the father, the son, the husband and the wife’, have 
been replaced by equality among the people. In the Chinese Constitution, Article 4 
notes that all nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal, while Article 
48 states that women enjoy equal rights. In recent years, however, there has been 
a trend towards a return to traditional values in Chinese society. Some key values, 
for example ‘harmony’ (he), have entered mainstream discourse in Chinese society. 
Among the Western values and the new values grown in contemporary society, ‘sci-
entism’ and ‘developmentalism’ are currently the two most influential discourses in 
China. The former focuses on the positive function of science and technology, and 
the latter puts an emphasis on economic development. Therefore the two discourses 
also have strong impacts on the current value system in China.
The values in the Chinese Constitution outline the core pursuits of Chinese 
people and form the basis for making policies related to science and technology. 
China being a socialist country, the Chinese Constitution emphasizes collective 
interests. Progress, affluence, peace and safety, and harmony are the four values 
identified in the Chinese Constitution that relate to people’s ethical considerations 
of science and technology development.
In recent years, realizing the importance of solidarity in values, the central gov-
ernment and the Communist Party of China have made a series of efforts to refine 
and codify the values. The core socialist value system that embodied the spirit of 
the nation and the time gradually germinated and formed over the period from 
the 16th national congress of the party in 2002 to the 18th in 2012 (Guo 2014). 
In September of 2012, the party formally put forward the core socialist values as 
follows:
Core socialist values are the soul of the Chinese nation and serve as the guide for build-
ing socialism with Chinese characteristics … We should promote prosperity, democracy, 
civility, and harmony, uphold freedom, equality, justice and the rule of law and advocate 
patriotism, dedication, integrity, and friendship, so as to cultivate and observe core social-
ist values (Hu 2012).
The core socialist values echo the values in Chinese Constitution and make them 
more explicit, so that they are more influential in guiding the government’s and the 
public’s activities.
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7.1  Introduction
This chapter discusses the evolution of science and technology policy in India, 
its linkage with national developmental plans and the challenges ahead for India 
in science, technology and innovation policy. In India, as in many post-colonial 
countries, the state has played a major role in using science and technology for 
national development besides giving it a special thrust. While India succeeded 
in creating a sizeable science and technology infrastructure within five decades 
of independence, the globalization of science and technology and changes in the 
external economic environment necessitated a change in the orientation of poli-
cymakers. The Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017) focuses on sustainable and 
inclusive growth, while the Science, Technology and Innovation Policy of 2013 
emphasizes new models for promoting innovation. In the global innovation dis-
course, India’s capacity for frugal and inclusive innovation is recognized, and the 
National Innovation System is also bringing about change, with contributions from 
many quarters ranging from multinational corporations to grassroots innovators.
Although ethical values have not been explicitly indicated in policy statements, 
key objectives of the policies have applied science and technology for socio– 
economic development and ensured that the benefits of science and  technology 
reach the masses. In the Indian context, access, inclusion and equity can be regarded 
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as ethical values and guiding principles in science, technology and innovation 
 policy. This is compatible with the vision of sustainable and inclusive growth. The 
challenges remain translating this into practice and developing suitable indicators.
7.2  Science and Technology Policy in India
‘Science: The Endless Frontier’, a report by Vannevar Bush published in 1945, 
played an important role in setting the agenda for post-war science and technol-
ogy policy in the USA. The report saw it as the task of science policy to contrib-
ute to national security, health and economic growth. It emphasised the potential 
economic impact of investing in science. Science policy is a tool for managing 
and funding the accumulation of knowledge by establishing, funding and sustain-
ing organizations (e.g. universities and research laboratories) and directing their 
outputs and accumulated knowledge towards meeting national objectives, among 
other things—and it can be justified from an economic perspective:
A general economic rationale for STI policy is that we pursue it because we think it will 
lead to technological progress, and we think that technological progress is a crucial deter-
minant of economic growth, which in turn we regard as ultimately vital to welfare of the 
individuals who comprise society (Kane 2001).
Given the wider impact of science policy, it can be analysed from various discipli-
nary perspectives (see, for example, Husbands Fealing et al. 2011). In post-colonial 
societies science policy became a prominent policy in national developmental agen-
das (Salami1 and Soltanzadeh 2012). Thus science policy is primarily a post-Second 
World War phenomenon. This is equally true of India, but the development of sci-
ence policy there can be traced to the response of Indian society to modern science 
(Sinha 1992).
With the introduction of English-medium instruction in higher education 
in 1835, many Indians were exposed to modern science, and this resulted in a 
 section of the community arguing for modern approaches, including science for 
social advancement. While the British set up colleges and universities, indig-
enous initiatives such as the Indian Association for Cultivation of Science and 
science popularization efforts increased access to science and enhanced the 
appreciation of science. The responses to modern science in India’s traditional 
society were of three kinds: modernists wanted India to follow the European 
model, critical modernists argued for a creative synthesis of European and Indian 
civilizations, absorbing the best from Europe, and critical traditionalists empha-
sized the need to give primary importance to Indian tradition and culture while 
drawing upon European knowledge and culture (Parekh 1989). The responses to 
modern science within the national movement and Indian society were  varied, 
and so was the understanding of science. Often science was equated with 
modernity.
By the 1930s, groups of scientists, nationalists and others were arguing that 
science would have to play an important role in post-independence India. The 
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National Planning Committee constituted in 1940 had a subcommittee on science. 
India gained its freedom in 1947, and the first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
inspired by Fabian socialism and centralized planning in the then USSR, envis-
aged centralized planning and strong support for science in India. He gained the 
support of scientists such as Homi Bhabha, Meghnad Saha and S.S. Bhatnagar, 
and the restructuring of science and technology infrastructure was started. The 
infrastructure left behind by the British was upgraded, and many new laboratories 
and universities and research centres were set up. India gave priority to research in 
atomic energy.
The first science policy statement was issued in 1958. In 1983 the govern-
ment came out with a Technology Policy Statement, followed by a Science and 
Technology Policy Statement in 2003. In 2013 the Department of Science and 
Technology issued its Science, Technology and Innovation Policy. These state-
ments and policies have provided the overarching frameworks for science and 
technology policy and its linkage with developmental goals.
Since 1952 there have been 12 five-year plans. The current five year plan 
(2012–2017) emphasizes sustainable and inclusive growth. The key features of the 
five year plans are set out in Table 7.1 [Source: Dogra (2011)].
Science for national development and security, and self-reliance, have been 
at the core of India’s science and technology policies. Although India had no 
document similar to ‘Science: The Endless Frontier’, its science and technology 
planning was led by scientists and technocrats who shared the visions of the politi-
cians. This alliance led to a broad consensus on applying science and technology 
in India and to continued support for science and technology from successive gov-
ernments. In that sense the post-colonial state in India was an ardent supporter of 
science and technology.
aIndia had three annual plans between 1966 and 1969
Table 7.1  India’s five year plansa
Plan Timeline Key feature
First 1951–1956 Agriculture-led
Second 1956–1961 Socialistic industrial policy
Third 1961–1966 Self-reliance in agriculture and industry (plan affected by wars 
with China and Pakistan in 1962 and 1965 respectively), price 
stabilization
Fourth 1969–1974 Society-oriented (education, employment and family planning)
Fifth 1974–1979 Non-economic variables
Sixth 1980–1985 Infrastructure (6 % per annum growth achieved)
Seventh 1985–1989 Welfare sector, programmes such as Jawahar Rozgar Yojana
Eighth 1992–1997 Dismantling licence prerequisites and reducing trade barriers
Ninth 1997–2002 Agriculture and rural focus
Tenth 2002–2007 Globally competitive growth
Eleventh 2007–2012 Employment and social indicators
Twelfth 2012–2017 Sustainable and inclusive growth
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The Department of Science and Technology was set up in 1972. Over the years 
the number of ministries and departments supporting science and technology 
has increased. In different periods India set up different departments, such as the 
Department of Electronics and the Department of Biotechnology, to capitalize on 
emerging technologies, while the mission mode approach was used for tackling 
problems. In the mid-1960s India launched its Green Revolution to overcome food 
shortages and achieve food security. This was the first mission mode application 
of science and technology to solve problems. The Green Revolution was driven 
with the support of private foundations, while the US government and the World 
Bank paid rich dividends and also enhanced the research and development capac-
ity in agriculture. This was followed by the ‘White Revolution’ in the dairy sector. 
Later the same approach was used in telecommunications and oil seeds. In 2007 
the Department of Science and Technology launched the Nano Mission to promote 
research in nanosciences and nanotechnologies and to ensure that India did not lag 
behind in this emerging field.
Science for national development and security has been a key driver in India’s 
science and technology policy. This is expressed in various statements including 
the Technology Policy Statement, which stressed the point that the fundamental 
objective of science in India was to meet the basic needs of people: food, water, 
housing, health and education. Self-reliance in core sectors and in advanced tech-
nologies such as atomic energy, space technologies and defence-related applica-
tions has been another important driver in India’s science and technology policy. 
This thrust has enabled India to achieve substantial progress in sectors such as 
space, and self-reliance has helped in applying science and technology for national 
development.
The opening up of the economy in 1991, subsequent developments in the 
global economic environment and changes in the science and technology milieu 
have had their impacts on science and technology policy. The earlier approach 
of relying solely on publicly funded science and technology, with restrictions 
on technology imports and licensing, was abandoned. The growth of the Indian 
economy, the availability of skilled human resources and changes in economic 
policies resulted in increased foreign investment in research and development in 
India by multinational corporations, and Indian institutions also increased the level 
and scope of collaboration with institutions and industries abroad. The change is 
evident in the Science, Technology and Innovation Policy of 2013, which goes 
beyond the state-led science, technology and innovation approach. Thus the Indian 
science and technology policy has come a long way from the 1950s, when science 
was regarded as a key component of the growth strategy. Table 7.1 sums up the 
changes over the decades.
Although applying science and technology for social development has been 
a key principle since the beginning, important initiatives in realizing this were 
taken by the Department of Science and Technology during the Sixth Five 
Year Plan in 1971, in the form of the Science and Society Programme. In 2011, 
based on the experiences gained from various initiatives under the Science and 
Society Programme and other activities, a new programme, Science for Equity, 
877 Science and Technology for Socio-economic Development …
Empowerment and Development (SEED), was established to provide technology 
solutions to challenges in rural and urban areas for the disadvantaged sections of 
society. The idea was to link innovations developed in laboratories with the needs 
of the disadvantaged sections of society and improve their quality of life.
India’s science and technology policy has seen both continuity and change. 
While there has been change in the choice of policy instruments, areas of thrust 
and priorities, continuity is evident in issues such as self-reliance in core sec-
tors, and capacity building. In the past two decades, the horizontal focus of sci-
ence and technology has been replaced with an emphasis on promoting innovation 
in a range of sectors including biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, automobiles and 
information technology. In terms of regulation, the emphasis on restrictions on the 
importation of trade and technology has been replaced with liberal policies, pay-
ments for licensing and royalties. Similarly, the push for self-reliance and indig-
enous development in all sectors of technology has given way to the importance 
of collaborative research, public-private partnerships and international collabo-
ration, with due acknowledgement of the opportunities that arise from outsourc-
ing research and development to India. In some sectors such as space and atomic 
energy, self-reliance remains the objective. The shift in focus and instrumentality 
is quite apparent in the Science, Technology and Innovation Policy of 2013.
Translating advances in science and technology into innovations is a big 
challenge. In the past few years the government of India has formed a National 
Innovation Council and announced a Decade of Innovation. The 2013 policy 
is different from the previous policies on science and technology in many ways. 
According to the policy:
Global innovation systems tend to bypass large sections of the community. Innovation for 
inclusive growth implies ensuring access, availability and affordability of solutions to as 
large a population as possible. Innovation therefore must be inclusive.
The policy goes on to list ‘Linking contributions of science, research and innova-
tion system with the inclusive economic growth agenda and combining priorities 
of excellence and relevance’ as an important objective. The policy advocates the 
strengthening of linkages between the scientific and socio–economic sectors, and 
it states that NGOs will be accorded an important role in delivering science, tech-
nology and innovation outputs.
Thus, over the past six decades or so, the scope of the policy instruments and 
the regulatory environment has undergone significant changes. The results are 
evident in India’s global ranking in publications and patents, and in other indica-
tors. The Twelfth Five Year Plan envisages spending on research and development 
increasing from 0.9 to 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP) by the end of 2017. 
It underscores the need for research towards breakthrough innovation in impor-
tant sectors. However, challenges remain and key questions are: how much should 
India invest in science and technology and what should be the objectives of sci-
ence, technology and innovation policy in the years to come?
A policymaker, after analysing investments and trends in science and technol-
ogy, concludes that India has to balance between competitiveness and inclusiveness, 
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and this will be a challenge for the research and development system (Ramasami 
2014). Nation-building and socio–economic development became the dominant 
themes in science and technology policy, and India is not the only country that has 
had this approach to science and technology policy. Science and technology policy 
is one of the policy instruments, and it is necessary but not sufficient to address all 
the issues in socio–economic development.
In India, prior to 1991, centralized planning by the state was the determin-
ing factor in setting priorities for science and technology. As Table 7.1 indicates, 
the key features of the plans have changed, although the basic objectives remain 
the same. After 1991, economic liberalization and globalization brought new 
challenges and opportunities in science and technology forward. India joined 
the World Trade Organization and had to amend its laws and enact new ones to 
meet the requirements of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). Similarly, India enacted a law to comply with the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Globalization helped India realize its com-
petitiveness in information technology services and the pharmaceutical industry. 
India became an attractive destination for foreign direct investment in research and 
development (Basant and Mani 2012).
According to R.A. Mashelkar, science and technology in India rests on four pil-
lars: techno-nationalism, inclusive growth, techno-globalism and global leadership. 
He categorizes India as a nation with ‘high indigenous science and technology capac-
ity but relatively low economic strength’ and includes China, Brazil and Argentina in 
that category with India (Mashelkar 2008). Pointing out the country’s achievements 
in science and technology, he argues that India should aim for global leadership in 
some areas in science and technology, and should focus on basic science. In 2010 the 
Science Advisory Council to the Prime Minister introduced its vision document enti-
tled ‘India as a Global Leader in Science’ with the following statement:
In the next two decades, India is likely to become an economically prosperous nation and 
move significantly towards being a far more inclusive society, with the bulk of its popula-
tion gaining access to facilities for education and health care and living a life with hope 
and security. To realize such a vision, it is essential that science is at the heart of the strat-
egy that the next stage of national development demands (Science Advisory Council to the 
Prime Minister 2010).
It listed India’s achievements in science and pointed out that the complex prob-
lems the country faced called for a ‘proper use of science’. It argued that India 
itself was the most cost-effective source of research and development in India as 
it accounted for 0.5 % of global expenditure on science and produced 2.5 % of 
the global output in science. The document suggested many measures, including 
more funding for science to help India become a leader in global science (Science 
Advisory Council to the Prime Minister 2010).
Such statements and documents acknowledge the potential in India for science 
and technology and innovation and take the position that India can use science to 
address its complex problems and also aspire to be a global leader in science. This 
is a formidable challenge, however, because global ranking in publications is not a 
measure of innovation, and even if the number of publications in a field is 
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reasonably high, their quality and impact matter too. For example, it has been 
pointed out that while India ranks sixth globally in publications on nanotechnol-
ogy, its ranking is lower in terms of citations of papers from India.1 A report from 
the World Bank published in 2007 pointed out the innovation potential in India 
and called for a three-pronged strategy to realize this potential: increasing compe-
tition and improving innovation infrastructure, strengthening the creation and 
communication of knowledge, and fostering more inclusive innovation (Dutz 
2007). Thus while the literature generally acknowledges India’s potential, the sug-
gestions on how this potential should be realized differ. Since independence, the 
Indian state has played a dominant role in science and technology policy and in 
funding research and development. It has incentivized private-sector research and 
development through various schemes. As Daniele Archibugi and Jonathan Michie 
point out, technological globalization does not mean less support for innovation 
from governments: more support is needed to enhance a country’s competitive 
advantage (Archibugi and Michie 1997). This is nowhere more true than in India.
Given the fact that India has become the third-largest economy in the world, 
the mantra ‘science and technology for development’ is all the more relevant. As 
Indian companies acquire foreign companies and invest in research and develop-
ment outside India while India continues to be an important destination for foreign 
direct investment in research and development, the picture is becoming more com-
plex. According to Sunil Mani, while the knowledge intensity of India’s output has 
increased to 14 % of India’s net domestic product, much of this emanates from the 
services sector, whose share of knowledge-intensive production was 11.55 % in 
2009. The proportion of exports comprising high-technology products doubled from 
1988 to 2008, when it stood at 16.94 % (Mani 2010). From the current trends in 
investment, publications and patents it is clear that India is entering a new growth 
phase in science and technology that has to be sustained if India is to emerge as a 
global leader in this field. In terms of spending on science and technology, publica-
tions and patents, India has made significant progress in the past decade. While the 
government is the major funder, the private sector’s share has increased significantly.
India’s planners and scientific establishment are aware of the need to increase 
investment in science and technology, to enlarge India’s share of science and 
technology publications, and to ensure that India is actively engaged in emerg-
ing technologies such as nanotechnology. Various measures have been taken to 
achieve these objectives. The Innovation in Science Pursuit for Inspired Research 
(INSPIRE) programme aims to attract talent to the sciences by providing schol-
arships right from school stage as incentives to students to pursue a career in 
science. In terms of publications, India’s share has increased significantly in 
the past few years, but to ensure that this continues and that India does not lag 
1 ‘Thus India was ranking 6th and had the fastest growth rate from 2001 to 2011, albeit from 
a low base. When looking at the citations of these papers, however, India ranks lower. For the 
top 1 % of cited papers India ranks 14th and for the top 10 % of cited papers it ranks 9th. This 
indicates that the country’s scientific output was not as much in the frontier domain as the simple 
volume indicator might have led us to believe’ (Greenhalgh 2013).
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behind countries such as Korea, the Twelfth Five Year Plan India invests heavily 
in science and technology. A study for the Department of Science and Technology 
points out that the citation impact of papers has increased to about 0.68 in 2006–
2010 from 0.35 in 1981–1985, and the targeted value is 1 for the period covered 
by the Twelfth Five Year Plan. The number of publications from India increased 
from 15,000 in 1981 to 40,000 in 2008, while India’s share rose from 3 to 3.5 % 
in the same period (DST 2012). Fully aware of the fact that India has to compete 
with countries such as Korea, Brazil and China, India’s planners believe that it’s 
share should increase to 5 % from the current 3.5 % within the next five years.
The challenge before policymakers is: how can India meet multiple objectives 
with the available infrastructure and human resources? As there is no guarantee that 
increased spending will automatically translate into desired outcomes, and as the 
National Innovation System in India is more complex today than ever before, old 
approaches may not work. State-supported public-sector research and development 
are necessary, but not sufficient, and hence new models such as public-private partner-
ships in research and development and joint product development may be necessary.
To conclude, the science and technology policy in post-independence India has 
been shaped by concerns over socio–economic development and the need for self-
reliance. In years to come, however, the policy will have to address new issues 
emerging on account of the globalization of science and technology, the opportu-
nities provided by emerging technologies and the technological convergence and 
other changes taking place in the global science and technology landscape. At the 
same time, the science and technology policy will have make a substantial contri-
bution to sustainable and inclusive growth.
7.3  Science and Technology Policy Discourses in India
Although science and technology policy in India is largely driven by the state, 
the debates on the role of science and technology in Indian society and modes of 
applying science and technology help us understand the policy discourses. For 
convenience, we can classify these discourses into the following categories:
•	 Nehruvian discourse
•	 Gandhian discourse
•	 People’s science movements and their discourse on science and technology
•	 Other voices and discourses on science and technology
According to Dinesh Abrol:
The ‘Gandhian’, ‘Nehruvian’ and ‘Left’ political traditions differed radically with each 
other in terms of the conception of ‘socio-technical imagination’, ‘vision of path of devel-
opment’ and ‘social carriers of innovations’ to be encouraged (Abrol 2012).
Of these, the Nehruvian discourse has been the dominant one and has had sig-
nificant influence on science and technology policy-making. This discourse 
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emphasizes the key role of the state in applying science and technology for 
national development, modernization and socio–economic development. The 
Nehruvian vision envisaged the transformation of Indian society through the appli-
cation of science and technology and the inculcation of a scientific temper. Nehru 
supported big projects, rapid industrialization made possible by state-centred plan-
ning and a key role for the public sector. In this perspective the state ensures that 
the benefits of science and technology reach all sections of society and that sci-
ence and technology themselves are scale-neutral and value-neutral.
On the other hand, the Gandhian discourse saw the application of science and 
technology as helping village revitalization. The Gandhian discourse, influenced 
by the ideas and life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, attached importance to 
the principle of production by the masses, village self-sufficiency and a decentral-
ized approach to planning. This discourse favoured limiting the role of the state in 
society and supported the autonomy of communities. Gandhians regarded values 
in science and technology as important and cautioned against applying science and 
technology to satisfy greed rather than genuine needs. The Gandhian discourse 
was influential in the freedom movement, but was eclipsed by the Nehruvian per-
spective in post-1947 India. Although this discourse gained support from E.F. 
Schumacher some decades later, and was used by scientists such as A.K.N. Reddy 
and C.V. Seshadri to develop alternative technologies and approaches, its impact 
on science and technology policy-making was minimal.
People’s science movements are influenced by leftist ideology and see science 
as a tool for social revolution. While they agree with the Nehruvian discourse 
on the scientific temper, they are critical of many projects and programmes ini-
tiated by the state in the name of development. Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishad, 
the best-known people’s science movement in India, played an important role in 
the struggle to stop the Silent Valley project, which the central government aban-
doned. These movements regard renewable sources of energy as important, are 
against multinationals in the agri-biotech sector and see a key role for public-sec-
tor research and development in finding innovative solutions.
Besides these three discourses, there have been other voices and views on sci-
ence and technology in India. Scientists including A.K.N. Reddy and C.V. 
Seshardri advocated a different approach that regarded it as important to find 
appropriate solutions to meet the needs of people and argued for a blend of tradi-
tional technologies and modern science and technology. Groups such as Patriotic 
and People-Oriented Science and Technology called for a relook at India’s tradi-
tional science and technology and their relevance to modern society.2 Figures such 
as Shiv Visvanathan, Ashis Nandy, J.P. Uberoi, Vandana Shiva, Jayanto 
Bandhbadhyay and Anil Agarwal, from different vantage points, provided critiques 
of modern science, of science and technology policy and of major projects. The 
resistance to large projects such as the Narmada Valley project, nuclear power, 
genetically modified organisms in agriculture and mega-projects in the power 
2 See Rajan (2005) and Prasad (2006) for a discussion of this.
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sector indicated that at the grass roots, the response to science and technology pol-
icy and development projects was ambiguous, and that not everyone shared the 
vision of the Nehruvian discourse. The dissenting voices and discourses did not 
have much impact on science and technology policy-making, but over the years 
they have contributed to the debates and discourses on science and technology pol-
icy by bringing in issues that had not received much attention. They raised issues 
relating to equity and development, environmental justice and alternatives that 
were not being explored. This, in turn, resulted in changes in policies relating to 
land acquisition, environment impact assessment and rehabilitation of the dis-
placed. The dissidents also worked on alternatives in agriculture, medicine, and 
energy.3
7.4  Ethics in Science and Technology Policy in India
Indian science and technology policies have been shaped by the concern that 
the application of science and technology should enable faster socio–economic 
development and that all sections should benefit from scientific and technological 
advances. The unstated assumption in these policies is that value-neutrality and 
scale-neutrality are to be addressed by appropriate interventions in favour of mar-
ginalized sections of the population. According to Rajeswari Raina:
Many of the inadequacies in current decision-making in S&T for development stem from 
a lack of shared understanding of causal relationships and common ethical principles that 
can guide decision-making (Raina 2010: 27).
The ethical assessment of technologies at their initial stages poses many problems, 
and there are challenges that have to be addressed by policymakers (Bostrom 
2007). But many principles, including the precautionary principle and the princi-
ple of public participation, have been developed to address ethical issues in sci-
ence and technology (UNESCO 2007). An important question, however, is: what 
are these common ethical principles? India has accepted global norms in bioeth-
ics and has created institutional infrastructure to give effect to them. Through the 
intervention of the supreme court and the efforts of the Indian Council of Medical 
Research, clinical trials are regulated by ethical principles and guidelines.
Although science and technology are universal, are there universal ethical 
principles that are relevant for science and technology policy-making in all coun-
tries? Should a country like India opt for ethical principles based on European 
or American values, or should it use its traditional ethics and theories to arrive 
at more appropriate principles? Those who espouse universal values could argue 
that since science and technology are universal and common to all cultures, such 
3 For reasons of space we do not discuss this in detail. Suffice it to say that while techno-
crats such as A.K.N. Reddy and C.V. Seshadri worked on developing alternative technologies, 
Gandhians worked on rural industrialization, agriculture and textiles.
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values should guide science and technology policy. Those who are against the uni-
versal values approach would not only question the idea of universal values, but 
would also point out that in bioethics the debate has been inclusive, taking into 
account bioethical values in different traditions including religions and cultures. In 
the case of research integrity and ethics, while there is consensus on some issues, 
divergent perspectives are expressed on others (Anderson 2011). According to 
Henk ten Have:
The need to establish common values and benchmarks, as well as to promote ethical prin-
ciples and standards to guide scientific progress and technological development, is becom-
ing increasingly acute, especially in developing countries that do not equally enjoy the 
benefits of scientific and technological advances. UNESCO’s work in ethics of science 
and technology reflects these global concerns. It examines such progress in light of ethi-
cal considerations rooted in the cultural, legal, philosophical and religious heritage of the 
various human communities (ten Have 2006).
Similarly, the report of the European Commission’s Expert Group on Global 
Governance of Science stresses the need to strike a balance between paternalism 
and irresponsibility. It calls for harmonizing general ethical principles and the 
recognition of religions, traditions and local cultures in dialogues (Ozoliņa et al. 
2009).
As science and technology policy is not an exercise in philosophy and is linked 
to larger societal visions, aspirations and demands, a blind application of universal 
value would not be suitable. Taking a culturally relativist approach and denying 
the need for value orientation in science and technology policy, or arguing that the 
values of a region or country alone should be considered in determining ethical 
values, would not be the right approach as such a view reflects a parochial mind-
set that refuses to recognize that science and technology are global and so are their 
impacts and implications.
A concern about ethics in science and technology policy can be expressed in 
many ways. For example, in the Fourth Basic Plan of Japan, ethics is reflected in 
the objective that policy should be created and promoted with society. The plan 
attaches importance to the promotion of ‘green innovation’ and ‘life innovation’. 
It proposes more involvement of the public in science, technology and innova-
tion policies, improving regulatory science and improving technology assessment 
(Ida 2011). This is a response to the problems—including earthquakes, a tsunami, 
a nuclear incident, ageing, a declining birthrate and the falling competitiveness 
of Japanese industries—faced by Japanese society and changes in the global sci-
ence and technology system (Ida 2011). A concrete response by expressing ethi-
cal concerns in science and technology policy is evidence that science, technology 
and innovation policy can incorporate ethical values based on need and relevance, 
and can choose from various principles and values the relevant one. Thus, while 
increasing public participation and improving regulatory science and technology 
assessment might be found as ethical concerns or norms in the science, technology 
and innovation policies of other countries, in the Japanese context incorporating 
them is a response to the needs of the society and its experience with promoting 
science, technology and innovation.
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Often ethics in science and technology is associated with values such as 
autonomy, human dignity and justice, and it is contended that science and technol-
ogy should be practiced in such a way that they do not negate or disrespect these 
values and do contribute to furthering the wellbeing of humankind (Evers 2001). 
But in the case of science and technology policy, the picture is more complex as 
distributional effects of policies have to be taken into account. Scholars work-
ing on science and technology policy have pointed out that access to science and 
technology and its benefits are often unevenly distributed, resulting in inequities 
in distribution that can result in outcomes that aggravate the broader inequi-
ties (Cozzens 2007; Woodhouse and Sarewit 2007). Bozeman et al. (2011) have 
analyzed the equity issues in science and technology and their linkages with sci-
ence and technology policy. One of the ways of assessing the equity impacts of 
science and technology policy is to find out whether science and technology policy 
has enabled the basic needs of most sections of society to be met, and has con-
tributed to better access to the outcomes of science and technology. Access and 
equity are interlinked. Better access may reduce inequities. In the literature, access 
is often discussed in the context of access to technology and services, including 
health services, and how race, gender and poverty affect access (see, for example, 
UNCTAD 2011).
If we regard equity as distribution with due consideration for basic needs and 
fairness, access is a determining factor. The policy framework might have taken 
equitable outcomes as an objective, but lack of access on account of various fac-
tors will skew the outcome. Hence policies to promote access may result in better 
and more equitable outcomes. In the literature, equity in science and technology 
has been examined in the context of specific technologies (Cozzens and Wetmore 
2011). In the case of innovation policies, it has been hypothesized that although 
innovation policy is not often considered in terms of distributional implications, 
left-oriented governments are more likely to attach importance to it (Breznitz and 
Zehavi 2013).
India’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan states that ‘our focus should not be just on 
GDP growth itself, but on achieving a growth process that is as inclusive as pos-
sible’ and rightly accepts that ‘strong inclusive growth is the only scenario that 
will meet the aspiration of the people’. This reflection indicates that the planners 
are aware of the need to move beyond GDP growth and that the challenge lies 
in framing policies to promote inclusive growth. In fact, in view of the fact that 
economic growth does not result in equitable benefits across different sections of 
the population, inclusive growth has been suggested as an objective. Organizations 
such as the Asian Development Bank and the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean have researched exclusion and equality (McKinley 
2010; ECLAC 2014). In the case of science and technology policies and specific 
technologies, inclusion and exclusion issues have been analyzed at length (see, 
for example, Mercado 2012; Haribabu 2009; Thomas and Fressoli 2011; Sutz and 
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Tomasini 2013). According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, policymakers should attach importance to addressing horizontal and 
vertical inequalities. Interestingly. a recent statement from the Indian government 
on science, technology and innovation for the post-2015 development agenda indi-
cates that it is sensitive to issues of inclusion and to using science and technology 
to meet basic needs:
India stands for and will be pleased to contribute on following dimensions of UNCSTD 
STI efforts vis-à-vis post 2015 Development Agenda:
•	 	Affordable Innovations, encompassing access, availability and usable solutions to 
meeting basic needs;
•	 	Accelerated Inclusive Growth for aspiring nations – developing countries with 
thrust on base of pyramid population (as a better replacement to the prevalent 
expression of bottom of the pyramid) … (Relia 2014)
Thus, in our view, access, inclusion and equity can be considered ethical values in 
relation to science and technology policy. There are many issues that need to be 
addressed, including developing science, technology and innovation indicators for 
access, inclusion and equity, and developing methodologies for measuring policy 
outcomes for access, inclusion and equity, and more theoretical work needs to be 
done on access, inclusion and equity.
7.5  Conclusion
Indian science and technology policy has come a long way since the early 1950s. 
Today, as India aspires to be a global leader in science and technology, it is impor-
tant for Indian policy to give attention to ethics in science and technology policy. 
However, this does not mean that science and technology policy has to import val-
ues from Europe or the USA. Rather, in our view, access, inclusion and equity 
can be considered ethical values and can be used to assess policy outcomes. This 
makes better sense in the Indian context, as it links societal development with sci-
ence and technology policy. It also reflects the current thinking on sustainable and 
inclusive growth.
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for a comparative study of three different fields of science and technology. In the 
field of new food technologies, especially genetically modified crops, the expec-
tations, tensions and conflicts surrounding these technologies can be documented 
and discussed from a historical point of view. In the new and emerging fields of 
nanotechnology and synthetic biology, on the other hand, we can show how more 
and more attempts are being made to manage expectations, tensions and conflicts 
in an anticipatory way.
Another basic assumption of the GEST project is that the nature of expecta-
tions, tensions and conflicts will vary, not only in relation to the contents of 
particular fields of science and technology, but also according to particular socio-
economic conditions, cultural contexts and values in the different global regions of 
Europe, China and India. Our aim in the three case studies presented in the follow-
ing chapters is to better understand the ways in which the expectations, tensions 
and conflicts surrounding science and technology relate to the specifics of different 
fields and to the broader societal contexts shaping developments in these fields. 
This chapter presents a framework for a more detailed comparative analysis of the 
three fields—food technology, nanotechnology and synthetic biology—in the three 
regions.
In the framework that we propose, the emphasis is on societal discourses as 
central storylines in the case study descriptions (Hanssen et al. 2008). This focus 
on the discursive aspect will enable us to systematically map the expectations, ten-
sions and conflicts arising, or potentially arising, from developments in the three 
fields of science and technology in the different regions. We will distinguish three 
discourses that are primarily defined by their specific content, namely those relat-
ing to issues of innovation, risk and power and control. In addition we will differ-
entiate between discourses of reflective ethics and lay morality, showing how the 
issues of innovation, risk, and power and control are perceived, both in the context 
of practices of ethical analysis and in the context of wider public debate. In other 
words, with regard to the three content-related discourses, the discourses of reflec-
tive ethics and lay morality are both reflective and crosscutting.
The aim of our comparative analysis is, first, to highlight particular common-
alities and differences between cases and regions in terms of the issues discussed 
and reflected upon in these various discourses, and, second, to show how these 
commonalities and differences can be understood in terms of the specific nature of 
scientific and technological fields, and in terms of particular socioeconomic condi-
tions, cultural contexts and values in the different regions.
The focus on science and technology discourses in describing and comparing 
our case studies should help us address some crucial questions from the GEST 
project. Governments in all three regions stimulate scientific and technological 
innovation and seek ways to deal with potential risks and conflicts arising from 
new and emerging science and technology. The object of our comparative analysis 
is a better understanding of the history and evolution of these tensions and con-
flicts and to see how this understanding might be translated into more responsive 
and robust practices of anticipatory governance of science and technology in the 
three regions. More specifically we focus in the GEST project on the discourses of 
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reflective ethics and lay morality as important sources of understanding that, espe-
cially in Europe and the US, have been ‘mainstreamed’ through the establishment 
and promotion of public ethics bodies, programmes on ethical, legal and social 
implications, and more comprehensive technology assessment practices, includ-
ing various forms of public deliberation and engagement (Paula 2008; van Est and 
Brom 2012).
The main questions guiding our comparative analysis might thus be phrased 
as follows: how are the different science and technology discourses in the three 
regions being translated into science and technology policy-making, and how is 
this translation mediated by institutionalized forms of ethical reflection and public 
deliberation? We will present an outline of our framework by discussing:
•	 the nature of the five discourses that we have distinguished,
•	 more specific definitions of these five discourses,
•	 the questions that will guide our comparative analysis, including some main 
findings from the case studies, and
•	 some concluding observations about the governance implications of our com-
parative analysis.
8.2  Nature of the Five Science and Technology Discourses
We see discourses as ‘frames’ structuring societal debates in terms of particular 
ideals, concerns, rights and values that may engage actors in politics, governance 
and regulation. Science and technology discourses will relate, on the one hand, 
to expectations about innovation and the goals and problem-solving opportuni-
ties of science and technology and, on the other hand, to concerns about the risks, 
side effects and wider societal consequences of science and technology. Such 
discourses should be seen as rooted in common cultural experiences in which 
debates about science and technology have crystallized around particular recur-
rent themes and values, in terms of which scientific and technological develop-
ments can be both justified and challenged. These experiences will be framed by 
particular historical and ‘iconic’ exemplars of science and technology, figuring 
either as icons of progress, like electric light or penicillin, or as icons of risk, like 
asbestos, nuclear energy or genetic modification. These common cultural experi-
ences refer to a historical dimension of science and technology discourses in soci-
ety, which will also shape current and future discourses about new and emerging 
technologies.
Science and technology discourses will likewise be fostered and shaped by 
specific culturally embedded reflective practices in society, including ethics, phi-
losophy, the social sciences, media and art. These two dimensions are translated 
in our framework into three content-related and two reflective and crosscutting 
discourses, as described above in the introduction and depicted in Fig. 8.1. The 
 discourses of innovation, risk, and power and control are primarily defined by their 
specific content. The discourses of reflective ethics and lay morality are primarily 
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defined as reflective and crosscutting debates articulating various perceptions 
and assessments of the themes and values that are discussed in the other three 
discourses.
There are two important observations to make with regard to the use of this 
framework in the case studies presented in the following chapters. The historical 
dimension of science and technology discourses implies that these discourses are 
shaped by specific historical and cultural conditions and experiences that may dif-
fer from region to region. In other words, the ideals, concerns, rights and values 
that will inform these discourses in our case studies should be understood in the 
context of the specific histories and cultures of the three regions of Europe, China 
and India. This is also true, of course, for the reflective practices informing these 
discourses and the particular values that characterize public debate and science and 
technology policy-making in the context of different political institutions and cul-
tural traditions in the three regions (see Chaps. 5, 6 and 7). Our comparative analy-
sis therefore sets out to highlight, in the three case studies of the GEST project, the 
commonalities and differences between science and technology discourses in the 
context of these different and regionally specific histories, experiences and values.
As a second observation about the use of our framework, it is important to note 
that it has to be empirically established to what extent the different discourses can 
indeed be clearly recognized in describing the debates, tensions and conflicts sur-
rounding the fields of science and technology in the three regions. Moreover, in con-
sidering these debates, tensions and conflicts, the distinctions between the different 
discourses often will not be clear-cut or easy to demarcate. However, by drawing these 
distinctions, our framework can serve as a valuable investigatory searchlight that may 
help us define relevant storylines in our case studies for comparative analysis.
8.3  Definitions of the Science and Technology Discourses
Even though the discourses that we have distinguished in our framework do not 
constitute sharply delineated categories, we do, of course, need definitions to 
work with in our case study descriptions. In the following, the five science and 
Fig. 8.1  Three content-
related and two reflective and 
crosscutting science  
and technology discourses
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technology discourses are more specifically defined in terms of the main themes 
that are addressed, the values that are implicated in discussions about these 
themes, and the actors that are most involved in these discussions.
8.3.1  Innovation Discourse
The main theme of the innovation discourse is the potential benefits of investments 
in science and technology: that is, the ways in which science and technology may 
contribute to important societal aims and challenges, such as economic competitive-
ness, general societal progress, increasing scientific temper and more specific soci-
etal challenges concerning the environment, energy, food and health, including public 
health. Thus the innovation discourse sets societal agendas for science and technology 
policy-making and defines steps and conditions to succeed. Values implicated in these 
science and technology debates may include market freedoms, progress, self-reliance, 
sustainability, social justice (including access) and equality. The actors most involved 
in the innovation discourse are scientists, industry and government: that is, the par-
ties directly involved in the ‘innovation system’. But there may also be other, critical 
voices from more marginally involved groups, including civil society organizations.
8.3.2  Risk Discourse
The main theme of the risk discourse is the harm potentially caused by scientific and 
technological developments to health (including public health), to the environment or 
to individual rights such as privacy. Although there is traditionally a strong focus in 
governmental risk regulation on ‘physical’ harms to human health and the environ-
ment, societal concerns about risks often also relate to ‘non-physical’ harms, includ-
ing wider socioeconomic and socioethical impacts in society. Values implicated in 
these risk debates include safety as a citizen right (i.e. the right to protection), har-
mony, dignity, precaution, social justice and sustainability. The actors most involved 
are scientists, government and regulatory agencies: that is, the parties directly 
involved in the ‘risk governance system’, which may however also include the more 
wide-ranging activities of public ethics and bioethics bodies and technology assess-
ment organizations. Here again, there may be other, particularly strong and critical 
voices from groups outside this system, including civil society organizations.
8.3.3  Power and Control Discourse
In societal debates about science and technology, tensions and conflicts may arise 
not only within, but also between, different discourses. Such power struggles raise 
controversial questions about control, responsibility and participation in dealing 
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with issues of innovation and risk and with the tensions between the two. The 
wider implications of scientific and technological developments for existing social, 
economic and geopolitical power relationships are another important theme in the 
power and control discourse, also involving questions about whose interests are 
served and about the ownership of knowledge and technology. Debates over power 
and control may involve the entire spectrum of values related to innovation and 
risks, including market freedoms, self-reliance, citizens’ rights (to protection and 
choice), harmony, sustainability, global justice (access) and equality. Civil society 
organizations and other public voices are often especially important actors outside 
established systems of innovation and risk governance that may raise questions 
about these issues.
8.3.4  Discourse of Reflective Ethics
Ethics has emerged as an increasingly important topic in public debates 
about science and technology, stimulating reflective ethics as a crosscut-
ting discourse involving expectations, concerns, rights and values relating to 
innovation, risk, and power and control (see Chap. 2). Reflective ethics may 
contribute to public debates by articulating ethical issues, stressing the con-
sequences of scientific and technological developments for social values and 
fundamental rights, and opening up debates about new ways to align values 
with these developments. Thus reflective ethics may enrich or initiate ethical 
debate by acting as an ‘early warning’ system, highlight tensions between val-
ues and scientific and technological developments, and translate ethical delib-
eration into policy-oriented guidelines or recommendations. Reflective ethics 
discourses have been institutionalized in public ethics and bioethics bodies 
and technology assessment organizations, supporting public debate or play-
ing an advisory role in governmental policy-making. Reflective ethics has also 
taken shape in research programmes focusing on the ethical, legal and social 
issues raised by new and emerging science and technology, and may find 
expression in less formalized modes of ethics deliberation, such as the media 
or art.
8.3.5  Discourse of Lay Morality
In the history of science and technology debates, we also see the emergence of a 
discourse more open to participation by groups or individuals that do not neces-
sarily claim any particular expertise in the scientific subjects under discussion, but 
nevertheless believe or are persuaded that their voices are as valid as those of the 
experts in the field of science or ethics (see Chaps. 3 and 4). Like the reflective 
ethics discourse, this public discourse may relate to the whole range of issues and 
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values relating to innovation, risk, and power and control. As a crosscutting dis-
course it is an important expression of what has been termed ‘lay morality’. The 
discourse of lay morality may find expression in spontaneously emerging public 
debates and controversies, but can also take shape in organized forms of public 
dialogue or consultation, such as focus groups or opinion surveys, and, last but 
not least, will often be embodied in activities and initiatives from civil society 
organizations.
8.4  Comparative Analysis of Science  
and Technology Discourses
Our framework helps us structure the case study descriptions and analyses in two 
ways. It serves, first of all, as a ‘searchlight’, defining different discourses as rele-
vant storylines. Thus we have examined the role of these discourses in debates and 
policy-making relating to different fields of science and technology in the three 
regions of Europe, China and India: how significant are the different discourses in 
shaping debates and policy-making, what are the issues and values at stake, who 
are the main actors involved, and which tensions and conflicts do we see within 
and between these discourses? In structuring the case study descriptions along 
these lines, the framework also facilitates a comparative analysis, guided by the 
following questions:
•	 What are the commonalities and differences between the three regions, if we 
compare the discourses in any particular field of science and technology?
•	 How are these commonalities and differences to be understood in relation to the 
specific socioeconomic conditions, cultural traditions, political institutions and 
values in the three regions?
•	 What is the role of the different science and technology discourses in science 
and technology policy-making in the three regions: that is, how are these dis-
courses being translated into science and technology policy-making?
•	 To what extent and in what ways is this translation mediated by the two cross-
cutting discourses of reflective ethics and lay morality?
8.4.1  Findings from the Case Studies
The next three chapters of this book focus on developments in food technologies, 
nanotechnology and synthetic biology, comparing the ways in which science and 
technology discourses in each of these fields have evolved in the three regions (see 
Chaps. 9, 10 and 11). Here we present a summary of the most significant findings 
from this comparative analysis, guided by the GEST framework and the questions 
listed above.
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8.4.1.1  New Food Technologies in the Three Regions
In the past 20–30 years Europe has seen attempts to introduce genetically modified 
food products commercially, which has led to strong resistance from civil society 
organizations and consumers. As a result, genetically modified food products have 
remained effectively barred from the European market. In this context a risk dis-
course has become predominant in Europe, emphasizing the principle of precau-
tion and consumers’ freedom of choice. However, this risk debate also involves 
a more comprehensive value-laden tension between, on the one hand, a ‘produc-
tivist’ innovation discourse of industrially driven agriculture directed towards 
increasing levels of production through convergent applications of biotechnology, 
and, on the other hand, a ‘post-productivist’ power and control discourse aiming 
at more sustainable, environmentally friendly, localized and pluralistic agricultural 
practices, including organic farming.
For the Chinese government, food security is a core issue, and there is a basic 
consensus that China should catch up with developments in transgenic technology 
in developed countries by building up its own transgenic technological strengths 
in agriculture. In this innovation discourse, there is a strong emphasis on ensur-
ing that China develops and maintains an independent ownership of its intellectual 
property rights in the area of genetic modification. Indeed, in terms of power and 
control, the food security and safety agendas are largely driven by the government, 
and there is very little scientific or public debate on the implementation of new 
technologies, including genetically modified products in the Chinese food chain. 
More recently, however, issues of risk related to genetically modified food prod-
ucts have become a focus of public concern in China.
Debates on food technologies in India highlight several challenges: food inse-
curity, declining productivity, the depletion of natural resources, increased risk 
from climate change, rising input costs, changing food habits and extremely high 
post-harvest losses. At the same time, debates and deliberation on issues of risk 
and regulation related to genetically modified foods have intensified in India, and 
this has led to the complete suspension of the process of commercializing geneti-
cally modified products. According to the opponents of genetic modification, such 
crops have negative effects on the environment and biodiversity, and also on socio-
economic conditions, as capital-intensive agriculture increases economic dispari-
ties between large and small farmers. In addition to this emerging risk discourse, 
we also see in India an active innovation and power and control discourse about 
the right balance between the various technological choices for food production: 
that is, transgenic technology, traditional breeding and organic farming.
8.4.1.2  Nanotechnology in the Three Regions
In Europe, many governments have promoted innovation in nanotechnology 
as a contribution to economic growth and competitiveness. Besides the strong 
and early involvement of science and industry stakeholders in this innovation 
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discourse, we have also seen the early emergence of a predominant risk discourse 
involving a range of state, private and civil society actors. This risk discourse not 
only relates to technical issues of risk, but has also emerged around other topics, 
such as uncertainty and precaution, with some civil society organizations call-
ing for a moratorium on nanotechnologies. In this context, a strong power and 
control, and also ethics, discourse has emerged, mainly driven by philosophers, 
social scientists and civil society organizations, emphasizing the socioeconomic 
and socioethical dimensions of nanotechnology. Several expert ethics bodies and 
technology assessment institutions in Europe have been conducting ethical assess-
ments of nanotechnology. Nanotechnology has not become a big public issue 
in Europe—not yet, at least—but there have been various experiments in public 
engagement.
In China there is a clearly predominant innovation discourse highlighting, as 
in Europe, the potential of nanotechnology to foster economic growth and global 
competitiveness. Although support for this pursuit of progress and ‘leapfrog’ 
development is widespread in China, the scientific community there has been 
active in putting issues of safety on the research agenda at an early stage. There 
have also been recommendations from within the scientific community for more 
transparent working methods, strengthened self-regulation and improved relations 
between science and society as important conditions for a harmonious innovation 
process. The thematization of broader, socially and ethically ambivalent aspects of 
nanotechnology is mostly limited to a closed community of Chinese scholars, but 
the first structures of a genuine ethics discourse are emerging in scientific circles. 
Moreover, there is some research effort taking place in China on public percep-
tions of nanotechnology.
In India a predominant innovation discourse has also emerged, motivated by a 
concern ‘not to miss the nanotechnology bus’ and, at the same time, laying spe-
cial emphasis on the enabling role of nanotechnology in solving urgent national 
problems and addressing the basic needs of the masses, such as clean drinking 
water and alternative energy sources. The risk aspects of nanotechnology have 
not received much attention, however. Although it was announced in 2010 that a 
nanotechnology regulatory board would be set up, and a committee was formed on 
risks and ethical issues, nothing much has happened. The power and control dis-
course in India comes down to ‘innovate first, regulate later’. Hardly any attention 
is being paid to the role of the public in the nanotechnology discourse and little is 
being done to address ethical challenges such as that of the distribution of benefits 
(Beumer and Bhattacharya 2013).
8.4.1.3  Synthetic Biology in the Three Regions
In Europe, synthetic biology is basically funded as ‘blue sky’ research in sup-
port of market-driven development, ‘smart and sustainable’ growth and competi-
tiveness. Moreover, experts have emphasized, from the very beginning, the need 
to address concerns about biosafety and biosecurity and broader ethical issues. 
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International civil society organizations have also been critically examining syn-
thetic biology from an early stage, not only as a new source of risk, but also as 
driver of the relentless global exploitation of natural resources and the commu-
nities dependent on them. In Europe, therefore, the emergence of synthetic biol-
ogy immediately prompted active discourses on innovation, risk and also reflective 
ethics, stimulated by European funding of research into ethical, legal and social 
implications. Synthetic biology is regarded as having arrived at a time when the 
role and position of science in society are facing increased public scrutiny. In this 
context, governments and scientists, including social scientists, advocate the early 
involvement of stakeholders and the broader public in the governance of synthetic 
biology. In the European power and control discourse, these issues converge in the 
overall theme of ‘responsible research and innovation’.
In China synthetic biology is also actively supported by the government, with 
the aim of catching up with developments in the US and Europe. More than in 
Europe, however, the Chinese innovation discourse involves deliberate attempts at 
priority setting in the framework of governmental five-year plans, in which syn-
thetic biology has been identified as a strategic priority in the nation’s applied bio-
technological research, especially in the biomedical and health care field. Issues 
of biosafety and biosecurity have also caught the attention of scientists in China, 
pointing to the need for the government to match global standards of regulation 
laid down in international agreements, but the major concern in this context is 
that issues of risk and regulation should not hamper China’s striving for progress 
in synthetic biology. In China the government is the principal agent in synthetic 
biology policy-making. There has not been much demand for control from scien-
tists or the public, and systematic ethical reflection on synthetic biology is mostly 
lacking.
In India there is only fragmented support for synthetic biology innovation from 
the government, and also little involvement of scientists or other stakeholders in 
discourses about the field. The most concerted contribution to synthetic biology 
policy-making in India has come from a special task force instituted by the gov-
ernment, which took a broad view of the promotion and regulation of synthetic 
biology, emphasizing not only its potential benefits, but also the need to address 
safety and ethical issues and to take the public into account. In considering India’s 
potential for innovation in synthetic biology, the task force report put the emphasis 
on meeting the developmental needs of the country, identifying biofuels as one of 
the key applications.
8.5  Conclusion: Governance Implications  
of GEST’s Comparative Analysis
The GEST project has focused on the relationships between the five science and 
technology discourses and science and technology policy-making in the three 
regions of Europe, China and India. What does the comparative analysis in the 
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three case studies tell us about these relationships? In general we observe a strong 
intertwinement and interactive dynamics between the discourses and science and 
technology policy-making. However, the GEST project has been interested in par-
ticular in the mediating role in science and technology policy-making of the two 
crosscutting discourses of reflective ethics and lay morality. As already indicated, 
these discourses have recently been more and more institutionalized and ‘main-
streamed’, especially in Europe, in response to tensions and conflicts arising from 
the introduction of new science and technology.
The first part of this book has discussed this emerging landscape of ethics 
and public discourses and their various forms of institutionalization in the three 
regions. What, then, can we conclude from the case studies about the role of these 
discourses in science and technology policy-making?
In comparing the science and technology discourses of the three regions, there 
is a notable contrast between Europe on the one hand, and China and India on 
the other. In all three case studies we see in Europe the predominance of a risk 
discourse that has been translated into a general regime of ‘risk governance’ with 
a strong international dimension (International Risk Governance Council 2005). 
In this context, the European discourses of reflective ethics and lay morality are 
strongly founded in a pervasive risk governance paradigm, based primarily on fun-
damental individual rights to protection against harm. In China and India, on the 
other hand, the innovation discourse is predominant in the three cases that we have 
described. This innovation discourse mostly translates into definitions of collective 
interests or needs that should guide the governance of innovation in terms of the 
‘common good’.
In general terms these observations suggest that in Europe more emphasis is 
placed on individual than community values, whereas in the other regions com-
munity values are emphasized over individual values (see Chap. 4). In the case 
of China, this picture is most clear-cut and also implies, in the context of China’s 
political system, that it is the government that defines the collective interests in 
science and technology policy-making, without a role for public or indeed ethics 
debate. In India the picture is more complex. Individual rights have been secured 
in the country’s constitution, and India has a culture of vibrant public debate, but 
in science and technology policy-making a reflective ethics discourse is lacking.
These observations suggest, finally, that tensions within and between the gov-
ernance of innovation and the governance of risk are major challenges for sci-
ence and technology policy-making—and indeed for a ‘global ethics’—in all three 
regions. In each of the regions, however, these global ethical challenges of power 
and control take a different form.
•	 In Europe, the major challenge is to strike a better balance in science and tech-
nology policy-making between risk governance, which is the currently domi-
nant paradigm, and a governance of innovation informed by values related to 
the common good and grand societal challenges.
•	 In China, the major challenge is to strengthen ethics and public discourses 
as a basis for a more participatory governance of both innovation and risk, 
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preserving harmony as a core value in the face of mounting public concerns 
about the role and risks of science and technology in society.
•	 In India, a lack of risk governance is one of the important challenges. Another 
major challenge is how to bridge the gap in the governance of innovation 
between the socioeconomic needs of the country in terms of access, equity and 
inclusion, and the imperatives of global economic competition, which are often 
paramount in science and technology policy-making.
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9.1  Historical Developments in Food and Agriculture
The past 20–30 years have seen significant changes in the way in which food secu-
rity, safety and the food economy have developed. These changes are due inter alia to 
advances in technology, together with changes in the roles of stakeholders and increas-
ing awareness of ethical considerations that incorporate consumer perceptions, animal 
welfare and environmental issues, and may vary according to local cultural influences.
9.2  The European Case
Over the past three decades, the dominant agri-industrial food production system in 
Europe has been challenged by a post-productivist model that is popularly perceived 
as more environment-friendly and grass-roots-initiated. This shift is a consequence 
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of changes in value systems, representing a change from a materialist to a post-mate-
rialist value orientation that has recently been evident in European societies (Inglehart 
1990; Lowe et al. 1993). This value shift can be superimposed on the ethical con-
tinuum of utilitarianism and deontology. The obvious utilitarian gains of the agri-
industrial model are becoming less significant than the gains in sustainability and 
wellbeing of the post-productivist model. It seems that society is looking beyond the 
material improvements in the quantity and price of food and, as in Maslow’s pyramid, 
attempting to incorporate what are often held to be the higher values that are required 
to actualize societal inspirations (Levidow et al. 2012). These values are entrenched 
in the process of governance in Europe, through the various treaties of the European 
Union, as justice, freedoms, rights, sustainability, dignity, solidarity and equality (see 
Chap. 5), and some of them influence the arguments and perceptions of stakeholders.
The discourses on innovation, risk, and power and control overlap in terms of 
argumentation embedded in scientific complexity, human values and socioeco-
nomic impact. The discourse of innovation and its focus on economic preroga-
tives cannot be clearly differentiated from that of risk, with its focus on individual 
effects, or that of power and control, which attempts to balance the two in a soci-
etally sustainable manner.
The relevant values themselves are used more as guiding principles than as 
defined legal concepts. The values of justice, equality, sustainability, freedoms and 
rights that are dominant in European societies show significant overlaps (and even 
contradictions) when it comes to real-life applications. Nevertheless, it is neither 
counterproductive nor undesirable to attempt a categorization of a scientific debate 
in terms of values and discourses, as long as there is clarity of source and purpose 
in the debate process. Table 9.1 summarizes the main arguments in terms of domi-
nant value and type of discourse in food technologies.
9.2.1  Justice and Equality
Justice and equality are combined in Table 9.1 because the overlap in the rel-
evant argumentation is sufficient to make them indistinguishable. Both refer to 
attempts to uphold fairness in societal dealings, rejecting prejudice or preference 
Table 9.1  Food technologies discourse and values: Europe
Justice and equality Sustainability Freedoms and rights
Innovation Economic develop-
ment; health benefit 
effects; unaffordable 
products
Disease resistance; 
extreme-climate crops; 
bioenergy crops
Choice between agri-
industrial and post-
productivist products
Risk Adverse health 
side-effects
Crop cross-pollination Monopoly market; lack 
of choice
Power and 
control
Substantial equiva-
lence; precautionary 
principle
Food security; food 
monopoly; crop 
coexistence
Labelling of GM 
products
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of treatment for one group over another. The innovation discourse derived from 
these values deals with two main arguments, the more straightforward of which 
focuses on the opportunity for new food technologies to provide for societal pros-
perity through economic development. This argument is promoted for many new 
technologies. However, the European food industry is substantial. Failure to adopt 
new technology may have an impact on many people, including employees and 
consumers. Equality is interpreted in this case in terms of (equal) access to work 
and food products. Preventing the implementation of a technology with direct 
health benefit effects runs contrary to the values of justice and equality (i.e. fair 
and equal access to wellbeing). Against this, an increase in injustice and inequal-
ity may be associated with products of new technology that are prized more highly 
than equivalents perceived as less healthy, and may be unaffordable for less afflu-
ent citizens.
The discourse of risk focuses on technical details, namely whether novel foods 
carry any risks to human or animal health. This discourse is also the least conclu-
sive in terms of values. Justice and equality would prohibit the unnecessary tak-
ing of risks, particularly if these are distributed inequitably across the population. 
From here, it could be argued that food technologies may represent a risky experi-
ment with human health and wellbeing, therefore breaching the value of justice.
The power and control discourse is where justice and equality are enshrined 
in law. For example, the interplay between two different arguments relating to 
risk assessment has been observed: substantial equivalence versus the precaution-
ary principle. From a global perspective, substantial equivalence represents a just 
and equal risk assessment process, and its abandonment creates unfairness and 
inequalities in international relations. The opposite might be true for the precau-
tionary principle applied at the level of the individual: it promotes fairness and 
equality for citizens who do not agree with the status quo and are unwilling to 
become what they see as research subjects.
9.2.2  Sustainability
The value of sustainability refers mainly to environmental protection, which 
includes the environment seen as a resource for future generations. Thus sustain-
ability relates to the way in which, and reasons why, food is produced. Innovation 
discourse revolves around the specific characteristics of food crops and their rela-
tionship to the environment. New technologies may be promoted as a solution to 
environmental threats (diseases), conditions (extreme climate) and energy pro-
duction (biofuels) that otherwise would be impossible or expensive to achieve. 
As such, it is argued that technologies promote a cleaner and more sustainable 
environment.
The sustainability risk discourse focuses on the introduction into the environ-
ment of novel crops that cannot be separated from the current ones. For example, 
cross-pollination may result in diminished biodiversity.
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The primary policy issue (i.e. regarding how to develop and maintain food 
security) is whether existing environmental conditions are sufficient to produce a 
sustainable source of food for the increasing human population. New food tech-
nologies have the potential to improve food security. At the same time, domina-
tion by a small number of profitable enterprises could create the opposite effect: 
a world where biodiversity is dwindling while what remains is governed by a few. 
Evidence in favour of developing a sustainable coexistence strategy is required 
scientifically, and legislative hurdles may be associated with its implementation.
9.2.3  Freedoms and Rights
The values of freedoms and rights are almost interchangeable. In the innovation 
discourse on food technologies, both proponents and opponents argue that citizens 
should have the right and the freedom to choose between products deriving from 
either agri-industrial or post-productivist types of agriculture. This usually, but 
not always, translates into choices between organic, nonorganic and genetically 
modified (GM) foods in Europe. What differentiates the arguments is not whether 
choice should exist, but how society should achieve it. The issue of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) is located in the risk discourse. IPR can have significant 
effects on the availability of food on the market, thus creating dangerous market 
shifts. For instance, extensive IPR protection could lead to monopolies, while 
weak protection could lead to lack of innovation. Different perspectives are not 
easily reconcilable.
The power and control discourse in Europe has focused primarily on the issue 
of labelling, in which the freedom to choose is associated with the right to know. 
Despite opposition by the food industry, the use of labelling to identify products 
containing or derived from GM material has been viewed as a basic right and has 
been legislated as such. The only undecided issue is the level of tolerance for new 
technology (i.e. GM) ingredients that is acceptable for labelling purposes.
9.2.4  Ethics and Public Perceptions
Dominant values are not easily distinguishable in public discourse because they 
permeate all argumentation. Reflective discourses may be better represented using 
a traditional approach to ethics discourse analysis that includes the description of 
stakeholder perspectives in terms of ethical principles. This analytic approach, 
termed ‘ethical matrix’, is inspired by the ‘principled approach’ in standard bio-
medical ethics (Bhuiyan 2010).
Such analysis identifies stakeholders’ perspectives on fundamental ethical prin-
ciples, both inward-facing, as they relate to themselves, and outward-facing, in 
terms of their ethical responsibility to other stakeholders and wider society. It is 
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possible that these different perspectives might in some cases be conflicting, even 
for a single stakeholder. The values individual stakeholders hold can affect the 
way in which they balance what they perceive as their own interests with those of 
other stakeholders, of particular importance where the interests and/or perspectives 
of different stakeholders appear to clash. For example, innovators whose primary 
focus is on their own freedom to innovate and market their inventions in a way that 
maximizes financial gain, while avoiding any negative impact on their brand or 
image, may find themselves in conflict with other stakeholders who see the right to 
open and transparent information as an essential factor in their freedom to choose 
and make decisions. Farmers who focus on their freedom to choose whether or not 
to grow GM crops or animals may find themselves in conflict with other stake-
holders who prioritize the protection of human health, the environment or animal 
welfare, or who perceive GM products as having unidentified potential risks.
Thus it is important for all stakeholders to understand not only their own needs 
but also the needs and perspectives of other stakeholders. Without a balanced ethi-
cal perspective, novel innovations may stall through opposition, or companies may 
be disincentivized from developing certain new technologies. This is, to a large 
extent, what has happened in Europe. One argument used by innovators and the 
food industry is that GM products can increase the food supply and strengthen 
food security, particularly in the developing world. However, these arguments are 
irrelevant to Europe, where food is plentiful and consumers feel entitled to make 
their own choices about the food they eat: they see no reason for exposing them-
selves to any level of potential risk when there are no evident benefits. It has been 
argued that consumers in countries suffering chronic food shortages are less con-
cerned, although a number of developing countries have also expressed concerns 
about GM foods.
If people are struggling to meet their basic physiological needs and perhaps 
have only one source of food, they are unlikely to reject food whatever its origins. 
This does not mean that any of their concerns can be ignored. As physiological 
and safety needs are met, people have greater opportunities to express the ethical 
principle of autonomy or freedom of choice. They may also have greater opportu-
nity and inclination to express outward-directed or altruistic choices, for example 
in relation to other communities, animal welfare or the environment.
It is argued by some innovators and policymakers that the benefits associated 
with GM foods are increasing and that consumer acceptance of GM products 
would lead to important economic growth. While there is some evidence that con-
sumers are more likely to accept GM products if benefits can be clearly identi-
fied, the broader economic-growth argument may be outside the field of interest of 
most consumers.
Other stakeholders have repeatedly failed to understand or accept the per-
spectives and values that drive consumer acceptance, arguing that if consumers 
understood the science, all would be well. Patently this approach does not work. 
European consumers appear to value their freedom to choose which food prod-
ucts they can buy. Although it is widely recognized that providing consumers with 
information on real and potential risks and benefits associated with GM foods in 
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general is important, this alone is not sufficient to secure consumer acceptance. 
Labelling provides for consumer choice. Manufacturers argue that consumers per-
ceive that GM products are unsafe.
9.3  The Indian Case
Food security has been an extremely serious problem in India over the past 
60 years. In the early years of independence, from 1947, India was dependent on 
food aid programmes. Thus the need for technological intervention to produce 
higher yields was a national policy priority. The Green Revolution was embraced 
by the Indian government as a technological response to the increasing gap 
between food demand and food availability. India was transformed from a food-
deficient country into a leading food producer. The Green Revolution resulted in 
a record grain output of 131 million tonnes in 1978/1979, establishing India as 
one of the world’s biggest agricultural producers. For example, the crop area 
under high-yielding varieties of wheat and rice grew considerably (Edugreen n.d.). 
Capital-intensive agriculture increased economic disparities between large farmers 
and small farmers.
The change from traditional subsistence farming to industrial monocropping 
had negative effects on small farmers. They found themselves trapped in a cycle 
of high interest rates associated with the purchase of seeds, fertilizers and pesti-
cides. Lack of competition meant that prices remained very high (Sebby 2010). 
The negative socioeconomic and environmental impacts of the Green Revolution 
are visible today. The institutional and economic conditions for applying Green 
Revolution technology effectively and safely were not fully in place, particularly 
for small and marginal farmers. The services needed for small-scale produc-
ers to gain access to or to realize the benefits were inadequate, especially for the 
resource-poor, the indigent and marginalized, and women (McIntyre et al. 2009).
The debate on environmental impact has led to an increase in policy support 
for organic production. However, post-production losses of perishable and semi-
perishable products are extremely high.
A further issue relates to inequality in access in relation to Green Revolution 
technologies that were available to producers in the rich northern states of Punjab, 
Haryana, parts of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. This has led to 
supplementary programmes aimed at improving food security at the subregional 
level.
The impediments to enhanced food production are also associated with urbani-
zation and market incentive structures that adversely affect areas under cultivation 
across different crops (Brahmanand et al. 2013). The overall costs of cultivation, 
largely an outcome of input costs, have increased significantly, pushing up overall 
food prices. As a result, India witnessed intense political debate, which led to the 
complete suspension of the whole process of GM commercialization (Chaturvedi 
et al. 2012; Chaturvedi and Srinivas 2013).
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However, food production techniques have diversified. Technologies like bio-
sensors, genomics, biotechnology and nanotechnology are now being developed 
and implemented. Technology-led paths should deliver prosperity, sustainability 
and employment to farming communities.
In India, farmers are increasingly experimenting with indigenous practices 
associated with alternative agriculture, although research in the area is less fre-
quently funded. Against this, more affluent farmers are adopting advanced techno-
logical solutions, largely led and supported by private-sector seed firms.
An ethical analysis can be applied to establishing a linkage between technolo-
gies and their socioeconomic aspects, environmental sustainability, the influence 
of global or external factors and equitable access. The proponents of GM technol-
ogy base their arguments on the environmental sustainability associated with its 
introduction. The opponents argue that the research and development infrastruc-
ture is very expensive and poorly regulated.
Three discourses—those of innovation, risk, and power and control—overlap, 
with socioeconomic issues cutting across them. Here the term  ‘socioeconomic’ 
may seem too vague or broad, but it is possible to identify the key issues of 
relevance.
The key lessons from this analysis of food technologies in India are:
•	 Innovation cannot be divorced from broader concerns relating to socioeconomic 
impacts. Considering such concerns as part of technological innovation policy 
and management will result in greater benefits to society, increased acceptabil-
ity and the wider adoption of technologies.
•	 Power and control should be understood in terms of impacts and how they can 
result in distorted markets, a less-than-optimum use of technology and societal 
resistance. The examples from India show that stakeholders may differ about 
regulatory activities. Those who question technologically based power and con-
trol often use socioeconomic discourse to highlight their concerns and to make 
counterclaims regarding benefits and risks, which are discussed in forums that 
may be unequal in terms of their influence on the policy process. Regulation 
and policy must address socioeconomic issues.
•	 Various technological options have to be assessed and promoted to maximize 
gains. It is here that assessments of socioeconomic factors have an important 
role in policy formulation. For example, technological options like non-GM 
biotechnology, traditional plant breeding and organic agriculture can be supple-
mented with GM biotechnology.
•	 Food technologies may ensure better productivity and environmental sustain-
ability. Access, equity and inclusion can be criteria in deciding on and imple-
menting technologies. Socioeconomic impact assessment may be applied in 
areas ranging from deploying innovation to protecting farmers from vulnerabili-
ties and risks associated with technologies.
In summary: in India, innovation issues cannot be divorced from broader concerns 
relating to socioeconomic impacts. Addressing these as part of technological inno-
vation policy and management will optimize benefits to society.
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9.4  The Chinese Case: Genetically Modified  
Foods in China
GM food cases in China cannot be discussed without reference to a GM cotton 
variety that was introduced to the country in the 1990s and rapidly promoted, 
 leading to the establishment of an associated regulatory system.
In 1992, the cotton-growing areas in northern China suffered severely from 
bollworms, which caused the yield per unit area in Hebei, Shandong and Henan to 
decline by nearly 30 %. The significant decrease in cotton production endangered 
the textile and related industries (Zhang and Wang 1993; Qiu and Wang 1998). 
A GM cotton variety developed by Monsanto was introduced to China in 1995 
and approved for commercialization by the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1998, this 
cotton variety was promoted widely in China. Monsanto acquired an advantage in 
the cotton seed market and quickly became the favoured choice of cotton growers 
across the country.
Meanwhile, the Chinese government increased efforts to develop related bio-
logical technologies. In 1991, the then State Science and Technology Commission 
of China initiated a research project on the development of insect-resistant GM 
cotton varieties. By 2005, China had successfully developed more than 30 such 
varieties, which were grown in nearly all cotton-growing areas, accounting for 
more than 70 % of the total cultivated area of all insect-resistant cotton varie-
ties. With the improvement of their research and development capacity and their 
superior knowledge of the needs of domestic cotton growers, Chinese cotton seed 
breeding companies have achieved rapid development and gradually established a 
competitive edge in the market. Insect-resistant cotton seeds independently devel-
oped by Chinese companies account for 90 % of the domestic market.
With respect to GM foods and related technologies, the Chinese government 
adopts a largely empirical approach, emphasizing industry security and innova-
tion. However, the process has been not without flaws, for example the lack of 
concern on the part of the government, researchers and the public regarding the 
environmental impact of GM crops. Not only consumers, but most cotton grow-
ers as well, were ill-informed about transgenic technology, and public knowledge 
remains limited, even now that GM crops have been promoted. The absence of a 
forum for stakeholders and the susceptibility of the public to anti-science rumours 
make it very difficult to conduct an effective dialogue between researchers and the 
public and to build consensus across groups.
The success in cotton production has given the government, research institutes 
and agricultural enterprises a deep understanding of the importance of transgenic 
technology. There is consensus that China should catch up with developed coun-
tries in transgenic technology and build its own transgenic technological strengths 
in agriculture and related fields. China has developed scientific programmes in 
both basic and applied research that have produced an extensive body of knowl-
edge about biology, thus laying a solid foundation for further research and devel-
opment. The Chinese government has been very prudent, however, about the 
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commercial production of GM crops. Only a limited number of GM varieties such 
as tomato, papaya and pimento have been approved for commercial cultivation. 
No permission has been given for the commercial GM cultivation of any staple 
crop, apart from biosafety certificates being granted to two GM rice varieties and 
one GM corn variety in 2009. However, the issuing of these certificates did not 
allow immediate commercial cultivation: to date, no GM staple crop has been 
approved for commercial cultivation in China.
China is concerned about whether GM foods will cause harm to human health 
and/or the ecology and environment. There are concerns that the long-term inges-
tion of the substance containing the Bt toxalbumin found in GM crops may be 
harmful to health. Supporters of GM foods cite research findings that the toxalbu-
min produced by the Bt gene is only toxic to certain organisms. Foreign research 
institutes have reported that GM foods may have a negative effect on the human 
liver, kidney and immune system, as frequently cited by the opponents of GM 
foods. A second concern relates to potential allergens that may be introduced into 
new crop varieties through GM. Therefore plants with any allergen gene inserted 
are prohibited from commercialization.
Transgene escape can potentially have negative impacts on the environment. 
Natural crossing will take place between some cultivated plants and nearby related 
wild species, introducing the genes of the cultivated plants into the wild species, 
to the extent that wild plants may take on the characteristics of the GM plants (e.g. 
pesticide resistance). China’s arable land is widely fragmented across farms, and 
therefore the asylum or refuge method for reducing the ecological impact of the 
transgenic technology is not feasible. A further risk is that because Chinese agri-
culture is so highly fragmented, effective governance and monitoring of GM crops 
is almost impossible and many GM crops are grown illegally (Zi 2005).
The Chinese government has identified a further risk issue that could best be 
described as ‘industrial risk’, meaning that the globally integrated agricultural pro-
duction system poses a threat to the agricultural security of developing countries, 
resulting in problems with access to foods and compromising the survival of mil-
lions of people. The population excluded from the economic system may gener-
ate political and economic crises in developing countries. Through such means as 
mergers and acquisitions, control of IPR and specialized production, the multina-
tional agricultural companies, which are based in developed countries, have imple-
mented a vertical integration strategy centred on a few developed countries that 
control the entire agricultural and food production chain from raw material supply 
to sales. As multinational agricultural companies become increasingly monopo-
listic globally, many individual medium and small-sized farms face bankruptcy. 
Developing countries are gradually losing their independence with regard to food 
production. Transgenic technologies are mostly controlled by large-scale agricul-
tural and chemical companies in developed countries. As a response, the Chinese 
government maintains strong vigilance over the potential risks of opening the mar-
kets concerned (Magdoff et al. 1998; Shiva 2000; Amin 2003).
At present, China’s GM food administration system still faces various prob-
lems, including poor coordination and cooperation between different government 
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departments, inadequate administrative measures and a lack of public participa-
tion, communication and decision-making transparency. From the perspective 
of policies, laws and regulations, China’s regulatory system for GM foods cov-
ers the economy, trade, production and environmental protection horizontally 
and research, experimentation, processing, production, operation, and import and 
export vertically, but there is still no specialized comprehensive legislation. The 
regulations issued by the various competent government departments are not only 
jumbled but also unable to address major biosafety issues that fall outside their 
scope. Moreover, the lack of coordination of the different laws and regulations has 
led to overlapping, conflicts or omission in responsibilities between the various 
departments.
Whether the farmers adopt new technologies is dependent on their cost and 
promised return. Even though GM seeds are several times more expensive than 
conventional seeds, the premium is worthwhile in the short term in view of the 
many benefits they bring, including savings in pesticide costs, the reduced use of 
labour and the prevention of pesticide-caused poisoning. Therefore farmers are 
generally willing to adopt these new technologies. In the long term, the degree 
of acceptance by consumers of GM foods and the implementation of a GM food 
marking system may lead to changes in demand, and uncertainty in this respect 
may cause fluctuation in the farmers’ expected returns (Ma and Huang 2003; Zhao 
and Chen 2011; Zheng et al. 2012).
The degree of acceptance by consumers of GM foods will eventually determine 
their growth. Two surveys in 2002 and 2003 showed that approximately 67 % of 
urban consumers were aware of transgenic technology and approximately 60 % 
accepted GM foods (Huang et al. 2006). Comparable surveys in recent years have 
indicated some improvement in urban consumer awareness of GM foods but a 
decrease in acceptance (Luo et al 2010; Zhou et al. 2012). The main determinants 
of consumer attitudes to GM foods are food safety and income. There is a positive 
correlation between perceived food safety and willingness to buy, and a negative 
correlation between income and the willingness to buy. Food safety is dependent 
on information symmetry, which is mainly subject to the influence of media pub-
licity and the degree of trust in the government. The views presented in the media 
influence the degree of acceptance of GM foods on the part of Chinese consumers.
A Chinese consensus conference on GM foods in 2008 suggested that Chinese 
consumers, especially those living in large and medium-sized cities, were increas-
ingly worried about GM food, and that the public were paying closer attention to 
the risks of biotechnology, particular in relation to GM foods. The Chinese public 
in general trust the government and scientists, a confidence that is enhanced by 
direct dialogue among the parties. The public are cautious about the development 
of GM, but supportive of the country’s efforts in developing GM technology.
In China, the discourse on supporting GM foods and related technologies 
through innovation involves two intertwined systems. The first is the discourse 
of developmentalism, which holds that only by giving full scope to the advan-
tages of biological technology and using transgenic technology to transform 
products into productivity can China’s agriculture undergo fundamental changes. 
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It further states that transgenic technology will improve the inherent value of tradi-
tional agriculture because the reduced production costs and improved outputs will 
increase agricultural productivity. Thus, it is argued, the development of GM foods 
is a long-term global agricultural trend, and will help solve China’s future food 
security problems. The second is the discourse of scientism, which, starting out 
from Deng Xiaoping’s judgment that ‘science and technology constitute a primary 
productive force’ (Deng 1994), holds that GM foods naturally have political legiti-
macy and that the aura of science lends scientists and technologies an authority 
and reputation that tend to foreclose reflection on the legitimacy and social conse-
quence of GM foods, thus endowing them with an automatic correctness.
The production and consumption of GM foods in China are also associated 
with potential risks—in general, and specifically in relation to China’s existing 
agricultural situation and administration, and to the industry security. The Chinese 
government does not want to see the country’s industrial security undermined 
either by foreign control of key technologies or by China’s own lack of techno-
logical preparation.
The Chinese government has a mixed attitude towards GM food technology. On 
one hand it is prudent about the commercial application of relevant technologies 
and, on the other, it takes research and development and independent possession 
of transgenic technologies as a strategic policy for supporting agricultural develop-
ment at the national level.
9.5  Conclusions from the Three Regions Analysis
A number of important factors affect the way in which policy is elaborated and 
established for the development and implementation of innovative food technolo-
gies in the three regions. The identity of the key actors and their position in rela-
tion to power and control influence policy implementation. Local food security 
considerations and socioeconomic factors are also relevant, particularly as they 
affect regional and national economies and global competitiveness. The role of 
ethical considerations depends on the extent to which such values influence these 
factors.
In Europe, consumers play a crucial role in developing policy and influencing 
the extent to which innovative food technologies are introduced. The European 
consumers’ response to technologies such as GM food has carried considerably 
more weight in the market than pure economic considerations. In the European 
context, regulatory transparency, risk perception and communication, fairness, 
trust and freedom of choice underlie and influence the extent to which consumer 
opinion affects novel food technology policies. It is useful to compare this expres-
sion of values in Europe with their relative influence in the different political, soci-
etal and economic situations of China and India.
The Chinese case study focuses specifically on the use of GM in  agriculture. 
The introduction of food technology has been influenced by a different relationship 
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between the state and its citizens. Associated policy appears to be influenced 
largely by Chinese scientific research, closely allied to government policies on the 
need to ensure economic independence and control, which are related in turn to an 
ideological perspective on the ability of science to deliver economic benefit.
Although public concern about GM food is increasing in China, there appears 
to be relatively little direct engagement, either with public interest groups or with 
Chinese consumers, to ascertain whether there are any ethical or other values held 
by citizens that may impact on the introduction of such food. At the same time, 
the Chinese government is aware of the need to protect its citizens from any risks 
associated with GM products, and recognizes that there is little point in introduc-
ing GM staples into the food chain if these are likely to be rejected by consum-
ers. This demonstrates that the Chinese government is concerned about its ethical 
responsibility to protect its citizens from harm and acknowledges consumers’ 
right to choose whether or not to consume GM food products. Although trust in 
government, regulators and scientists may be higher in China than in Europe, the 
principle of consumer informed choice through the informative labelling of foods 
produced using new technologies may well still be an important consumer condi-
tion of acceptance of GM foods, and potentially other innovative food technolo-
gies (Coles and Frewer 2013).
In India, agrifood innovation cannot be divorced from broader socioeconomic 
impacts (effects on small farmer communities, the environment, labour costs, tra-
ditional agriculture, etc.). Stakeholder debates are often based on socioeconomic 
concerns. Discussion of putative risks (and associated policy measures) is an 
important issue in India, while food security is a major preoccupation for poli-
cymakers. Traditional plant breeding and organic agriculture too are important in 
Indian agricultural production.
Food policy in India is also influenced by various interest groups and/or trade 
bodies for which socioeconomic considerations (based on access, equity and 
inclusion) are key value considerations. This appears to have produced a number 
of very pragmatic policy choices that aim to sustain and develop organic agricul-
ture while at the same time making room for the sustainable implementation of 
biotechnology innovations.
9.5.1  Regional Commonalities
Taken together, certain similarities between the three regions offer a road map for 
collaboration. Public multi-stakeholder debates are becoming the norm, rather 
than the exception, in all regions. The proximity of food to consumer-citizens and 
a strong and increasingly educated and assertive civil society in all three regions 
are changing the rules of policy debates. To an increasing extent, policy agen-
das are influenced by the outcomes of multi-actor and multi-stakeholder public 
interaction. Understanding the social dimensions of new food technologies may 
become an important consideration in the policy process.
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The growing vocalization of consumer concerns may lead to a shift of balance 
in the power and control spectrum. As the existing risk assessment paradigm is 
questioned, measurements of long-term effects are becoming prominent elements 
in the official risk assessment process that require a greater emphasis on collabora-
tive activities in constructing a new common procedure.
While there are similar concerns in all three regions about issues of risk and 
safety and how these are expressed, the mechanism to deal with these still varies 
considerably. The precautionary principle plays a major role in the European con-
text, and is also now taken into account by the World Trade Organization and the 
Codex Alimentarius. In India, the focus is on developing an increasingly stringent 
regulatory framework for food safety with the introduction of the National Food 
Security Act of 2013 and a new regulatory body, the Food Safety and Standards 
Authority of India in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. In China, 
although the precautionary approach operates in relation to the introduction of GM 
staple foods, the ideological scientism position is still an important consideration.
Despite these differences, in the context of a global market in food products, 
some clarification of parameters for a common approach to global risk assess-
ment standards is required. In any common collaborative activity between the 
three regions, food security has to be accepted as a valid indicator of the potential 
impact and value assessment of new technologies. A commonly understood socio-
economic analysis is also required as a basis for policy development.
The engagement of the public and stakeholders in food debates is increasingly 
seen as an integral part of the policy process. Participatory technology assessment 
exercises have been conducted in all three regions (e.g. consensus conferences), 
but formal institutional structures are missing in China and India (see Chap. 4). 
Some context-based structures that presuppose a common understanding of meth-
odological parameters in public engagement should be developed in pursuit of col-
laborations that will see an integrated food policy input in the three regions.
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10.1  Introduction
For roughly 15 years, ‘nanotechnology’ has been established as a generic term for 
a wide and inhomogeneous field of science and technology branches that enable us 
to manipulate, observe and measure at a scale of less than 100 nm. One nanometre 
is equal to one billionth of a metre. Nanotechnology or, more precisely, nanotech-
nologies as the application of nanoscience—an interdisciplinary science that cuts 
across established scientific and engineering disciplines like chemistry, physics, 
biology, or engineering—consists of overlapping technologies in which different 
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industrial sectors such as communication, health care and biotechnology meet and 
partly converge. Moreover, because it provides a toolkit for realizing certain (pre-) 
products in many sectors, nanotechnology has been classified as an ‘enabling tech-
nology’ and as a starting point or exemplar of a new industrial revolution. The 
broad and open definition of the umbrella term ‘nanotechnology’, as well as com-
prehensive visions and expected research and development programmes, have led 
to the creation or designation of new subdisciplines (or ‘hyphen disciplines’) such 
as nano-electronics, nano-medicine, nano-ethics and nano-toxicology.
At the nanoscale the characteristics of matter can be significantly altered 
because of size-specific properties such as the dominance of quantum effects: for 
example, downsized material structures that consist of the same chemical elements 
may change their mechanical, magnetic, electronic and optical properties. 
Engineered nanomaterials1 are manufactured for specific ends, such as carbon 
nanotubes for reinforced car tyres or antistatic packaging, nanosilver particles for 
antibacterial coatings, titanium carbide for harder cutting tools and nanoparticles 
for drug delivery. Nanomaterials appear in different forms and are generally cate-
gorized according to their dimensions: for instance, very thin surface coatings, 
films or layers are nanoscale in one dimension; nanotubes, nanowires and fibres 
are nanoscale in two dimensions; nanoparticles, quantum dots and nanoshells are 
nanoscale in three dimensions.
During the 1990s some governments set up state-run promotional programmes 
for nanotechnology, although they did not then use the actual term ‘nanotechnology’ 
(Wullweber 2010: 157). At the end of the 1990s nanotechnology became a positive 
guiding vision (Leitbild)2 for future technology development. Science policy and 
governmental actors succeeded in shaping a programmatic nano-discourse by link-
ing far-reaching promising nano-visions to the current state of the art in specific 
fields of nanotechnology, such as nanomaterials and nanoelectronics. The fields 
identified for governmental action were taken up in governmental nanotechnology 
research and development programmes introducing mid-term guiding visions for 
the shaping of the nanotechnology discourse in particular and the science and tech-
nology policy discourse in general. Important technology policy actors from leading 
industrial countries started framing the field of nanotechnology by conceptualizing 
different developments under the umbrella term ‘nanotechnology’, through research 
and development programmes showing the medium- and long-term way forward, 
and by establishing and maintaining networks embracing actors in research, indus-
try, politics and the public sphere. ‘Nanotechnology has arguably been the strongest 
movement in the re-organization of the disciplinary landscape of science and engi-
neering worldwide in the past decade’ (Schummer 2007: 670, 671).
1 Besides engineered or manufactured nanomaterials, there are also natural nanomaterials like 
volcanic ash, fire smoke, clay and evaporating sea salt.
2 Leitbilder (guiding visions) are close to being concrete technological developments, but have 
not yet been realized, though there is good evidence of their feasibility (Grunwald 2005).
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The first and biggest nanotechnology research and development programme 
explicitly promoting nanotechnology, the National Nanotechnology Initiative, was 
initiated by the US government in 2000:
Nanotechnology is the first economically important revolution in science and technology 
(S&T) since World War II that the United States has not entered with a commanding lead. 
Federal and industrial support of R&D in the United States for this field already is sig-
nificant, but Europe and Japan are each making greater investments than the United States 
is, generally in carefully focused programs. Now is the time to act (National Science and 
Technology Council 2000: 114).
From 2000 to 2007 more than 60 countries established more or less comprehen-
sive and coherent nanotechnology research and development programmes (Roco 
2007: 37). This worldwide nanotechnology-oriented innovation process is situ-
ated in a highly competitive field among leading industrial nations and regions. 
Governments and actors in the science industry in particular are encouraging a 
robust innovation discourse that characterizes nanotechnology as a revolution-
ary key technology, highlighting its potential benefits and possible contribution 
to big societal challenges, such as global competitiveness and sustainability, and 
aims, such as economic growth and the wellbeing of the population. In the field of 
energy production, for example, semiconductor nanowires and quantum dots have 
potential for sustainable solar energy harvesting. Promising applications in the field 
of medicine are personalized drug delivery and the in situ regeneration of bones.
Some actors, on the other hand, including researchers in science and technol-
ogy studies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), contrast the potential 
benefits with uncertainties and possible environmental, health, and safety risks 
as a counterbalance to this innovation paradigm, since not much is known about 
the interaction of nanomaterials with the human body or the environment. Besides 
these primary or absolute risks there are also secondary or related socioeconomic 
risks involving autonomy and democratic codetermination or global justice and 
societal equity through an entrenchment of current market and political power 
imbalances (the nano-divide). In particular, the discussion on governance and the 
risk assessment of nanotechnologies has led to an entanglement of different argu-
mentation patterns, principles and value concepts.
Nanotechnology encompasses a wide and heterogeneous field of technologies 
and possible applications, including far-reaching visions of converging technolo-
gies, human enhancement and transhumanism. Here we apply a more down-to-
earth approach to nanotechnologies, focusing on nanomaterials.
10.2  Discourses on Innovation, Risk, and Power  
and Control
Since we are comparing discourses on nanotechnologies in Europe, China and 
India—three different regions with different sociocultural histories and socioeco-
nomic contexts—the term ‘discourse’ is to be understood in quite a broad sense. 
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Our analysis3 will show how the umbrella term ‘nanotechnology’ is conceptual-
ized by one or more actors in each of the three regions, as well as how this con-
ceptualization refers to region-specific sociocultural value conceptions.
10.2.1  Innovation
As stated in the introduction, nanotechnology has become a worldwide exemplar 
of industrial progress and innovation. Actors in science policy and the science 
industry link the development of nanotechnology to a wide range of beneficial 
applications. In each region, those involved in any innovation discourse have to 
show how their conceptualization of nanotechnology fits societal needs in order to 
represent nanotechnology as a socially robust sociotechnical system.
All three regions have been involved in research at the nanoscale since the 1980s, 
with awareness of nanomaterials growing during the 1990s. The nanotechnology 
innovation discourse also started in all three at about the same time, the beginning 
of the 2000s. But there are significant differences between the regions in innovation 
policy. Whereas China and many EU member states set up guiding and envisioning 
nano-strategies and permanent central coordinating bodies, India started by launch-
ing a Nano Science and Technology Initiative coordinated by the Department of 
Science and Technology, which also oversees other science and technology activities.
10.2.1.1  European Union
The development of a coherent policy for nanotechnologies at a European level 
can be traced back to the year 2000, when the cross-departmental Unit G4: 
Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies was established in the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Research, in order to gather information from other direc-
torates-general and services with the aim of providing guidance for the European 
nanotechnology strategy and distributing research funds for nanotechnologies from 
the EU’s multi-annual Framework Programmes for Research and Technological 
Development. Although nano-specific promotion programmes did not exist before 
the year 2000, there were some early efforts at nanotechnology research and devel-
opment in the fourth and fifth framework programmes of the European Commission.
In May 2004 the commission adopted the communication ‘Towards a European 
strategy for nanotechnology’ (European Commission 2004), followed by an action 
plan for nanosciences and nanotechnologies in 2005 (European Commission 2005). 
In these policy papers the commission refers to the potential contribution of nano-
sciences and nanotechnology to addressing many of today’s societal challenges, 
especially in medicine, information technologies, food and water, energy and 
3 This analysis is mainly based on Fautz et al. 2014.
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environment, as well as security. It notes the strong knowledge base in nanosciences 
that the EU has established over the preceding decade, but doubts that the EU is in a 
good position relative to its main international competitors, since it is investing less 
and lacks world-class infrastructure. The commission makes the point that European 
excellence has to be translated into commercially viable products within a favour-
able environment for innovation. At the same time it addresses environmental, health 
and safety (EHS) aspects and ethical, legal and social implications, confirming that 
nanotechnologies must be developed in a safe and responsible manner.
The EU and its member states have continued to foster nanotechnologies by 
issuing action plans and research strategies with international engagement and by 
supporting or releasing codes of conduct for research and development.
So, for Europe, we can observe a broad governmental policy engagement 
to develop a coherent strategy on nanotechnology including a variety of actors, 
particularly in science and industry. Critical voices make references to prior dis-
courses, developments and governance failures in the field of new and emerging 
technologies, such as biotechnologies, but governments too have learned from 
prior conflicts and developed more sophisticated strategies of anticipatory govern-
ance and conflict reduction, including certain forms of dialogue and participation.
The main innovation narrative is that of nanotechnologies exercising a kind 
of collective beneficence for society as a whole. Government policy papers raise 
expectations and emphasize how nanotechnologies can potentially benefit all 
citizens and the environment by addressing grand societal challenges—like fight-
ing diseases, improving food and water safety, making the production and use 
of energy more efficient, protecting the environment, enhancing the security of 
human life and private property and increasing the economic wealth of the whole 
of society—in accordance with basic principles such as justice, autonomy and 
sustainability. In this way the main drivers of the innovation discourse directly or 
indirectly invoke the European values of equality, freedom and solidarity: equality 
of chances for wellbeing through economic growth; freedom of research as well as 
to conduct business; and solidarity by improving the health situation of the people 
and the environment through nanotechnologies.
10.2.1.2  China
In China, the main driver of the innovation discourse is the government. This 
is welcomed by industry, but also overwhelmingly by researchers, social sci-
entists and the public, who all largely share a common vision and concep-
tion of national progress. In March 2001, the Chinese government established 
the National Committee for Direction and Coordination of Nanoscience and 
Nanotechnology Research to allow the comprehensive and coherent planning of 
such research across the country and to coordinate the actions of the various play-
ers. In July 2001, the National Programme on the Development of Nanoscience 
and Nanotechnology (MOST 2001) was released to provide specific planning 
for the overall development of nanotechnologies. In 2006, the State Council of 
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the People’s Republic of China released the Outline of National Medium- and 
Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (MOST 2006), in which 
nanoscience was described as ‘one of the most promising areas where leap-frog 
development is possible’ since nanotechnologies had the potential to ‘give birth 
to a new technology revolution, and create huge development space for materials, 
information, green manufacturing, biology, and medicine in China’ [our transla-
tion]. In 2012, a special five-year nano research plan (MOST 2012a) was formu-
lated in order to deepen the implementation of the outline plan (MOST 2006) and 
advance major national scientific research programmes.
Although a handful of big national companies, such as Haier, are involved in nano-
technologies research, most industrial investments come from new business actors, in 
contrast to what is happening in other countries, where the majority of investors are 
big companies (Ren and Zhang 2010). Moreover, the nano industry field is subject 
to the economic need and political will for high increases in gross domestic product, 
making local governments eager for earlier returns on investment (Zhou 2007). This 
impatience has led to the low level of industrialization of nanotechnologies in China.
In terms of values, both progress and affluence can be identified as important ref-
erence points for the Chinese innovation discourse. The value of progress is embed-
ded in the widely shared concept of social evolutionism. This is evident in the 
government’s praise of economic progress through innovation aimed at catching up in 
international market competition and making the Chinese nation a self-reliant global 
leader in science, technology, and innovation. The scientific community supports 
these aims, with a particular focus on promoting research in order to perform well in 
international science and technology competition. Chinese enterprises that jump on 
the nano-train expect improved products for international competition, and can bene-
fit from the public’s appreciation of technological applications that symbolize societal 
progressiveness and individual wealth. Therefore affluence is the other main value 
of the government’s innovation discourse, with the Communist Party deriving its 
legitimacy from its ability to guide the Chinese people to an affluent life through the 
improvement of their livelihood and the creation of material wealth. Closely related to 
this are the values of personal wellbeing and of social and ecological harmony.
10.2.1.3  India
In India, the main focus area of nanotechnology for government and industry 
lies in addressing urgent societal needs and challenges, as well as in the com-
petitive commercialization of nano-enabled consumer products. The Department 
of Science and Technology launched the Programme on Nanomaterials: Science 
and Devices in 2000 in order to initiate some end-to-end projects leading to tan-
gible technologies, processes and technologies. The emphasis was on projects 
addressing urgent national challenges like water purification, alternative energy 
production and conservation (DST 2001). An expert group on Nanomaterials: 
Science and Devices, charged with the development of a National Nanoscience 
and Nanotechnology Initiative, was launched in October 2001 under the aegis 
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of the department. The key targets of the initiative were to create research infra-
structure and to promote basic research in nanoscience and nanotechnology. It 
focused on various issues relating to infrastructure development, basic research 
and application-oriented programmes in nanomaterial, including drugs, drug deliv-
ery, gene targeting and DNA chips. Nanotechnology was heralded as a revolution-
ary technology with applications in almost every aspect of life. In recognition of 
the important role and multifaceted applications of nanotechnologies, the initia-
tive was elevated to the level of a mission programme in 2007 (called the Nano 
Mission), with enhanced funding from the government. Primary objectives of the 
Nano Mission are basic research promotion, infrastructure development, the crea-
tion of public-private partnerships and technology development centres, human 
resource development, and international collaboration (DST 2008).
In terms of values and principles, the innovation discourse in India is mainly 
driven by the principle of beneficence—that is, doing good for others, here refer-
ring to society and the nation. This means that nanotechnological innovation is 
seen as bringing society wellbeing and justice in terms of access, equity and inclu-
sion, since nanotechnologies are expected to address major social challenges and 
to push economic growth.
10.2.2  Risk
One of the challenges in nanotechnology policy, and in related ethics discourses, 
is the heterogeneity of the field, something that has become particularly obvious in 
the case of risk discourses. In early stages, these dealt with various nanotechnol-
ogy approaches and applications, but since the mid-2000s, they have focused on 
the EHS risks of nanomaterials. For our comparison of risk discourses, important 
questions are:
•	 What kinds of risks are linked to nanotechnologies?
•	 How are they dealt with?
•	 How are they balanced against expected benefits?
EHS risk issues appeared almost at the same time in Chinese and European 
research communities. The Chinese government integrated risk research into its 
policy agenda—in particular thanks to advocacy and promotion by scientists—on 
the basis of a cost-benefit framework. In India, a risk management framework still 
has to be developed.
10.2.2.1  European Union
Within its Fifth Framework Programme for Research and Technological 
Development (1998–2002), the EU started funding specific research on EHS aspects 
of nanotechnologies (Aguar and Murcia Nicolas 2008). Since the years 2003 
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and 2004, EHS issues have increasingly been addressed by a variety of actors in 
Europe—including NGOs, the European Parliament, regulatory authorities, expert 
bodies, reinsurance companies and those involved in science and technology stud-
ies—and the risk (governance) discourse has become one of the strongest and most 
visible discourses in the debate on nanotechnologies, creating linkages with other 
nano-discourses and scrutinizing conventional risk assessment frameworks with ref-
erence to the precautionary principle or sustainability. By the year 2004, the first 
expert recommendations initiated by the European Commission appeared (e.g. 
Malsch 2004), emphasizing the need to assign new Chemical Abstracts Service 
(CAS) registry numbers to manufactured nanoparticles and to classify them in 
categories of risk, toxicity and proliferation. This has since been elaborated in the 
emerging subdiscipline of nanotoxicology (Kurath and Maasen 2006), where new 
risk assessment methods are being developed for the new and unknown properties 
of nanomaterials. Also reinsurance companies, by applying consequentialist risk 
assessment frameworks, soon became aware of possible EHS risks and emphasized 
the need for increasing risk research funds (Hett 2004; Lauterwasser 2005).
Even though there are no separate regulatory frameworks for nanotechnologies, 
the current EU regulations provide the most important framework for the activi-
ties of EU member states in this field. Moreover, in October 2011, the European 
Commission adopted a recommendation on the definition of the term ‘nanomate-
rial’, which was criticized by environmental, health and animal protection NGOs 
(CIEL et al. 2011) for being too narrow in scope and hence not adequate to deal 
with the risks of nanomaterials outside the range of 1–100 nm.
The European Parliament, the European Commission and several authori-
tative European and national research bodies commissioned by the European 
Commission and member state governments discussed and analysed the appropri-
ateness of risk management frameworks in current legislation for handling nano-
related risks, and the commission addressed EHS issues in many statements and 
funded research projects. But on concrete risk assessment and management meas-
ures, differences in risk perceptions became obvious between the more proaction-
ary commission and industry on one side and the more precautionary European 
Parliament and civil society stakeholders on the other. Scientific expert bodies 
generally recommended a case-by-case approach to risk assessment and some-
times expressed doubts about the fitness of relevant legislation for nanoscale mate-
rials, in the absence of sufficient data on the behaviour of nanomaterials in the 
human body and the environment.
As a counterbalance to the Promethean innovation rationale, the main advocates 
of an alternative European risk discourse base their argumentation mainly on the 
principles of non-maleficence, justice and precaution. They reject consequentialist 
or utilitarian standard risk frameworks as falling short of the challenges entailed 
in given scientific uncertainties and call for new and enhanced measures for the 
evaluation of and protection from EHS risks and physical harm, referring to prin-
ciples such as sustainability and precaution. A good example is the risk and regula-
tion discourse centred on European chemicals regulation, as outlined in the report 
Ethics Debates on Nanotechnologies in the EU (Fautz 2013). Moreover, there is 
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ongoing discussion among those engaged in science and technology studies, as 
well as between NGOs and governments, on risk assessment procedures as such: 
whether they can still be based on classical and mainly consequentialist frame-
works or should rely on specific interpretations of the precautionary principle.
The values invoked in this discourse are mainly solidarity, human dignity and 
equality: solidarity in terms of protecting human and environmental health, for 
instance by insisting on high regulatory standards for the use and release of nano-
materials; human dignity and equality in terms of individual physical integrity, in 
that no-one should be exposed to risks against his/her own will or for the profit of 
others, even if utilitarian positions would justify exposing some people to higher 
risks for the sake of majority welfare.
10.2.2.2  China
Nanotoxicology research has become an important field for Chinese researchers to 
raise their profile as international high-level scientists. Moreover, the nano-scien-
tists can be seen as the dominant actors in the Chinese risk discourse on nanotech-
nologies. It is particularly thanks to the advocacy and promotion of the scientists 
that the government included the topic of nanosafety in its policy documents and 
earmarked funds for the research of EHS aspects.
The Chinese State Guidelines on Nanotechnology Development released in 
2001 did not mention risk research and management. Nevertheless, China’s sci-
ence community paid attention to the safety of nanotechnologies quite early. In 
November 2001, a group of chief scientists on nanotechnologies proposed conduct-
ing research on the bio-effects, toxicity and safety of nanotechnologies (Zhao and 
Chai 2005). In 2003, the Chinese Academy of Sciences set up an open lab on nano 
bio-effects and nano safety, which later became the Key Laboratory for Biomedical 
Effects of Nanomaterials and Nanosafety. Since its establishment, the lab has made 
important contributions to nanotoxicology. In addition, the Chinese research com-
munity has held several symposiums since 2004 on the safety of nanotechnologies.
In 2005, the Chinese government started formulating standards to regulate 
nano-related research, production and application and to control possible risks 
and harm (Shen and Wang 2011). The nanotechnology health, safety and environ-
ment standardization group was established in March 2010 to take responsibility 
for standardization in relation to the EHS impacts of nanomaterials and products 
during their manufacture, packing, transportation and use. In 2011, a standards 
research project, Health and Safety of Nanotechnology in Workplace, was set up. 
In the 12th Five-Year Special Plan for Major National Scientific Research Program 
on Nano Research, from 2012, efforts were announced to ‘pay attention to stand-
ardized manufacture of nanotechnology products and formulate several prod-
uct standards and safe production rules for important nanotechnology products’. 
In addition, ‘nanotechnology safety’ was listed as one of the nine major research 
tasks (MOST 2012b). But still there are no regulatory policy measures apart from 
international attempts at standardization.
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Discussions of health and environment issues in the risk discourse are related 
to the values of safety and harmony. But all participants in that discourse link 
safety and harmony directly to progress and innovation by emphasizing the impor-
tance of reducing the occurrence of hazardous or anomalous situations that could 
threaten progress and affluence. The relatively uncontroversial framing of the risk 
discourse among those involved might also be based on the fact that currently 
applied conventional risk assessment frameworks of cost-benefit analysis, which 
acknowledge only proven risks, remain largely uncontested.
10.2.2.3  India
In India, risk assessment of nanotechnologies does not rank as high on the policy 
agenda as in China or Europe. Some actors have tried to push this issue, but so 
far there has not been much significant research or policy action. There are a few 
Indian authors who follow international risk research and debates (e.g. Seetharam 
and Sridhar 2007; Srinivasan 2008), trying to get these issues higher up the Indian 
policy agenda or, at least, to promote them in the Indian research community 
and raise awareness (e.g. Pradeep and Burgi 2006). Dhawan and Sharma (2011) 
criticized the fact that among more than 200 funded projects of the Indian Nano 
Mission programme from 2001 to 2010, only one could be directly related to 
nanotoxicity studies. The International Conference on Nanomaterial Toxicology 
(ICONTOX), jointly organized by the Indian Institute of Toxicology Research and 
the Indian Nanoscience Society in 2008, was a rare exception.
In 2010 the government appointed a ‘Task Force for developing Regulatory 
Framework on Nanotechnology’ and announced that a nanotechnology regula-
tory board would be set up, but so far not much has happened. The Department 
of Science and Technology and other agencies have meanwhile sponsored some 
research on EHS aspects of nanotechnologies, but the outcome of that research 
and its policy impact remain unclear. Risk governance of nanomaterials is an 
important subject of research and negotiation in various international arenas, 
including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. But so far, there 
has not been much significant research or policy action in India.
In terms of invoked values, the few critical voices that are trying to develop a 
risk discourse argue in favour of protecting the health of all potentially affected 
individuals as well as the environment. This concept corresponds with the Indian 
value of fraternity, which refers to the dignity of the person.
10.2.3  Power and Control
The power and control discourse deals with issues of political and economic power 
and justice. It is about whose interests are served by nanotechnology development 
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policies and regulations, about who has to take the risks and who can profit from 
its benefits. These are very sensitive issues, since stakeholders in the nanotech-
nology field may have conflicting interests concerning the use and framing of 
nanotechnologies.
10.2.3.1  European Union
Like the risk discourse on nanomaterials, the power and control discourse in 
Europe emerged around the years 2003 and 2004, when current nanotechnol-
ogy developments underwent their first technology assessment studies. With a 
strong innovation discourse making nanotechnology an exemplar of technologi-
cally driven innovation, the question of an adequate and inclusive governance 
framework consequently became a hot topic among actors in the field of nano-
technology discourse. The leading figures in the power and control discourse 
are philosophers, writers on science and technology studies, and NGOs that are 
keeping a critical eye on the high expectations that accompany the development 
of nanotechnologies. They are tackling issues of controllability and power, or of 
access and equity, and advocate the inclusion of broader socioeconomic impacts, 
such as the consequences for developing countries, in governance frameworks 
for nanotechnologies. In doing so they also refer to similar developments in other 
fields of technology, for instance biotechnologies. Furthermore, the power and 
control discourse overlaps broadly with the risk discourse, where the Promethean 
positions of governments and industry, focusing on opportunities for innovation 
and competitiveness, are opposed by the precautionary world views and inclina-
tions of NGOs, the European Parliament and the general public.
In 2006 NGOs began to contribute substantially to the social debate on nano-
technologies in Europe. Most NGOs focused on threats to health and the environ-
ment posed by nanomaterials, issues of controllability and power, and questions of 
access and equity. After initial calls for a moratorium on the use of nanomaterials 
in consumer products, civil society organizations and trade unions developed quite 
distinct positions on nanotechnologies. On the one hand they acknowledged the 
beneficial potential of nanosciences and nanotechnology for society, the environ-
ment and the economy, and shared expectations raised by governments. On the 
other hand they were concerned because the risks of manufactured nanoparti-
cles were not being fully assessed, and they favoured stricter precautionary legal 
frameworks to protect consumers, workers and the ecosystem. Important issues 
of the European power and control discourse were labelling, privacy and security, 
regulatory issues, risk-benefit distribution and the nano-divide, research funding 
for EHS aspects, public funding as against private funding, and market power.
In order to promote and demonstrate the responsible development of nanotech-
nologies, governments, regulatory bodies and industry set up—more or less suc-
cessfully—voluntary reporting schemes, risk management frameworks and codes 
of conduct, measures that can be seen as experimental approaches to dealing with 
the uncertainties and challenges in the dynamic field of nanotechnologies. On 7 
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February 2008, the European Commission recommended the adoption of a code 
of conduct for responsible nanosciences and nanotechnology research, which had 
been developed during an open consultation phase. The code combines a number 
of general EU policy objectives, such as competitiveness, precaution, sustainabil-
ity and public consultation, with the aim of ensuring integrated, safe and respon-
sible nanosciences and nanotechnologies research for the benefit of the society as 
a whole (European Commission 2008). A survey in 2011 showed, however, that 
while respondents generally agreed with the code, only 15 % said that their organ-
izations had adopted it.
In terms of principles and values, the most proactive participants in the 
European power and control discourse—philosophers, authors on science and 
technology studies, and NGOs—are expanding the risk discourse, which is mainly 
centred on scientific evidences and paradigms, by emphasizing the socioeconomic 
and sociocultural dimensions of nanotechnology. Within this broader framework 
the potential benefits of nanotechnologies are balanced not only against possi-
ble EHS risks and principles such as non-maleficence and sustainability, but also 
against possible socioeconomic risks and principles like autonomy or justice. Here 
the concept of autonomy—which is a core element of all modern Western theo-
ries of democracy—refers to the European values of freedom, solidarity, equality 
and human dignity, and to principles such as citizens’ rights, justice, sustainability 
and precaution, which guarantee citizens a life free of coercion and make them co-
authors of their common life contexts within their political communities. Dignity 
is addressed in terms of the individual integrity and individual rights of a per-
son; freedom in terms of the person’s right to liberty, security and information, as 
well as respect for and protection of privacy and personal data; and solidarity and 
equality in terms of social security, access to basic goods and services, and soci-
etal inclusion.
10.2.3.2  China
In China, generally speaking, the power and control discourse is overshadowed 
by the government’s innovation discourse and the widely shared aim of rapid pro-
gress for China among actors in the science and technology field.
Concerning questions related to this discourse, Chinese participants in the 
nanotechnology field remain quite reserved or cautious. Some calls for a mora-
torium on nanotechnologies in China have been brought into the discussion via 
international NGOs. When reporting on these debates, the media have basically 
maintained a neutral stance, but a few reports have called attention to the right 
of the public to know and urged government administrations to take note of pub-
lic attitudes and consider mechanisms for government supervision and policy 
adjustment.
The government’s attitude to power and control issues is primarily focused 
on bolstering the country’s independence of external influences, particularly by 
ensuring that it attains a leading position in international military and economic 
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competition. This perspective, which relates the value of progress to the princi-
ples of autonomy and self-sufficiency, and thus underlines the primary status of 
innovation and progress, is widely shared by participants in the Chinese power 
and control discourse. The government has also started some action for consumer 
information and workplace safety, but without any significant outcome yet.
For researchers, the power and control discourse is mainly framed by reflec-
tions on scientists’ responsibility to society. With the outbreak of a series of food 
safety scandals in recent years, however, there has been growing public concern 
about the negative implications of science and the social responsibility of scien-
tists. Therefore some elite scientists have expressed views on the potential nega-
tive impact of nanotechnologies and recommended an increased public awareness 
of nanotechnologies.
Many issues that can be related to power and control discourse arose with 
the emergence of systematic and intensified ethical reflection in Chinese science 
communities from 2009. Besides advocating the participation of sociologists 
and humanists in nano research, elite scientists have called for self-regulation by 
the academic community and initiated the formulation of a code of conduct for 
nano research, which will be completed soon. These actions reflect the scientists’ 
realization of their own social responsibility and their willingness to establish a 
more harmonious relationship between science and society—not least in order to 
foster and secure society’s support for nanotechnological innovations. Some phi-
losophers and social scientists have picked up the issues of social equity (the nano-
divide) and of the consumer’s right to make an informed choice. So far, however, 
there have been no systematic or in-depth discussions on the attribution of respon-
sibilities among the state, enterprises and scientists in the management of nano-
technology or on the mechanism of accountability.
Overall, the power and control discourse in academia is centred on the value of 
harmony. Here harmony serves as an overarching or integral concept covering a 
wide range of other values and principles, including equity, justice, citizen’s rights 
and freedom, non-maleficence and sustainability. By arranging these values and 
principles in a harmonious way, progress and affluence will be secured.
10.2.3.3  India
In India too, the nanotechnology power and control discourse is overshadowed by 
the government’s innovation discourse, which harbours an optimistic vision of the 
application of nanotechnologies in addressing many societal challenges and fur-
thering economic development. Therefore, as in China, many of those involved 
in the nanotechnology field hold the view that India should ‘innovate now, reg-
ulate later’. Some experts do criticize the government, though, for particularly 
promoting research projects that lead to commercially viable and profitable prod-
ucts, while not giving enough support to those that focus on addressing societal 
needs and integrating different stakeholders’ views. A few experts also call for 
more governmental activity to inform the public about the risks and benefits of 
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nanotechnologies, as well as the introduction of a labelling system giving consum-
ers the opportunity to make an informed choice. A significant difference between 
the Indian and the Chinese discourses on power and control is that criticism in 
India is directed at the government, which is held responsible for the governance 
of nanotechnologies—or its failure.
Power and control discussions in India seem to be driven by the principles of 
justice and autonomy. Justice is addressed by calls to ensure access, equity and 
inclusion concerning the benefits of nanotechnologies: nano-based products and 
services should be available and affordable for all. The principle of autonomy is 
invoked in calls for increased stakeholder involvement in nanotechnology policy 
framing, as well as in claims for product labelling to ensure consumer choice.
10.3  Crosscutting Spheres of Lay Morality  
and Reflective Ethics
Culturally embedded values play an important role in the construction of socio-
technical systems: they are the context in which the sociotechnical system of 
nanotechnology is situated in each region. Therefore an assessment of lay moral-
ity and of professional ethical considerations plays an important role in translating 
nanotechnology into a robust sociotechnical system. Ethical reflections can help to 
clarify the value-laden discussions and confusion around the acceptability of nano-
technologies, particularly by exposing and elucidating the (partly hidden) conflict 
lines, in order to allow substantive discussions. Even if ethical reflections cannot 
always provide solutions to value conflicts, they can at least structure argumenta-
tion lines and thus enable conflicting parties to enter a process of mutual learning 
and understanding as an important precursor to the discursive solution of conflicts 
arising within new sociotechnical systems.
Concerning the social robustness of nanotechnologies, it can be stated that 
nanotechnology has not (yet) become a big public issue provoking discussions 
and opinion-forming processes among citizens in the three regions. Studies on the 
media reporting of nanotechnologies suggest that there is no wide-ranging societal 
debate in any of the regions. Most newspaper articles on nanotechnology are for-
mulated in a neutral and descriptive style.
10.3.1  European Union
Various more or less experimental public engagement projects and opinion assess-
ment procedures have been carried out to assess public attitudes towards nano-
technologies in Europe and thus anticipate and assess the social robustness of 
nanotechnologies. A great deal of research into the translation of lay views into 
technology policy-making processes remains to be done, but the main issues of 
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lay perception of nanotechnologies can be summarized as follows: Lay people 
acknowledge the potential benefits of nanotechnologies for human health and the 
environment, but, at the same time, express concerns about different aspects of 
nanotechnologies, like privacy, justice, market power, regulatory gaps, transpar-
ency and risk management.
Besides these experimental forms of technology assessment, the ethical assess-
ment of nanotechnologies has been undertaken by several expert bodies and 
technology assessment institutions in Europe, along with scholars of science and 
technology studies from ethics, philosophy and the social sciences, as well as 
NGOs. The inclusion of ethical expertise in technology policy-making has become 
standard in European technology assessment methodologies. In the past 10 years 
the ethical debate on nanotechnologies has evolved, since it was characterized by 
the dispute between a dominant consequentialist approach and opposing deonto-
logical frameworks, into an opening up of the consequentialist framework of clas-
sical EHS risk assessment. The ethics discourse as such has also covered the other 
discourses and related value conflicts. Besides considerations of the precautionary 
principle as an instrument to deal with scientific and normative uncertainties, the 
broader issues of socioeconomic and cultural implications have been addressed. 
Several authors have emphasized the coevolution of science, technology and soci-
ety. There has also been (meta-) reflection on the proper framework for ethical 
reflection on nanotechnologies. That development has been dominated by ethi-
cists, philosophers and social scientists.
Throughout their strong engagement in the risk and the power and con-
trol debate, the NGOs have also made important contributions. The European 
Commission too has taken part in the reflective ethics discourse, for instance by 
funding ethical research projects and requesting an opinion on nanomedicine 
from the European Group on Ethics. At least with its code of conduct the commis-
sion took up ethical principles and values, but in quite a vague and non-binding 
manner.
10.3.2  China
Such institutionalized ethics debates and structures can be found in neither China 
nor India. But with the first academic meetings on the ethics of nanotechnologies 
in China, from 2009 onwards, structures of a genuine ethics discourse emerged 
within scientific circles, similar to and overlapping with the power and control 
discourse.
In China, moral and ethical reflections on nanotechnology can mainly be 
found in the academic circles of scholars on ethics and philosophy. From 2002, 
when discussion of the ethical issues of nanotechnology began, to 2008, a dozen 
papers were published on the ethical and social aspects of nanotechnology, mainly 
inspired by foreign research in the field. In 2009, when the first academic meet-
ing focusing on the ethics of nanotechnology in China took place, the ethics 
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discussion entered a new stage. The discussion of nanoethics mainly treats three 
aspects: ethical accountability, ethical consequences and ethical practices. Those 
ethics discussions are thematically crosscutting, in linking various aspects of 
nanotechnology to ethical considerations. But it is questionable whether the mat-
ter is crosscutting among actors in the nanotechnology field, especially concern-
ing policy-makers and industry. This observation goes hand in hand with the low 
visibility of lay morality expressions, although there is an increasing perceived 
need—particularly among scientists, but also among policymakers—for lay opin-
ion assessment in science policy. The media report on nanotechnologies from time 
to time, but in a distant and neutral manner.
10.3.3  India
For India, apparently, the moral and ethical assessment of nanotechnologies is not 
an important topic, although a qualitative study involving 120 practitioners from 
21 laboratories across India (Patra et al. 2010) indicated that most of the Indian 
practitioners working in the field of nanoscience and nanotechnology research 
recognized ethical issues in this research area. These findings are supported by a 
recent survey among 35 nanoscientists in public funded research and development 
centres across India (Sahoo 2013). As in the risk discourse, there are certain Indian 
authors who are trying to get internationally discussed ethics issues higher up on 
Indian science and policy agendas (e.g. Radhakrishnan 2007).
10.4  Conclusion: Governance, Discourses and Values
This chapter’s comparative analysis of nanodiscourses, nanopolicies and their 
underlying value concepts across three regions has revealed differences in the 
governance settings of technological innovation. These differences are, of course, 
strongly related to socioeconomic conditions, but are also influenced by dominant 
value concepts, which serve as focal points for ethical reflections on nanotechnol-
ogy issues and are inherently part of the political core beliefs of policy-makers. 
When comparing the discourses of innovation, risk, and power and control, and 
their references to distinct cultural value concepts and principles, we can observe 
differences between the discourse structures in each region—that is, in the align-
ment of the discourses to each other.
In Europe, the proponents of the risk discourse as well as of the power and con-
trol discourse scrutinize or attack the innovation discourse and try to offer an alter-
native innovation path with a more critical and precautionary focus on risk issues 
and questions of power and control, thereby invoking the same European values, 
but with a different conception. Public authorities use a kind of incremental gov-
ernance approach that recognizes critical issues and takes them up on the agenda 
14110 Discourses on Nanotechnology in Europe, China and India
if public pressure is anticipated—a lesson from the controversy around genetically 
modified organisms. An important point that distinguishes Europe from China and 
India is the early and strong involvement of science and industry stakeholders, 
together with stakeholders from civil society organizations and ethics experts, in 
nanotechnology policy formulation. Bringing all stakeholders and experts together 
allows creative solutions for innovative products to be found and market opportu-
nities better anticipated. This is where the Chinese government in particular has a 
problem: China has large research capacities, but few spillovers from science into 
industry.
In China, the innovation discourse is the integral part of the nano discourse, in 
that it sets the framework for the subdiscourse of risk and that of power and con-
trol. On the value side, this goes hand in hand with a rather broad assumption of 
peace and harmony relating to issues of risk and power and control that promises 
progress and affluence for the Chinese nation. Therefore the Chinese governance 
style in nanotechnology development can be characterized as vertical and techno-
cratic or scientistic. This also applies to ethics and moral issues, which are aligned 
to the innovation rationale and discussed in closed scientific circles. It is still an 
open question whether scientists, thanks to their high reputation and authority, are 
able to place critical issues touching on moral and ethical questions on the policy 
agenda.
In India, the innovation discourse is almost the only discourse on nanotechnol-
ogies. Nonetheless, some arguments are put forward against this strong innova-
tion rationale, to the effect that it could undermine the values of access, equity 
and inclusion. Almost all government funding for nanotechnologies is spent on 
promising basic research and, most important, application-oriented research. Risk 
assessment is a minor activity that is at an early stage of development, since other 
societal challenges outweigh the perceived need for research on possible risks 
related to nanotechnologies. The Indian governance approach towards nanotech-
nologies can therefore be characterized as quite reductionist. This situation of 
rather weak risk governance is most likely due to the government’s view that it is 
too early to decide on regulating a new and promising technology.
These different governance settings in each region are also distinct in the cross-
cutting spheres of ethics and lay morality: in China, there is an evolving genuine 
ethics discourse on nanotechnologies, with scientists reflecting on the relationship 
between science and society—something that has not yet happened in India. But 
these reflections by Chinese researchers have not yet reached policy circles or the 
stage of institutionalization. In Europe, there are several institutionalized forms of 
ethical expertise, as well as civil society organizations and others, situated in the 
spheres between lay morality and professional ethics. They form a kind of back-
ground to discussions and discourses on nanotechnology development, and the 
development of further technologies. Some researchers are even trying to explore 
and deepen our understanding of lay morality and its cultural embeddedness in 
European member states or regions, whereas in China and India, the integration of 
forms of lay morality into nanotechnology development policy seems hardly pre-
sent yet.
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11.1  Introduction
Synthetic biology constitutes a new field of research, in which scientists are gaining 
more and more control over the fundamental building blocks of life. This allows 
them to ‘design’ and ‘create’ microorganisms that may perform a variety of useful 
tasks, but at the same time become increasingly isolated from organisms we may 
find in nature. Given the potential of synthetic biology to contribute to addressing 
important challenges in, for example, health, the scarcity of resources and energy 
security, it is no surprise that this field has been embraced as a promising scientific 
endeavour by scientists all over the globe. On the other hand, like agro-biotechnol-
ogy and nanotechnologies—or any other field of science and technology, for that 
matter—synthetic biology also gives rise to concerns about potential risks. In addi-
tion, it raises moral questions and concerns, since it allows scientists to put ‘life’ 
and ‘nature’ on the drawing board as never before.
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Synthetic biology may thus—once more, like any other science or technology— 
also lead to tensions (and even conflict) and therefore debate. The nature and 
dynamics of these tensions and debates are, however, not solely informed by the 
character of a particular science or technology; they are also informed by the spe-
cific socioeconomic conditions, cultures and values in a given locality, which will 
therefore be taken into account in our comparative analysis of the three regions. 
Furthermore, we see synthetic biology as a global endeavour, contributing to an 
increased global interconnectedness. This is expressed, for instance, by increas-
ing international scientific cooperation, but also by potential risks that are not con-
strained by state borders.
The contribution of synthetic biology to this increased global interconnected-
ness was recently underscored by the Global Network of Science Academies (IAP) 
(IAP 2014a).1 The IAP issued a statement appealing for global commitment 
regarding synthetic biology, recommending continuing worldwide collaboration 
between researchers and those regulating and enabling synthetic biology, and also 
calling for controversial issues to be settled. However, as we previously men-
tioned, moral concerns may lead to tension within a specific region, but also 
between different regions.
Against the backdrop of these region-specific traits and global interconnect-
edness, this chapter will analyse and compare the emerging debate on synthetic 
biology in the EU, China and India. The analysis will be based primarily on three 
reports of the Global Ethics in Science and Technology (GEST) project, each 
focusing on discourses on synthetic biology in the region concerned (Stemerding 
and Rerimassie 2013; Zhang 2014; Srinivas 2014). We consider the debate in the 
EU rather mature in comparison with those in the other regions, and moreover 
believe that it reflects many traits of the international debate on synthetic biology. 
We will therefore use the European debate as a starting point, and then highlight 
region-specific traits in China and India.
In conducting this analysis we will use the analytical framework described in 
Chap. 8, thus analysing discourses on innovation, risk, and power and control. 
In addition, we will focus on two crosscutting discourses: first, public debates 
expressing lay morality—what expectations and issues have been raised concern-
ing synthetic biology by voices from civil society and the broader public?—and 
second, how reflective ethics voices have engaged with synthetic biology in the 
three regions. We will examine the nature of each discourse: that is, what kinds 
of issues are discussed and to what values do they relate? What kinds of actors 
take part in the discussion? Then we will consider whether certain discourses are 
dominant. This will allow a comparative analysis of the three regions, which will 
consider similarities and differences.
1 The Global Network of Science Academies consists of 106 scientific academies from all over 
the world, including the EU, China and India (IAP 2014b).
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Throughout this endeavour we will pay specific attention to the role of region-
specific values, as described in Chaps. 5, 6 and 7, in the debate. We will begin, 
however, by briefly describing the understanding, framing and state of the art of 
synthetic biology in the three regions, since its understanding and the degree of 
development are highly likely to be core parameters for the nature, and even emer-
gence, of the different discourses in the three regions.
11.2  Understanding Synthetic Biology
The theoretical basis of the contemporary understanding of synthetic biology is 
attributed largely to Waclaw Szybalski, who proclaimed in 1974:
Up to now we are working on the descriptive phase of molecular biology. … But the real 
challenge will start when we enter the synthetic biology phase of research in our field. We 
will then devise new control elements and add these new modules to the existing genomes 
or build up wholly new genomes. This would be a field with unlimited expansion potential 
and hardly any limitations to building ‘new better control circuits’ and … finally other 
‘synthetic’ organisms … (EGE 2009).2
Thus, according to Szybalski, biology will eventually evolve into a different kind 
of science, in which we shift from describing to designing, or redesigning, life. 
Szybalski’s words have turned out to be prophetic, but it was not until the turn of 
the century that scientists started research under the explicit heading of synthetic 
biology. Interestingly, many of these researchers were not primarily involved in 
molecular biology. Today ‘synthetic biologists’ employ a variety of novel 
approaches, all of which allow increasing control over the fundamental building 
blocks of life. This unique quality can therefore also be found in the definitions 
used in the three regions to describe synthetic biology.3 A definition by a high-
level expert group for the European Commission (NEST 2005), for instance, reads 
as follows:
Synthetic biology is the engineering of biology: the synthesis of complex, biologi-
cally based (or inspired) systems, which display functions that do not exist in nature. 
This engineering perspective may be applied at all levels of the hierarchy of biologi-
cal structures—from individual molecules to whole cells, tissues and organisms. In 
essence, synthetic biology will enable the design of ‘biological systems’ in a rational 
and systematic way.
2 Luis Campos demonstrates that the label ‘synthetic biology’ can actually already be traced 
back to the beginning of the 20th century. The earliest explicit reference to ‘synthetic biology’ 
comes from the book La biologie synthetique by Stéphane Leduc (1853–1939) (Campos 2009).
3 For a more detailed account of dominant approaches in synthetic biology see Stemerding and 
Rerimassie (2013).
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The Indian Task Force on Synthetic and Systems Biology Resource Network 
pr oduced the following, quite similar, definition:
Synthetic biology refers to both:
•	 	the design and fabrication of biological components and systems that do not already 
exist in the natural world; and
•	 the re-design and fabrication of existing biological systems (SSBRN 2012).
In the official China Biotechnological Development Report, synthetic biology is 
described as:
… a new trend of biotechnological development … to form new biological systems and 
achieve expected industrial application (Department of Science and Technology for Social 
Development under the Ministry of Science and Technology of China, China National 
Center for Biotechnology Development 2009).
Synthetic biology is thus commonly understood as the application to biology of 
a true engineering approach, in order to design, or redesign, organisms that are 
useful for society.
11.2.1  Framing of Synthetic Biology as an Emerging 
and Converging Technology
The emergence and introduction of new science and technology in society are, 
more often than not, accompanied by tensions and conflicts. However, as a new 
and emerging field of engineering, synthetic biology is still largely at a laboratory 
stage. Therefore discussions about synthetic biology as a potential source of ten-
sions and conflicts will be strongly influenced by experiences with other science 
and technology developments in the recent past:
To debate a still quite abstract technology, participants functionally need a frame that 
determines which arguments are legitimate and which issues are relevant (Torgersen and 
Schmidt 2013).
According to Torgersen and Schmidt, three fields of science and technology cur-
rently provide important frames for discussing synthetic biology: (green) biotech-
nology, nanotechnology and information technology.4 This makes even more 
sense, because synthetic biology is often considered to be enabled by so-called 
‘NBIC convergence’: the synergetic convergence of nanotechnologies, biotechnol-
ogies, information and communications technologies and, though less relevant in 
this context, cognitive sciences (Van Est and Stemerding 2012).
4 ‘In the biotechnology debate, risk has long been emphasised over economic benefits. More 
recently, nanotechnology has been referred to mostly in terms of benefits, while risks tended to 
be an issue for scientific discourses. This has frequently been related to the many outreach activi-
ties around nanotechnology. Information technology, finally, has retained the image of being 
“cool” and useful on a personal level’ (Torgersen and Schmidt 2013).
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When looking at the three regions, we must conclude that synthetic  biology 
is predominantly framed, and debated, as a new phase in the development of 
 biotechnology, as illustrated in statements by important spokespersons in the field. 
According to the New and Emerging Science and Technology High-Level Expert 
Group for the European Commission (NEST 2005), synthetic biology could rev-
olutionize the biotechnology industries and perhaps even biology as a science. 
In important symposiums, such as those organized by the China Association for 
Science and Technology, synthetic biology is described by Chinese biologists as 
one of the great frontiers of modern biotechnology. The Indian task force sees syn-
thetic biology as a science of the future, which may change the profile of the bio-
technology industry. Synthetic biology is thus commonly understood in the three 
regions as the next wave in biotechnology, which will also strongly frame soci-
etal debates about its potential implications. Conceived as a new form of ‘extreme 
genetic engineering’, synthetic biology may well add fuel to the ongoing debates 
and controversies surrounding genetically modified organisms (ETC Group 2007).
11.3  The Development of Synthetic Biology in the Three 
Regions: The State of the Art
Ever since the turn of the century, synthetic biology has been gaining interna-
tional momentum and the number of published papers has been steadily increas-
ing (Zhang 2014). As illustrated in an interactive map (reproduced in Fig. 11.1) 
produced by the Synthetic Biology Project, which is led by the US-based Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, synthetic biology research  activity 
has emerged all over the globe. In addition, there is increasing international 
Fig. 11.1  Map tracking the number of synthetic biology research groups across the globe 
(Reproduced from http://www.synbioproject.org/library/inventories/map/)
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collaboration among synthetic biologists, contributing to an ever growing global 
interconnectedness.
There are significant differences across the three regions in the development of 
synthetic biology, which ranges from rather advanced to just starting. In Europe 
such development is not quite as advanced as in the United States, but is still very 
much at the forefront. Once synthetic biology emerged in the United States, it was 
almost immediately embraced by the European scientific community, and the EU 
(as well as several individual EU member states) rapidly started investing in syn-
thetic biology as well (Stemerding and Rerimassie 2013). By 2014, synthetic biol-
ogy was gradually being applied in industrial settings (Schmidt 2012).
Synthetic biology has also attracted the attention of Chinese researchers, 
although this did not begin happening as early as in Europe. The Chinese gov-
ernment started funding synthetic biology research in about 2008, and ever since 
has given the field more and more support. The development of synthetic biology 
in China is therefore not as advanced as in Europe, but now the country is fully 
equipped to catch up with countries at the forefront (Zhang 2014).
In sharp contrast, synthetic biology has so far gained little attention in India, 
and is as yet largely confined to certain institutes and groups—very few in com-
parison with the number of Indian groups working in life sciences and biotechnol-
ogy. Also the interest from the Indian government and industry is limited so far 
(Srinivas 2014). Accordingly, this chapter’s discussion of the discourses on syn-
thetic biology in India will be primarily based on the findings of the aforemen-
tioned task force, made up of government representatives and academics, which 
was established by the government to examine the opportunities for synthetic biol-
ogy and systems biology for India.
11.4  Comparing Discourses on Synthetic Biology  
in the Three Regions
Preceding chapters have described dominant approaches in synthetic biology 
and observed that in all three regions the field is understood as a new phase in 
the development of biotechnology. It has also been noted, however, that the state 
of the art of the development of synthetic biology differs widely among the three 
regions: development in the EU can be seen as ‘advanced’, in China as ‘rapidly 
catching up’ and in India as ‘just starting’. Against this backdrop, we will now 
analyse and compare how synthetic biology has been debated so far in the three 
regions, based on discourses relating respectively to innovation, to risk, and 
to power and control, and also those concerning lay morality and reflective eth-
ics. We will highlight the issues being discussed, the values to which they relate 
and the actors that play a part in the discourse. A more detailed account of the 
discourses in each region can be found in the three GEST reports on this topic 
(Stemerding and Rerimassie 2013; Zhang 2014; Srinivas 2014).
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11.4.1  Discourses on Innovation
Why is synthetic biology important? What are the opportunities? What can the 
field deliver? What is needed for synthetic biology to mature into an industrially 
relevant and socially robust discipline? These are the central questions of an inno-
vation discourse.
In all three regions voices are heard on the opportunities synthetic biology 
might bring for society. It is perceived as a potentially powerful field of research 
whose applications might help address challenges that all three regions face. Such 
challenges may relate to (public) health, sustainability, energy sources and ecol-
ogy. Synthetic biology is also seen as a vital source of future economic develop-
ment in the context of global competition between the three regions. Thus support 
for synthetic biology should enable China to ‘catch up’ with the US and Europe 
and is called for in India so that the country does not ‘miss the bus’ (Zhang 2014; 
Srinivas 2014).
In Europe, the New and Emerging Science and Technology (NEST) Pathfinder 
funding scheme, set up in 2004, was an important starting point for the develop-
ment of synthetic biology (Pei et al. 2011). It was followed by several other initia-
tives, including those under the Seventh Framework Programme and the road map 
of the project called Towards a European Strategy for Synthetic Biology (TESSY), 
which is dedicated to strategy development for synthetic biology in Europe 
(TESSY 2008; Gaisser et al. 2009). More recently, from 2012 to 2014, came the 
establishment of ERASynBio, a European initiative aimed at the development and 
coordination of synthetic biology in the European research area. One of the impor-
tant aims of this initiative was to comprehensively map national and transnational 
funding programmes, funded synthetic biology projects, relevant strategies and 
reports, and active companies, in order to develop a strategic vision. According to 
these mapping activities, about €450 million of public research funding was allo-
cated to synthetic biology from 2004 to 2014 (ERASynBio 2014) (Fig. 11.2).
Important issues that need to be addressed, according to the ERASynBio net-
work, include building a transnational multidisciplinary research community, 
data sharing, standardization and accelerating the applied and industrial use of 
synthetic biology. Another particularly important issue is what a proper intellec-
tual property regime for synthetic biology would look like. Should it allow broad 
patenting or would an open-source regime be more desirable? As for values, we 
find that the European discourse is predominately informed by values of freedoms, 
including market freedoms, and sustainability (e.g. EASAC 2010). Furthermore, 
in the EU a need is felt to go beyond technoscientific support actions in order to 
make synthetic biology successful, for instance by addressing ethical and regula-
tory concerns early on (e.g. TESSY 2008; OECD, Royal Society 2010). This is 
aptly expressed in a broadly shared call for responsible research and innovation 
(RRI) in synthetic biology (e.g. ERASynBio 2014). Interestingly, in considering 
the innovation potential of synthetic biology, the Indian task force also explicitly 
mentioned issues of risk and ethics as equally important to address.
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As in Europe, there is in China a strongly developed innovation discourse, from 
which several support actions are apparent, such as capacity and community building 
(Zhang 2014). In many scientific symposia, such as the Xiangshan Science 
Conference sessions, it is evident that Chinese biologists consider synthetic biology 
to be one of the great frontiers of modern biotechnology. These biologists have there-
fore called for government support on many occasions, and not without success. For 
example, synthetic biology is marked as one of the 12 core key technologies for pri-
oritized development in the 12th Five-year Plan for Biotechnological Development 
(MOST 2011) released by the Ministry of Science and Technology. Furthermore, 
synthetic biology has been financed by a series of programmes, such as the 
863 programme,5 the 973 programme6 and the National Natural Science Foundation.
Regarding values, the innovation discourse is informed by the full spectrum of 
Chinese values. Stimulating synthetic biology is expected to contribute to promot-
ing economic development (progress), protecting public health (harmony), safe-
guarding national security and coping with an ageing and growing population 
(peace), and last, addressing resource and environmental needs (sustainability) 
(CNCBD 2010). This illustrates that while ethics is not institutionalized in China 
5 The 863 programme, or the National High-tech R&D Programme, was approved in 1986 to 
promote high-technology research and development in China. Biotechnology is listed as one of 
its eight priority fields.
6 The 973 programme, or the National Basic Research Programme of China, was approved in 
1997 to support basic science and technology research. It promotes research and innovation in 
fields of far-reaching and strategic importance, such the life sciences.
Fig. 11.2  Sites of major 
European public investment 
in synthetic biology 
(ERASynBio 2014)
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in the same way as it is in the EU or the US, it certainly has a place in directing 
the course of synthetic biology in China.
India, unlike Europe and China, does not have a strongly developed innovation 
discourse yet. In the recommendations of the Indian task force, however, there is a 
strong link between the identified potential aims for synthetic biology in India and 
the needs of the country, ranging from energy security to improvements in agricul-
ture and health, topics that strongly relate to values of access and equity.
Last, in all three regions the International Genetically Engineered Machine 
competition (iGEM), a synthetic biology design contest for students, is considered 
an important educational, capacity-building and community-building tool (see e.g. 
ERASynBio 2014; SSBRN Task Force 2012; Zhang 2014).
11.4.2  Discourses on Risk
Like any other technology, synthetic biology not only promises potential benefits, 
but also raises concerns about possible risks. What types of risks are perceived? 
By whom? What weight do they assign to the risks in relation to the benefits? How 
should society deal with these potential risks?
The potential risks of synthetic biology make up an important part of the evolv-
ing story of synthetic biology. This is the case for the EU, but also for China and 
India. Two types of categories of risks are distinguished: first, biosafety, relating 
to potential unintended consequences for humankind and the environment, and 
second, biosecurity, relating to potential misuse (e.g. EGE 2009; CNCBD 2010; 
SSBRN Task Force 2012). The fact that all three regions devote attention to these 
issues is no real surprise, however, since EU member states, India and China are 
all party to several international conventions, such as the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety and the Biological Weapons Convention, which call for these issues to 
be addressed as well.
Civil society organizations in Europe, unlike the other regions, are strongly 
involved in the evolving risk discourse. A central value in the European discourse 
is protection as a citizen’s right. In terms of this right, civil society organizations 
demand a strict precautionary approach and also bring in a more inclusive per-
spective of justice, solidarity and equality. Whereas synthetic biology is supported 
in the innovation discourse for its potential contribution to a greener economy, 
civil society organizations challenge it for its detrimental effects on sustainability; 
that is, for promoting the exploitation of natural resources and the communities 
that are dependent on them (FOE et al. 2012). Indeed, similar concerns have been 
voiced in India (Srinivas 2014).
In China risks are also seen as a point of concern, but hampering innovation 
and missing out on the opportunities of synthetic biology are actually perceived 
as much bigger risks by both the government and the scientific community. This 
became clear, for instance, at an academic symposium dedicated to synthetic 
 biology and ethical and biosecurity concerns, organized by the China Association 
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for Science and Technology in 2010. In fact, some experts, such as the Chinese 
scientist Yang Huanming, expressed their concern about the influence of criti-
cal public opinion in the developed countries on public perceptions in China and 
called for positive publicity for synthetic biology (Yang 2011). Another Chinese 
scientist, Du Lin, advocated efforts to create a consensus that the discussion of 
ethical and biosafety issues relating to synthetic biology should not hinder syn-
thetic biology research in China. In his view, such a discussion should serve the 
purpose of responding to future international opposition, rather than hindering 
China’s development in this field of research (Du 2011). Progress therefore seems 
to be dominant value in the Chinese risk discourse.
11.4.3  Discourses on Power and Control
On one hand, synthetic biology may provide opportunities to address the grand 
challenges societies are facing, including those relating to health, energy and sus-
tainability. On the other hand, synthetic biology may give rise to risks and ethical 
concerns. In a response to this tension, a recent statement by the Global Network 
of Science Academies called for a global commitment regarding synthetic biology 
(IAP 2014a). According to IAP chairman Volker ter Meulen, it is time to settle 
the ‘synthetic controversy’ (ter Meulen 2014). He notes that if synthetic biology 
is to thrive, the world needs to decide now how the field should be regulated and 
supported. In a comment in The Guardian, science and technology studies scholar 
Jack Stilgoe (2014) responded:
My question is why we, the public, are shut out of the conversation about benefits. 
‘Realising the potential’ of SynBio is talked about as though that potential is pre-ordained. 
It isn’t. SynBio will become what scientists, innovators, users, regulators and others make 
of it. It could be used to create brilliant, emancipatory, subversive, public-value inno-
vation, or it could bolster existing power structures. The direction will depend on who 
is involved, what they value, what research gets done, how intellectual property (IP) is 
arranged and more.
So who gets to decide the direction in which synthetic biology should develop and 
under what conditions? In other words: who gets to exercise the power and control 
over synthetic biology?
Our case studies found a strongly developed discourse on this topic only in the 
EU. The main actors are government and the scientific community, but civil soci-
ety is also making its mark (ETC Group 2007; Roco 2008; Tait 2009; IRGC 2010; 
EASAC 2010; Zhang et al. 2011; FOE et al. 2012; ERASynBio 2014). Largely 
inspired by earlier bad experiences with the public reception of technologies, 
both policymakers and the scientific community feel the need to involve stake-
holders and the broader public early in the development of synthetic biology. The 
aim is that such involvement, besides addressing ethical, legal and social issues 
head on, allows synthetic biology to be better embedded in society, which reso-
nates well with the European striving towards responsible research and innovation 
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(EC 2013). In order to foster responsible research and innovation in the field of 
synthetic  biology, the European Commission for instance funded the Synenergene 
programme (2013–2017), which is dedicated to responsible research and innova-
tion and public engagement in synthetic biology (Synenergene 2014). Furthermore, 
European policymakers and the scientific community call attention to issues that 
require a delicate balance, such as devising forward-looking re gulation without 
stifling innovation and maintaining the equilibrium between scientific freedom 
and self-regulation vis-à-vis state-driven regulation and coercion. This latter form 
of hard government is particularly advocated by internationally operating NGOs 
such as Friends of the Earth and the Action Group on Erosion, Technology and 
Concentration, or ETC Group. As a result, the European governance landscape of 
synthetic biology is already rather complex, even while synthetic biology is still pre-
dominantly confined to the laboratory.
Turning to the Indian case, the Indian task force also recommends that ethi-
cal, legal and social implications should be addressed and public opinion mapped 
upfront, rather than technological development alone being stimulated as a top 
priority. To substantiate this stance, it refers to the negative consequences of pre-
maturely pushing biofuels. In addition, the task force raises the tension between 
open-source initiatives and rigid intellectual property approaches, as these relate to 
the Indian values of access, equity and inclusion.
The Chinese discourse shows a different picture, namely that the development 
and management of synthetic biology are largely in the hands of the government 
and the scientific community, and are considered sufficient so far (Zhang 2014).
11.4.4  Synthetic Biology and Lay Morality
Public reception is crucial for the course of development of a technology. To put it 
bluntly: it can make or break a technology. The concerns of members of the public 
may involve potential physical harms, but to a large extent they will also relate 
to non-physical issues: that is, boundaries related to their values and culture that 
should not be overstepped.
However, given its early stage of development, synthetic biology has not yet 
given rise to significant public debate. In fact, even public awareness is rather low.7 
In the EU there is no real active debate so far, apart from the voices of a small 
number of NGOs, but surveys among the general public and organized public dia-
logues already demonstrate a large degree of pluralism, involving a variety of 
issues and values (RAE 2009; Battachary et al. 2010; Rerimassie and Stemerding 
2014; EC 2010). Such issues include concerns regarding biosafety and biosecurity, 
7 Only in the EU has public awareness of synthetic biology been gauged via surveys. The 2010 
Biotechnology Eurobarometer (EC 2010) revealed that a large majority of EU citizens (83 %) 
had never heard of synthetic biology.
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freedom of research, monopolization and increasing global inequalities, relating to 
a broad spectrum of values, such as citizens’ rights and market freedoms, justice, 
solidarity, equality and sustainability. These issues and values will prove difficult 
to reconcile. This is sure to become a serious challenge for the governance of syn-
thetic biology, given the aspiration to include a wide array of actors and the issues 
they put forward.
China has not seen an active debate on synthetic biology so far. The public hold 
science in high esteem and trust the government’s management of synthetic biol-
ogy. This attitude reflects the Chinese value system, in which, in the pursuit of 
progress and affluence, pragmatism and developmentalism prevail over potential 
risks as long as the latter have not materialized as actual threats (Zhang 2014). 
This fits in well with the findings on Chinese public perceptions of science and 
technology (See Chap. 3).
Unsurprisingly, there is no public debate on synthetic biology in the Indian case 
either. However, a well-known opponent of genetic modification, Vandana Shiva, 
recently voiced criticism of synthetic biology, as did certain environmental groups 
in India (Domicone 2013). The concerns raised mostly relate to socioeconomic 
considerations and values such as equity and access.
11.4.5  Synthetic Biology and Reflective Ethics
In addition to public expressions of lay morality, morality is reflected upon by 
voices in the field of reflective ethics. Such voices may belong to academia or to 
ethics advisory bodies, including groups and organizations engaged in technology 
assessment and the examination of ethical, legal and social (ELSI) implications. 
Have such voices been heard so far in the emerging debate on synthetic biology? 
If so, are they making an impact on science and technology policy-making and 
development?
In the EU there is strong involvement by reflective ethics voices. In fact, the 
European technology assessment and academic communities engaged with syn-
thetic biology early (Douglas and Stemerding 2014). The EU has contributed sub-
stantially to this effort by funding several programmes on ethical, legal and social 
implications, such as SYNBIOSAFE, Synth-Ethics and SYBHEL (for Synthetic 
Biology for Human Health: Ethical and Legal Issues). On one hand, reflective eth-
ics voices analyse and deepen issues and concerns that have already been raised by 
other actors. On the other hand, reflective ethics also enriches debate by address-
ing issues that so far have not played a big part, but might in future. A good exam-
ple is an in-depth analysis of the notion of ‘playing God’ conducted by the EU 
project SYNTH-ETHICS (Link 2011). This notion is considered potentially con-
troversial in the context of synthetic biology since it revives concerns that have 
been voiced regarding earlier biotechnology as well.
Another important contribution was made by the European Group on Ethics, 
which gave a detailed account of EU regulations and the relevant global provisions 
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with regard to biosafety, biosecurity, intellectual property and potential appli-
cations of synthetic biology, and also the international framework of ethics and 
human rights (EGE 2009). On the basis of this international human rights frame-
work, the European Group on Ethics articulates the main values that should guide 
the ethics of synthetic biology, including human dignity, autonomy and respon-
sibility, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice and sustainability—indeed, largely 
 corresponding with the spectrum of European values described in Chap. 5. 
Broadly speaking it is possible to identify four different roles that reflective ethics 
is playing in the emerging debate on synthetic biology:
•	 Articulating values and issues
•	 Highlighting tensions (often hidden) between values
•	 Enriching debate
•	 Translating the articulated values and issues into science and technology 
policy-making
It is perhaps not surprising that such efforts are being made in Europe, since 
 earlier biotechnologies aroused considerable controversy.
In China some reflective ethics voices from academia are heard, but systematic 
reflection on the moral aspects of synthetic biology is generally lacking. In fact, 
ethical reflection has so far mainly been limited to the general introduction and 
citing of foreign views. A few ethics scholars have raised their voice in an appeal 
for issues of risk and ethics to be addressed in more ‘authentic’ ways by surveying 
the important philosophical and cultural factors in Chinese public policy-making 
concerning synthetic biology (Zhai and Renzong 2010). Given China’s social and 
cultural environment and its prevailing pragmatism and developmentalism, little 
public resistance against synthetic biology is expected (Zhang 2014).
In India, too, no clearly visible tradition of reflective ethics can be found, but 
the Indian task force does recommend that ethical issues be addressed in a an 
‘atmosphere of public acceptance and transparency’, given potential sensitivities 
raised by synthetic biology as a science that interferes with life (Srinivas 2014).
11.5  Conclusion and Discussion: Governance Challenges
This chapter has set out to map the evolving debates on synthetic biology in the 
EU, China and India. It has demonstrated that the European debate on synthetic 
biology has already become quite mature, the debate in China is taking form, and 
the Indian debate is slowly emerging (Table 11.1).
Comparing the nature of the debates in the three regions reveals distinct fea-
tures and positions on the pros and cons of synthetic biology. On one hand, these 
debates are informed by differences in the state of the art of synthetic biology in 
the respective regions. On the other, they are informed by region-specific socio-
economic conditions, cultures and value systems. Based on our analysis we have 
identified a number of region-specific governance challenges that will play an 
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important role in the evolution of the debates on synthetic biology in the three 
regions. These challenges are summarized in Table 11.2.
To better understand these governance challenges we should distinguish 
between risk governance and innovation governance. Discourses of risk in the 
three regions are being framed by scientific knowledge and legal regimes that are 
negotiated and established not only in a national or regional context, but also a 
global context. In other words, risk governance has a strong international dimen-
sion. In all three regions we have seen that, in discussions of synthetic biology, 
attention is drawn to issues of biosafety and biosecurity, articulating the need for 
governments to match global standards of regulation laid down in international 
agreements, such as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Biological 
Weapon Convention. This global interconnectedness also creates international 
forums in which parties can search for common ground on how to deal with 
biosafety and biosecurity risks in synthetic biology.
In our understanding of innovation governance in the three regions, a global 
perspective is also obviously important, given the dynamics of international com-
petition, exchange and cooperation. At the same time, innovation governance in 
the three regions relates to socioeconomic and socioethical issues that are more 
specifically framed by regional contexts, values and concerns. In Europe, synthetic 
biology is basically funded as ‘blue sky’ research in support of market-driven 
development. In China and India one finds more deliberate attempts at priority set-
ting in the framework of governmental five-year plans. The Chinese government 
has identified synthetic biology as a technology to be prioritized strategically in 
the nation’s applied biotechnological research, especially in the biomedical and 
health care field. The Indian task force synthetic biology report put the emphasis 
on meeting the developmental needs of the country, and identified biofuels as one 
of the key applications.
In these different regional contexts of synthetic biology innovation, the role 
of the public and reflective ethics also differs, raising governance challenges that 
are specific for each region (as indicated in Table 11.2). In Europe, as we have 
seen, experts have emphasized the need to address ethical and safety concerns 
Table 11.1  Overview of synthetic biology discourses in China, the EU and India (shading of 
cells indicates degree of development)
EU China India 
Development of synthetic 
biology 
Innovation 
Risk 
Power and control 
Lay morality 
Reflective ethics 
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from the very beginning. Studies of the ethical, legal and social implications have 
received active support, and there have been several public dialogue initiatives 
about synthetic biology. The resulting challenge for the European governance of 
synthetic biology is how to balance the range of interests and values of all relevant 
stakeholders.
In China the government is the principal agent in synthetic biology policy-
making, and there has not been much demand for control from scientists or the 
public. The public generally hold science in high esteem, and systematic ethical 
reflection on synthetic biology is mostly lacking. However, there is clear concern 
among scientists that public opinion might be swayed by critical accounts of syn-
thetic biology in the foreign media. How to maintain public trust in the context of 
international public debate thus arises as a key governance challenge in China.
In India, the task force took a broad view of the promotion and regulation of 
synthetic biology, emphasizing its potential benefits but also the need to address 
safety and ethical issues and to take the public into account. However, conven-
tional patterns of budget allocation and established institutional divisions in India 
are not conducive to the development of a broad interdisciplinary field and to 
effectively directing synthetic biology innovation to the country’s socioeconomic 
needs.
What are the implications of these governance challenges for our aim to 
strengthen ‘global ethics’ in science and technology policy-making in a world of 
increasing interconnectedness? Our case study demonstrates that issues articulated 
in public and ethics discourses about synthetic biology are strongly framed by 
debates emerging in a European and American context. Indeed, to the extent that 
these issues are addressed in the Chinese or Indian regional context, they often 
reflect or replicate European public and ethics discourses rather than more specific 
regional values and concerns.
A truly global dialogue will therefore require a strengthening of public and eth-
ics voices in all three regions, in ways that respond to the specific governance chal-
lenges in each region and more specifically reflect regional values and concerns. 
Such a dialogue will also require a global forum to support mutual learning about 
the possibilities and implications of synthetic biology on the basis of international 
exchange and cooperation. We have identified two forums that may play an impor-
tant role in this regard. First, related to the world of synthetic biology innovation, 
we would like to highlight iGEM, the annual International Genetically Engineered 
Machine competition, which attracts student teams from all over the world. In just 
10 years iGEM has developed into a global hub for thousands of young scientists 
to ‘meet and compete’ (Zhang et al. 2011). This global community not only offers 
a fascinating learning environment, it has also promoted an interest in synthetic 
biology among researchers in China, and could do so in India as well. Moreover, 
and most importantly for a global ethics in synthetic biology, iGEM requires teams 
to include in their projects ‘policy and practices’ work, which stimulates a global 
exchange and dissemination of ideas about biosafety and biosecurity, questions of 
intellectual property, ethics and public engagement in the emerging field of syn-
thetic biology. Second, from the perspective of international public policy making, 
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we see an important role for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Over the course of time, UNESCO has been 
manifesting itself more and more as an important global ethics forum. In 2005 the 
general conference of UNESCO pioneered in this regard by acclamation of the 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. For the first time in history, 
such a large number of UN member States committed themselves and the interna-
tional community to respect and apply fundamental principles of bioethics set forth 
within a single document (UNESCO 2006). Therefore, we consider this an excel-
lent opportunity to build on in dealing with emerging science and technology.
References
Battachary D, Calitz JP, Hunter A (2010) Synthetic biology dialogue. Biotechnology and 
Biological Sciences Research Council, Swindon
Campos L (2009) That was the synthetic biology that was. In: Schmidt M, Kelle A, Ganguli-
Mitra A, De Vriend H (eds) Synthetic biology: the technoscience and its societal conse-
quences. Springer, New York, Heidelberg, pp 5–22
CNCBD (2010) China’s biological economy: biotechnology and bio-industry innovation from 
the perspective of international comparison. China National Center for Biotechnology 
Development. China Agricultural Science and Technology Press, Beijing
Department of Science and Technology for Social Development under the Ministry of Science 
and Technology of China and China National Center for Biotechnology Development (2009) 
China biotechnological development report 2008. Science Press, Beijing, pp 128–130
Domicone A (2013) Synthetic biology: an emperor with no clothes? PMJWire, Policy Matters 
Journal. http://www.policymattersjournal.org/2/post/2013/09/-synthetic-biology-an-emperor-
with-no-clothes.html. Accessed 2 June 2014
Douglas CMW, Stemerding D (2014) Challenges for the European governance of synthetic 
 biology for human health. Life Sci Soc Policy 10(2):1–18
Du L (2011) Ethical issues and biosafety goals of synthetic biology explained. Academic division of 
China association of science and technology. Ethical issues of synthetic biology and biosafety. 
China Science and Technology Press, Beijing, pp 26–28
EASAC (2010) Realising European potential in synthetic biology: scientific opportunities and 
good governance. German Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, Halle
EC (2010) Special Eurobarometer 340: science and technology. European Commission, Brussels
EC (2013) Options for strengthening responsible research and innovation. Report of the Expert 
Group on the state of art in Europe on responsible research and innovation. European 
Commission, Brussels
EGE (2009) Ethics of synthetic biology. Opinion no. 25. European Group on Ethics, European 
Commission, Brussels
ERASynBio (2014) Next steps for European synthetic biology: a strategic vision from 
ERASynBio. European research area network for the development and coordination of 
 synthetic biology in Europe
ETC Group (2007) Extreme genetic engineering: an introduction to synthetic biology. ETC 
Group, Ottawa
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
162 V. Rerimassie et al.
FOE, Cta, ETC Group (2012) The principles for the oversight of synthetic biology. Friends of the 
Earth, Washington, DC
Gaisser S, Reiss T, Lunkes A et al (2009) Making the most of synthetic biology: strategies for 
synthetic biology development in Europe. EMBO Rep 10(Suppl 1):S5–S8
IAP (2014a) IAP Statement on realising global potential in synthetic biology: scientific opportu-
nities and good governance. Global Network of Science Academies, Trieste
IAP (2014b) Academies. http://www.interacademies.net/Academies.aspx. Accessed 2 June 2014
IRGC (2010) Guidelines for the appropriate risk governance of synthetic biology. International 
Risk Governance Council, Geneva
Link H (2011) In-depth analysis of outstanding philosophical issues in: SYNTH-ETHICS Report 
WP1: identification of ethical issues and analysis of public discourse, pp 40–49
MOST (2011) 12th five-year plan for biotechnological development. Ministry of Science and 
Technology of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing
NEST (2005) Synthetic biology: applying engineering to biology. Report of a NEST high-level 
Expert Group. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg
OECD, Royal Society (2010) Symposium on opportunities and challenges in the emerging field 
of synthetic biology. OECD and the Royal Society, London
Pei L, Schmidt M, Wei W (2011) Synthetic biology: an emerging research field in China. 
Biotechnol Adv 29(6–3):804–814. doi:10.1016/j.biotechadv.2011.06.008
RAE (2009) Synthetic biology: scope, applications and implications. Royal Academy of 
Engineering, London
Rerimassie VG, Stemerding D (2014) SynBio politics: bringing synthetic biology into debate. 
Rathenau Instituut, The Hague
Roco M (2008) Possibilities for global governance of emerging technologies. J Nanopart Res 
10:11–29
Schmidt M (ed) (2012) Synthetic biology. Industrial and environmental applications, Wiley-
Blackwell, Weinheim, Germany
Srinivas KK (2014) The status of synthetic biology in India. In: Stemerding D, Rerimassie VG, 
Srinivas KR, Zhang W (eds) GEST deliverable 5.2. Ethics debates on synthetic biology in the 
three regions
SSBRN Task Force (2012) Report of the task force on synthetic biology and systems biology 
resource network. Planning Commission, New Delhi
Stemerding D, Rerimassie VG (2013) Discourses on synthetic biology in Europe. Rathenau 
Instituut, The Hague
Stilgoe J (2014) Don’t shut the door on the synthetic biology debate. The Guardian, 8 May. 
http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2014/may/08/dont-shut-the-door-on-
the-synthetic-biology-debate Accessed 2 June 2014
Synenergene (2014) What is Synenergene? http://synenergene.eu/information/what-synenergene 
Accessed 2 June 2014
Tait J (2009) Governing synthetic biology: processes and outcomes. In: Schmidt M, Kelle A, 
Ganguli-Mitra A, De Vriend H (eds) Synthetic biology: the technoscience and its societal 
consequences. Springer, New York, Heidelberg, pp 144–154
ter Meulen V (2014) Time to settle the synthetic controversy. Nature: 509(135). 
doi:10.1038/509135a
TESSY (2008) Documentation of TESSY stakeholder workshop Brussels, 10 June 2008. 
Opportunities for stakeholders. TESSY deliverable D3.2
Torgersen H, Schmidt M (2013) Frames and comparators: how might a debate on synthetic biol-
ogy evolve? Futures 48(100):44–54. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2013.02.002
UNESCO (2006) Universal declaration on bioethics and human rights. UNESCO, Paris
Van Est R, Stemerding D (2012) Making perfect life: European governance challenges in 
21st century bio-engineering. Science and Technology Options Assessment, Brussels
Yang H (2011) Actively promote the development of synthetic biology. Academic division 
of China association of science and technology, Ethical issues of synthetic biology and 
biosafety. China Science and Technology Press, Beijing, pp 18–21
16311 Discourses on Synthetic Biology in Europe, India and China
Zhai X, Renzong Q (2010) Ethics and regulation of synthetic biology. Science Times 2010–7–16 
A3. http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2010/7/234644.shtm. Accessed 12 June 2014
Zhang J, Marris C, Rose N (2011) The transnational governance of synthetic biology:  scientific 
uncertainty, cross-borderness and the ‘art’ of governance. BIOS, London School of Economics 
and Political Science, London
Zhang W (2014) Discourses on synthetic biology in China. In: Stemerding D, Rerimassie VG, 
Srinivas KR, Zhang W (eds) GEST deliverable 5.2. Ethics debates on synthetic biology in the 
three regions
165
Chapter 12
Conclusions: Incorporating Ethics  
into Science and Technology Policy
Sachin Chaturvedi, Yandong Zhao, Miltos Ladikas  
and Dirk Stemerding
© The Author(s) 2015 
M. Ladikas et al. (eds.), Science and Technology Governance and Ethics,  
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-14693-5_12
The rapid developments in science and technology raise many ethical questions 
and regulatory challenges. To address these, we need to understand the impacts of 
such developments and how society should develop frameworks and institutions 
to address them continually. In post-World War II Europe and the USA, many ini-
tiatives have been taken to address ethical issues, including the development of 
institutional frameworks based on ethical guidelines and values, and of appropriate 
international protocols and guidelines. The World Health Organization, the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and other international 
institutions including professional bodies have played an important role in the 
internationalization of ethics in science and technology.
In developed countries, various bodies and independent initiatives carry out 
some form of social-ethical analysis. Often organizations conducting technology 
assessments or advising governments on such assessments perform this function. In 
the USA, the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues undertakes 
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the task when required, and the erstwhile Office of Technology Assessment used 
to include social-ethical analysis in its findings and reports. But the social-ethical 
analysis of technologies received a boost when, as part of human genome research, 
studies on ethical, legal and social issues were funded in the USA and Europe. 
There are many bodies in Europe that can undertake technology assessment and/
or analyse ethical, legal and social issues in new technologies. In China there are 
initiatives in this direction, but not many bodies to undertake such assessment, nor 
is there a single organization with this role. In the case of India, the Technology 
Information, Forecasting and Assessment Council was established with a mandate 
to perform technology assessment, but it has not done much work in that area.
As is clear from the preceding chapters, Global Ethics in Science and 
Technology is a project that seeks to contribute to these assessments and processes 
by developing frameworks that facilitate dialogue and by improving practices that 
bring together policy-makers and stakeholders.
12.1  State of the Art of Debates in the Three Regions
Naturally the three regions have different needs, perspectives and priorities in sci-
ence and technology developments that in turn influence debates on ethics and 
the social impacts of science and technology. Nevertheless, many similarities are 
evident in the roots, processes and even resolutions of some debates. The starting 
point of the comparison undertaken in this book was to look at the roots of atti-
tudes and perspectives in value and belief systems in the three regions.
The value systems display perhaps the most obvious differences between the three 
regions. The Enlightenment-derived values of justice, dignity, freedom, citizen’s 
rights, solidarity and equality in Europe appear rather different from those of pro-
gress, affluence, peace and harmony that we see in China, or those of development, 
self-reliance and scientific temper that are pursued in India. This is perhaps not sur-
prising, as the trajectories of science and technology and historical developments are 
different in each region. But, as we have seen in the cases of India and China, a con-
temporary understanding of ethics is not necessarily attached to traditional belief sys-
tems. Instead, those systems derive their logic from notions of development (mainly 
economic), social progress and social coherence. These appear less contradictory to 
contemporary European values that derive from the common understanding of a new 
humanism than the prescriptions of traditional belief systems deriving from religion. 
There are similarities among regions at the level of applying science and technology.
There are similarities in the official ethics advisory structures of the three 
regions. All three have also established quasi-official institutional ethics advisory 
structures at the level of professional associations, health care practitioners and 
environmental organizations. There is a clear trend in all three regions towards 
the institutionalization of ethics advisory mechanisms within the official decision-
making structures that permeate most national science and technology bodies.
Our comparison of lay morality indicators was drawn mainly from public per-
ception survey data, mainly in China and Europe. We found that the European 
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public appear to have a twofold, and perhaps contradictory, view of science 
and technology—simultaneously positive and extremely cautious—while the 
Chinese public seem more inclined towards a categorically positive view. For 
instance, 89 % of Chinese respondents agree that ‘science and technology make 
our life healthier, easier and more comfortable’, compared to 66 % of Europeans. 
Similarly, on the other side of the spectrum, only 14 % of the Chinese questioned 
agree that ‘scientists are scary because they have the knowledge and capability 
to change the world’, compared to 53 % of Europeans. The limited data that we 
examined in India point in the general direction of a highly positive view of sci-
ence and technology, with some reservations when it comes to developments that 
have created intense public debate, such as genetically modified foods.
In the case of Europe, the strong civil society culture has a direct influence on 
various debates about specific technologies (e.g. genetically modified foods and 
nanotechnologies), whereas far more limited but nevertheless intense civil society 
participation is evident in China and India. The Chinese government’s most recent 
science and technology programme explicitly promotes public participation in 
decision-making, although it is uncertain how this will be realized. In India, civil 
society groups are organized around specific themes (e.g. the genetically modified 
Bt brinjal), with activities focusing on the empowerment of marginalized groups to 
influence policy processes.
The development of participatory technology assessment has also been widely 
dissimilar in the three regions. This approach is well established in Europe as a 
means of bringing about a structured stakeholder debate on science and technol-
ogy. In China, which has an energetic but unstructured civil society sector, par-
ticipatory technology assessment is recognized as a positive development but 
not applied widely yet: the occasional exercises in this form of assessment are 
the result of isolated institutional initiatives. In India there is no evidence of such 
development at either governmental or institutional level.
Based on this comparison, the parameters were identified on which to base an 
analytical methodology that could produce in-depth comparisons between the three 
regions on the discussion and adoption of ethics. The methodology was designed to 
compare debates on values, rights and ideals aiming at engagement in public dis-
courses on regulations, politics and governance. These debates are historic, influ-
enced by cultural norms, and reflective. They focus on the risks and side effects of 
science and technology, but also on goals and problem-solving possibilities, and 
thus address in addition the chances for innovation in socio-economic contexts.
12.2  Mainstreaming Socio-ethical Analysis  
in the Three Regions
Mainstreaming social-ethical analysis in science and technology policy is an 
important objective, and there are many ways of achieving it. This is not so easy, 
however, when social-ethical analysis is considered irrelevant or an impediment 
to policy-making. The dearth of institutions that give priority to mainstreaming or 
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integrate it as part of their mandate constrains mainstreaming. Another important 
issue is that of the values and normative guidelines that should help mainstreaming. 
Often the introduction of universal values and claims that seek to guide institutions 
is resisted, as they are perceived to be impositions from abroad, or the values are 
perceived to be out of context or likely to create conflicts with current practices. 
The challenge lies in addressing these concerns, but this can be done by identifying 
values that are acceptable and during the process of framing ethical issues.
In China and India, the innovation discourse is the dominant discourse, and sci-
ence and technology policies have objectives that are closely linked to national 
development, economic competitiveness, self-reliance and strategic interests. 
Hence the science and technology policy-making process is more influenced and 
directed by actors and agencies that articulate visions embracing such objectives. 
Elsewhere in Asia, in countries where the hands of the developmental state not 
only point the direction but also set the objectives, this has had significant impacts 
on science and technology policy. Thus the experience of India and China indi-
cates that the science and technology policy process has provided little scope for 
other voices and discourses, and social-ethical analysis has not been given the 
importance it deserves. This is changing, however, as evident in India’s Science, 
Technology and Innovation Policy and in the initiatives taken by the Chinese gov-
ernment to assess public opinion and perception, as well as the increase in impor-
tance given to ethical, legal and social issues in science and technology policy.
Mainstreaming social-ethical analysis does not mean that India and China 
should replicate structures and processes that are found in Europe or the USA, 
nor that they should adopt the same policies. Mainstreaming as a process will 
take time to take root and expand. Hence the modalities of mainstreaming have to 
develop, taking into account the science and technology contexts, the relationship 
between science and technology and society, and the diversity in stakeholders in 
either country.
India and China have agencies for technology assessment and significant 
power to undertake social science research involving social-ethical analysis. 
Scientific bodies and scientists’ organizations often express interest in understand-
ing social-ethical implications and in issues of science, technology and society. 
With policy-makers acknowledging the importance of understanding social-ethical 
implications, the modalities of mainstreaming can be developed. Both countries 
need to expand their institutions for technology assessment and to broaden the 
mandate of those institutions to include social-ethical analysis. The use of public 
perception surveys should be expanded in China, and in India such surveys need to 
be undertaken systematically. Science academies, universities and publicly funded 
institutions can act as bridges between policy-makers, those who undertake social-
ethical analysis and those who represent other voices.
Mainstreaming can thus be achieved by giving due weight to modali-
ties, institutionalizing and mutual learning. Such an approach will help develop 
mainstreaming that is contextual and appropriate, and this will contribute to under-
standing convergences and divergences in approaches and the comparative analy-
sis of value systems and ethical principles in the three regions.
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12.3  Food Technologies in the Three Regions
Mainstreaming social-ethical analysis in food technologies is an important task, 
but as social impacts and implications are considered in policy-making and in 
technology assessment, the major task lies in incorporating ethical concerns and 
linking them with the technology assessment and social impact assessment of food 
technologies. As discussed earlier, the idea of ethics varies from region to region, 
depending on each region’s unique value system. China has ample experience in 
this context, as the frequency of such surveys has gone up recently. Both India 
and China have robust systems for assessing gains in productivity and measuring 
economic benefits from technological interventions. These can be used effectively 
to develop the analysis of socio-economic impacts and also to investigate whether 
technological interventions enhance access to better technologies.
Mainstreaming social-ethical analysis in food technologies means going 
beyond a productivity-oriented innovation discourse in assessing technologies and 
incorporating wider concerns and values. For this, the capacity of the current sys-
tem to address these concerns has to be improved. The institutional capacities have 
to be strengthened so that, through dialogue and consultation, the experts, lay pub-
lic and farmers can interact and come to know and understand the positions and 
views of other stakeholders. India and China have a long way to go in this, and can 
learn from Europe, which has rich experience of stakeholder engagement and get-
ting feedback on technology from consumers. At the same time, however, Europe 
can also learn from the strong focus in China and India on societal goals as part of 
science and technology programmes.
Similarly, India and China can jointly assess the technological options and what 
social-ethical aspects need to be studied as a priority to ensure that policy-making 
is sensitive to the different concerns of different stakeholders. Europe can learn 
from the experience of India about how to deal with different technological solu-
tions and how to develop approaches to food technology that go beyond simply 
taking a stance for or against genetically modified foods.
12.4  Nanotechnology in the Three Regions
Our brief survey, as evident from the case studies, reveals that innovation is the 
dominant discourse in all three regions, while the risk discourse does not have the 
same importance. The power and control discourse, which is articulated through 
important actors who are also the promoters of nanotechnology, in conjunction 
with the innovation discourse, sets the baseline for policy-making. While nano-
technology is an emerging technology with universal appeal and application, the 
capacity of countries to invest in and apply it is not uniform. A social-ethical anal-
ysis of nanotechnology needs to be mainstreamed, and would not be the antithesis 
of innovation discourse. If this is understood clearly, then it will be easy to evolve 
policies to mainstream.
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In the case of nanotechnology, modalities to mainstream range from institution-
alizing structures supporting research into ethical, legal and social implications 
to integrating socio-ethical assessment into decision-making. But when innova-
tion discourse dominates the policy discourse and regulatory issues are neglected, 
mainstreaming has to begin with the task of advocacy and arguing for socio-ethical 
analysis, to gain space for such thinking in policy-making. Dialogue with policy-
makers and scientists, and creating an understanding that mainstreaming socio-
ethical analysis will not hinder innovation or the funding of nanotechnology, can 
be used as the first two steps in convincing the policy-makers and other actors 
about the need for mainstreaming. Simultaneously it is important to contextualize 
mainstreaming on the basis of relevant issues and concrete objectives. For  example, 
environmental, health and safety issues can be emphasized in relation to the need 
to avert disasters like the Bhopal gas tragedy, while the safety of products can be 
stressed as a precondition for winning consumer acceptance.
12.5  Synthetic Biology in the Three Regions
The innovation discourse in synthetic biology capitalizes on the potential of this 
field and emphasizes the new avenues that it opens up. In Europe this discourse inte-
grates synthetic biology with the knowledge-based bioeconomy perspective, which 
envisages a greater role for biotechnology and synthetic biology in the transition to 
a bioeconomy. In contrast, the innovation discourses in India and China do not give 
emphasis to the idea of bioeconomy and perceive synthetic biology more as a con-
tinuation of the biotechnology and genetic engineering paradigm. In China the inno-
vation discourse highlights opportunities for China to leapfrog its competitors using 
synthetic biology and considers this a great frontier of modern biotechnology. While 
the risk discourse in China underscores the case for cautious optimism, there is also 
a perception that considering ethical issues and risk dimension at an early stage hin-
ders progress. In India, while the innovation discourse is dominant, concerns about 
societal issues and risks are also expressed. In the case of India, the task force report 
takes a comprehensive approach to synthetic biology, recognizing its potential. At 
the same time it draws attention to regulatory, ethical and social issues, pointing out 
that these have to be addressed, and also gives prominence to public engagement.
In Europe the discourses on synthetic biology have gone beyond innovation and 
given weight to risk aspects too, particularly the issue of dual use. Moreover, studies 
on ethical, legal and social issues in synthetic biology have contributed to policy-
making in this field. Thus Europe has a better understanding of and road map for 
synthetic biology, and the innovation discourse is tempered by risk discourse and 
social-ethical concerns. This has influenced the policy-making process too. In India 
and China, the risk dimension is underplayed or considered a technical issue, while 
in Europe it is assessed differently, focusing on regulation, biosafety and stakeholder 
involvement in decision-making. While public engagement is virtually absent from 
the discourses in India and China, it is given enough importance in Europe.
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But as synthetic biology is in its nascent stages in India and China, and is yet to 
get major support from governments, we can expect more vigorous debate and dis-
cussion in future. At the same time, because these countries have not paid any atten-
tion to ethical, legal and social issues so far, while Europe has given them some 
weight, discourses on social-ethical analysis may not evolve rapidly. Since industry 
and scientists are aware of issues in biosafety and risk, which are becoming increas-
ingly important to research and development, it is likely that even if civil society is 
not active in this area, industry and scientists will press for greater biosafety and more 
comprehensive regulation and harmonization with global standards and practices.
Mainstreaming therefore has to be done taking into account the contexts and 
issues. For this it is better to start with technology assessment mechanisms. Since 
some scientists are concerned about biosafety and regulation, persuading them 
that, while these are important, there is also a need for the broader perspective that 
social-ethical analysis can provide will enable more support for mainstreaming. 
Because synthetic biology is more complex than biotechnology or genetic engi-
neering, it would be useful to form interdisciplinary groups of scientists to address 
issues, and more interaction with stakeholders would help create awareness and 
open up spaces for dialogue and debate. National academies of sciences and pro-
fessional bodies can play an important role in this.
Another important issue is that of assessing lay perceptions and values, and 
the public’s understanding of synthetic biology. China has carried out many sur-
veys on public perceptions of science and technology, but India has yet to begin. 
Mutual learning between India and China in addressing social-ethical issues is 
desirable. As both countries are in the initial stages of development in synthetic 
biology, now is the time to initiate these efforts. For example, India and China can 
develop models for public engagement, identify key issues in biosafety that are of 
interest to both countries and consider joint programmes for developing biosafety 
regimes and regulating synthetic biology. As both countries have to take positions 
at global level on dual use and on the linkages between synthetic biology and the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity in addressing issues of global gov-
ernance, the scope for joint work on these issues is immense. This work can also 
be used in social-ethical analysis. Hence India and China can explore options for 
greater collaboration and mutual learning in synthetic biology.
12.6  Conclusion
Mainstreaming ethics in science and technology policy-making is a major chal-
lenge that needs to be addressed flexibly. Given the diverse contexts, and the influ-
ence of various discourses in policy-making and the normative values embedded in 
them, it is not possible to suggest a one-size-fits-all approach or solutions based on 
that. The innovation discourse on science and technology for development is domi-
nant in China and India, while in Europe the institutional mechanisms are in place 
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to consider stakeholder views and introduce ethical values into technology assess-
ment exercises. Mainstreaming can be achieved in many ways, and the outcomes 
need not converge but can result in divergences that are relevant and suitable to the 
given national context. Besides the suggestions made in the various case studies, 
the project has found that a number of specific steps would be necessary to make 
mainstreaming more acceptable and relevant in the three regions.
•	 Establish common global deliberation platforms on the social determinants of 
science and technology
Global Ethics in Science and Technology has been the start of such a deliberation 
platform. Establishing a permanent forum that includes all major global science 
and technology players will provide space for global deliberation. This will need 
a specific programme with wide membership and equitable financial contributions 
to set up a regular platform for discussion and to initiate research programmes on 
specific global challenges in science and technology.
•	 Initiate capacity-building programmes for common structures on ethics policy 
advisory
Our review has shown that proper ethics institutionalization requires official 
structures to analyse relevant issues and accordingly advise policy-makers on the 
options available for action. Technology assessment has taken up this role in most 
European countries, while participatory technology assessment has specialised in 
drawing in divergent stakeholders and engaging the public in the process of issue 
analysis. Such an institutional function and setting would be welcome in China 
and India. There is scope to initiate capacity-building programmes on (participa-
tory) technology assessment methodologies in order to allow similar initiatives to 
take hold in the particular context of India and China.
•	 Promote the development of common social impact indicators for science and 
technology
Impact assessment is important in establishing socio-ethical analysis in any region. 
Impact indicators are a complex but necessary step in such assessment. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has already started by 
bringing together an expert group to work on improving the current set of indi-
cators. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and 
other relevant United Nations organizations can contribute. In this context, devel-
oping such indicators for emerging technologies is very important, and will be rel-
evant for studies on responsible research and innovation.
•	 Develop comparative systematic public perceptions databases
Public perception surveys on science and technology in general or on specific 
technologies are important sources of feedback and information. Unfortunately, 
such surveys are not widely used, which hampers the possibility of direct compari-
sons between countries and cultures. Directly comparable public perceptions data 
will be needed if a common understanding is to be reached and a common analysis 
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pursued. This can be done with the establishment of an expert group to devise a 
common survey to capture the diversity of values and local perceptions of risk and 
benefit.
•	 Promote common templates of public engagement
This is a serious challenge in all three regions. Europe has a clear tradition of pub-
lic engagement, while India and China are willing to develop structures to promote 
it locally. It would be desirable to develop common templates and structures of 
public engagement in order to allow for direct comparisons where possible. With 
respect to national traditions in public discussion and decision making, it would be 
possible to develop common programmes of engagement through established par-
ticipatory technology assessment methodologies.
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